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
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
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THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
AND NATO MARITIME STRATEGY:
THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE
FORWARD DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

VOLUME THREE

2

FINAL SUMMARY REPORT

10 July 1985

THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
AND NATO MARITIME STRATEGY:
THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE
FORWARD DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

VOLUME THREE

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| Horizontal Escalation | NATO Northern Flank | SLOCs | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | NATO Southern Flank | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>Until recently NATO planning focused on the balance of air-land forces on the Central Front. It was assumed that NATO maritime forces would be used almost exclusively to defend transatlantic SLOCs and protect the flanks. Navies have received more attention of late, for although sea power alone cannot win a war in Europe, a war cannot be won without it.</p> <p>It is now recognized that naval forces can: strengthen deterrence at all levels (not only strategic); project power to stabilize non-NATO areas vital to the</p> | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

VOLUME THREE

THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
AND NATO MARITIME STRATEGY:
THE FUTURE ROLE OF NAVAL FORCES IN THE
FORWARD DEFENSE OF WESTERN EUROPE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| NATO's Northern Flank General H. F. Zeiner Gundersen Norwegian Army (Ret.) | 282 |
| NATO's Southern Flank and Mediterranean Security Dr. Sergio A. Rossi | 325 |
| French Naval Forces and the Maritime Strategy Admiral Marcel Duval | 376 |
| Soviet Naval Forces and Theater Strategy: Implications for Naval Planning Dr. Donald C. Daniel Ms. Gael D. Tarleton | 422 |
| The Soviet Envelopment Option in a NATO Contingency: Implications for Alliance Strategy Dr. Milan Vego | 453 |

NATO'S NORTHERN FLANK

by

General H. F. Zeiner Gundersen
Norwegian Army (Ret.)

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Introduction

The main crux of NATO's whole existence could be summed up in the word deterrence, or preventing war. One cannot, however, deter unless a possible aggressor knows that one will and can defend successfully. If he is convinced of that, then and only then does one deter. This goes for NATO as a whole, and it goes for its Northern Flank. In other words, credible deterrence and credible defense are two sides of one coin. The NATO-countries have furthermore pledged themselves never to attack but always to defend if attacked.

A potential aggressor, therefore, will have to evaluate existing political will, military potentials, limitations and vulnerabilities as seen from the point of view of his possible intentions. Only then will he have a picture of our real deterrence (or defense) value. This also goes for NATO as a whole and it goes for its Northern Flank. Deterrence is closely related to a second key word, interdependability. There seems to be two facets to this, the interdependability between countries and areas within the NATO-area and the interdependability of NATO (or parts thereof) with the "outside world."

Let us look at the NATO area (as defined in paragraph 6 of the Treaty). This area falls in five major parts, namely North America, the Atlantic Ocean with its islands and three European mainland areas of the North, the Center and the South. These five areas are interdependent, politically and strategically. What happens in one area is of concern to the others. The topography of the European areas is very different, as is their defense build-up. The practical application of, for instance, the present strategic key-phrase of "forward defense" may therefore vary somewhat. Such variations have impact on other areas. What happens in the area of the Atlantic will obviously both influence the land areas in general and be influenced by for instance what happens on the Northern Flank. Similarly, what happens in the North will influence the Center and vice-versa. We must also keep in mind the dimension outside the NATO-area. Neither NATO nor its 16 countries live in a vacuum. NATO as a whole and its different parts are influenced from outside and influence that outside, regarding both objective facts and perceptions of those facts in the public mind. Although this need not imply political or military action outside the area, it is sensible to consider the area outside prior to one's decisions. It may also mean planning for contingencies in both peace and war situations.

I. THE NORTHERN FLANK

What, then, is the Northern Flank?

It is easy and comfortable to define NATO's Northern Flank as ACE's Northern Command, the area of which includes Denmark, Norway, Germany roughly North of the Elbe river as well as the coastal waters of these countries and the airspace above them. Formally speaking such a definition in a way is correct. Yet, it seems too limited, particularly when one remembers the interdependability of NATO's five geographic areas. The Norwegian Sea, for instance, although formally outside of ACE's Northern Command really seems part of NATO's Northern Flank. (Some may in this connection remember the old discussions on whether or not Norway should be part of SACEUR's or SACLANT's Command areas. That discussion was settled years ago. Norway is firmly committed to remain with SACEUR). This paper, therefore, is not limited solely to the "Northern Command area." Instead, it will consider as NATO's Northern Flank that part of NATO's total land area and waters, bordering in the north on the Icebarrier in the Polar basin; in the Northeast on the Soviet Union's land area and home waters of the Barents Sea; in the east, the two neutral countries of Sweden and Finland as well as part of East Germany; in the west, Greenland seems a natural border; and to the south, the GIUK gap and a line roughly from the northern tip of Scotland to the Elbe river and from there due east.

Geographic, Hydrographic
and Topographic Facts

This flank area is vast, and the weather conditions are by and large adverse, admittedly in different ways. For the sake of simplicity it will be described under three major headings: sea areas; straits and passages; and land areas.

The sea areas include:

- The Barents Sea, not really part of the Northern Flank area but considered as Soviet home waters by their Northern Fleet (possibly also by NATO-countries) is the neighbor to the northeast. It has depths of about 150-250 fathoms, mostly covered by ice in the winter. East of the Norwegian border there are about 80 nautical miles (NM) of all year round open coastal waters along the Kola peninsula. The Barents Sea is rather stormy and cold.
- The Norwegian Sea is limited to the West by a line running roughly from Iceland to Spitsbergen, to the East by the Barents Sea and the coast of Norway. There are depths down to about 2000 fathoms in the basin, but only about 250 fathoms to the east (Barents Sea), and to the South (Iceland-UK gap) about 300. The distances from the southern tip of Iceland to Spitsbergen and the North Cape are about 850 NM and 800 NM, respectively. The distance from Bergen in the west of Norway to Iceland is about 500 NM. Very rough weather prevails in winter time. South of the Icebarrier at about 74-75° north, it is entirely free of ice all year. All ports on the Norwegian coast are free of ice throughout the year.
- The Greenland Sea is bordered on the west by Greenland, on the east by the Norwegian Sea. Depths go down to about 2000 fathoms in the main basin, but in the south (Denmark Straits) only about 150-200 fathoms. All in all the area covers about 850-800 NM north to south and 30° west to east. The weather is cold and rough, and the whole sea may be covered by ice during wintertime.

- The North Sea between Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom is shallow, with depths roughly from 10-15 down to 50-60 fathoms. Along the Norwegian Coast, though, depths are down to 200-300 fathoms (the Norwegian Ditch). Distances are about 350 NM north to south and somewhat less from west to east. In wintertime, the weather is rough, but in summertime it is mild. The whole area is free of ice throughout the year.
- The Norwegian Sea is without question the central area. It is also well suited for all types of naval operations throughout the year. The other sea areas appear to be limited in one way or another.

The Straits and Passages

- The Norway Sea-Ice passage, between Norway and the Icebarrier. Here, the depths come to about 150-250 fathoms. In summertime it is generally free of ice up to Spitsbergen (450 NM); in wintertime the passage may narrow to about 200 NM wide, varying with the years. Weather is roughly the same as in the Barents Sea.
- The Denmark Straits between Greenland and Iceland, has somewhat varying depths, ranging around 200 fathoms. About 150 NM wide, it has rough weather, and is covered by ice in the winter. There is also danger of icebergs in summer.
- The GIUK gap really includes the already mentioned Denmark Straits. Depth of passage between Iceland and the Faroe Islands varies from about 130 to 300 fathoms between the Faroes and the United Kingdom, down to 600 fathoms. The distance from Iceland to the Faroes is about 200 NM, from the Faroes to the United Kingdom about 180 NM. Weather may be rough, but there are no ice problems.
- The Channel area. This sector is not really a part of the Northern Flank area, but ships could enter or exit the North Sea through the Channel.
- The Baltic Exits (or entrances) consist of the sound between Denmark and Sweden (i.e., NATO and a neutral country), and the belts between the Danish Islands. They are all narrow and have depths down to only a few (5-15) fathoms. At times these are icebound in winter (especially the belts). There are peacetime restrictions on numbers of naval ships to pass per day from any one nation.

Submarines always have to pass surfaced. The length of the sound and belts is about 60 NM. No major weather difficulties exist.

- The three most important passages seem, for different reasons, to be the Norway Sea-Ice passage, the GIUK gap and the Baltic exits (entrances). Their importance will vary depending on who wants to use them and for what purposes.

The Northern flank includes six major land areas:

- Denmark and the Northern part of Germany really comprise, when seen from the military point of view, one area with common topographic characteristics, such as rolling agricultural land with the highest points about 500 feet above sea level. It is industrialized, with a fair and easy climate. Denmark measures about 17,000 square miles, and Northern Germany (north of the Elbe river) about 4-5,000 square miles. Both Denmark and Northern Germany have good and sizeable harbors. Important to notice is the Kiel Canal, which runs from Kiel to the mouth of the Elbe river, allowing for transfer of shipping from the Baltic to the North Sea (and vice-versa), thus circumventing the Baltic exits (entrances).
- South Norway, i.e., Norway up to about 100 miles north of Trondheim, is mountainous (up to 8,000 feet above sea level), and has a rugged coastline with any number of small islands along it. In between these islands, protruded by them, big ships may and do travel. There are many harbors. This area measures about 81,000 square miles, and has a population of 3.5 million. It is industrialized, without much agriculture, and has a temperate climate, with no ice problems along the coast.
- North Norway, i.e., Norway north of the area described above, is very mountainous, having a rugged coastline with many small islands up to the North Cape. Traffic conditions along the coast are the same as for south Norway. This zone measures about 43,000 square miles and maintains a population of about 400-500,000. Industrialized in many places, North Norway is a center for fishing and fishing industries, without much agriculture. The overwhelming part of the population lives along the coast.

- These three land areas coincide roughly with the three principal command areas in ACE's Northern Command, but there are really three more land areas to consider. First, the Spitsbergen archipelago, which includes about 24,000 square miles, and a population of about 3,000 (Norwegian and Russian settlements). The principal industry is coal mining. Constitutionally, it is part of Norway and activity is regulated by the Paris Treaty of 1920, which demilitarized the archipelago. It is cold and windswept, and has a coastline that is usually, but not always, wholly covered by ice in the winter season.
- Iceland is lava-strewn, fjord-scalloped, and mountainous, with volcanoes and hot springs. Harbors never freeze. It has about 40,000 square miles, and a population of 0.2 million. The climate is temperate but stormy. Fishing and trade exists, but not much agriculture.
- The Faroes, a group of islands, contain about 540 square miles and a population of 44,000. (Constitutionally, they are a part of Denmark.) The climate is temperate but stormy, the terrain mountainous (up to nearly 5,000 feet) with steep coastlines. Fishing, agriculture and industry are pursued, but there is only one major harbor (Thorshavn).

Altogether these six land areas really surround the Norwegian Sea and its subsidiary the North Sea. Except for the Spitsbergen archipelago and, at times, parts of the Baltic exits (entrances), their coasts are free of ice all year around. This is quite unique for such latitudes (north of 55°N).

Neutral, Neighboring Countries

The point has been made earlier on the interdependency of NATO and its countries with territories outside the area. In the north this really means the neutral, neighboring countries of Finland and Sweden.

- a) Norway possesses some capability for defense against invasion and reconnaissance of high sea areas.
- b) Denmark possesses some capability for defense against invasion.
- c) Iceland has no armed forces of its own, but contributes the naval/air base at Keflavik which may, subject to U.S.-Icelandic treaty provisions, be used for staging through operations and flying in reinforcements.
- d) The composition of the navy and air force of the German Federal Republic shows extensive capability for high sea operations and reconnaissance in the Baltic and the North Sea, if not further out.
- e) The composition of the British Royal Navy and Air Force shows quite considerable capabilities both for high sea operations and for antiinvasion purposes, although it could not achieve superiority in the Norwegian Sea-North Sea complex, not even in combination with the Northern Flank countries.

Neutral Countries
on the Northern Flank

Finland

The Finnish forces are limited in size and composition by the Peace Treaty signed after the Second World War. The biggest ships in the Navy are two corvettes. There are no submarines and what other vessels there are are mainly fast rocket and gunboats, patrolcraft and mine layers/mine sweepers as well as a number of landing craft. The navy maintains bases on the Gulf of Finland. The air force is composed of aircraft manufactured in eastern, western, and neutral countries. It is small, with a total of 42 fighting aircraft. The composition of the navy and air force indicates a limited capability for defense against invasion and really no capability for offensive operations.

4 submarines (attack) and about 88 smaller warships. Poland also has a total of 42 amphibious (landing) ships of varying sizes, 15 of which are attack craft.

The air arm of the Baltic Fleet seems to have as its main component about 40 maritime attack aircraft of the "Backfire" type. In addition, the Leningrad air defense area, to which the major bases of the Baltic Fleet belong, has about 500 aircraft, including 130 ground attack aircraft (i.e., MIG-27 Flogger), 60 attack helicopters and 100 transport helicopters. The Baltic Fleet also could be reinforced by the transfer of aircraft from other parts of the Soviet Union, as well as from Poland and East Germany. The Leningrad base area is, of course, not constrained. It includes Kronstadt, Paldiski, Lepaia, Klapeida, and Riga, in addition to East German ports, such as Peenemunde and Sassnitz, and Polish ports, such as Gdynia and Ustka. The composition of the Baltic Fleet (to which should be added the Polish and East German navies) indicates:

- Considerable capability for high sea operations outside of the Baltic.
- Extensive capability for amphibious operations against NATO or neutral countries.

The quality of ships and crews would probably be equivalent to that of the Northern Fleet. There is no need to detail here the capabilities of European NATO navies and air forces on the Northern Flank, but merely to summarize as follows:

The Soviet Baltic Fleet
Bases and Air Support

This Fleet consists of:

- 6 submarines of about 2,300 tons with ballistic rockets
- 5 submarines of about 1,200-2,300 tons with cruise missiles
- 25 attack submarines of from 1,000-2,000 tons
- 3 cruisers of from 8,000-18,000 tons
- 10 destroyers of from 2,000-8,500 tons
- 30 frigates of from 800-3,600 tons
- 281 smaller warships, such as minelayers, mine sweepers, and motor torpedo boats, etc.
- 53 amphibious (landing) ships of varying sizes

This fleet contains the following percentages of the total Soviet naval ships:

7% of the submarines with ballistic missiles
7% of the submarines with cruise missiles
12% of the attack submarines
8% of the cruisers
28% of the amphibious craft

It is striking how the composition of this fleet varies from the Northern Fleet, most notably in the big numbers of landing craft and smaller ships compared to the bigger types. The East German and Polish navies must to all intents and purposes be considered as part of the Baltic Fleet. By and large these are coastal (small-ship) navies. East Germany (DDR) has 2 frigates and 123 smaller warships, in addition to some 12 landing ships (tanks) as well as supply and lighter transport ships. Poland has 1 destroyer,

2 out of a total of 3 aircraft carriers
30% of the cruisers
7% of the amphibious craft

The amphibious craft in the Northern Fleet are able to transport one marine infantry brigade at a time. The air arm of the Northern Fleet consists of a total of 380 aircraft, among with are:

100 helicopters
40 transport aircraft
TU-95 Bear reconnaissance aircraft
TU-16 Badger attack aircraft

In addition, the Archangelsk air defense area has 340 fighter aircraft, of which half are all weather fighters. It should also be remembered that if need be there would be no difficulty drawing on aircraft from other parts of the Soviet Union.

The Kola Base area stretches east from Pehenga. It includes Severomorsk, Motovsky Bay, Polyarny, Germithka and Archangelsk. The base area, therefore, is fairly constrained, considering the size of the fleet. In the Kola Peninsula, there are 16 to 17 sizable airfields, capable of receiving reinforcements. The Northern Fleet, moreover, contains extensive capabilities for high sea operations. Only a small part of it (e.g., landing- crafts) is limited to use in the Far North. The quality of ships and crews seems to be average.

have difficulties getting out into the Atlantic. The Northern and Baltic Fleets, however, could first operate in the Northern Flank areas, the Norwegian Sea, the North Sea and the Greenland Sea. They could then, if deemed necessary, continue out into the Atlantic.

The Military Forces (Naval/Air)

With bases and air support, the Soviet Northern Fleet consists of:

- 45 submarines of the 20-30,000 tons size and varying radii of action, with ballistic rockets of varying size and range
- 36 submarines of 1,200-15,000 tons and varying radii of action, with cruise missiles of varying type and range
- 92 attack-submarines from 1,000-4,800 tons
- 2 aircraft carriers (KIEV class) of 37,000 tons, each with 14 Forger VT04 aircraft and 16 Hormone helicopters
- 11 cruisers of from 6,000-25,000 tons
- 19 destroyers of from 3,100-8,500 tons
- 47 frigates of from 800-3,600 tons
- 15 smaller warships, such as minelayers, minesweepers and motor torpedo boats
- 13 amphibious (landing) ships

This impressive fleet contains the following percentages of total Soviet naval ships:

- 55% of the submarines with ballistic missiles
- 55% of the submarines with cruise missiles
- 45% of the attack-submarines

to be found. This area has, however, some critical weaknesses, such as its dependence on raw materials imports for its industries, on foreign supplies for civilian and military use, as well as on reinforcements from overseas if ever there is a war. If the Central area does not receive external help, it will be strangled. It would only be a question of time, then, of how long it could keep going. The only way to make certain such strangulation does not take place is in the first place to keep the seaward lines of communications open. But it also means pursuing a general policy which allows for the stream of raw materials to continue flowing to Europe from foreign sources. If ever there is a conflict, NATO therefore must be master of the Atlantic.

There is a familiar debate as to whether the Soviet Navy, in the main built up from 1960 onwards, is mainly for offensive purposes or for defensive purposes, to establish a "cordon sanitaire" at sea. The overall composition of their fleets, however, seems to indicate a mix of purposes. This composition is most reasonably the result of an analysis of NATO strengths and weaknesses, including our dependence on seelines of communications. Their aim appears to be two-fold: protecting their own strike capabilities at sea and offensive use against our sea lines of communications. Only two of their fleets are of concern to the North and the Center, namely the Northern and Baltic Fleets. The Far East Fleet obviously has other tasks and the Black Sea Fleet will

Voters in most of these countries are split roughly half and half between conservatives and social-democrats. The main issues of disagreement are found in the economic field. On foreign and security policy there is some but not much disagreement between parties in any one country. Finland wants no major changes and nothing to happen that might upset the eastern neighbor. Sweden wants to retain the neutrality and a strong defense to safeguard it. Norway, being solidly for NATO, wants a solid defense but realizes it is dependent upon reinforcements from abroad. It also wants no major changes in the Northern balance. Denmark holds views similar to Norway, but in some quarters seems not so convinced of the need for strong defensive forces. Iceland, aware of its unique strategic position, does not want its own defense but will politically guard against any attempt at infringing upon its sovereignty.

II. MILITARY FACTS AND EVALUATIONS

A. General Reflections and Overall Strategic Considerations

Of the three different NATO areas in Europe (North, Center and South) the Central area is -- for NATO as a whole -- the most important. That is where the bulk of the European population lives and where the major European industrial potential is located. It is also where the bulk of today's European technological capacity and knowledge is

It seems unlikely that the northern countries themselves would voluntarily rock this balance. Such rocking (and reroxing) could therefore take place, consciously or unconsciously, from the East or from the West, because of the overall strategic importance of the Northern Flank area and also of its sensitivity. Any rocking/reroxing would concern all the northern countries and could similarly affect them all. In this connection, there seems to be little sense deliberating over what might be considered rocking this balance. This varies with the time and circumstances -- as well as in the eyes of the beholder. Yet, the existence of such a balance does, in principle, put limitations on the freedom of action of all concerned. But all powers and countries today somehow have limitations to their freedom of action.

Internal Political Considerations

It is a strong characteristic of the northern populations, irrespective of country, that they (like many countries) are very concerned lest anyone should infringe upon their independence and integrity. They do not like to be told what is good for them. Doing that turns out to be counterproductive. They will decide themselves what they think constitutes "telling them." At the same time they have a firm belief in freedom of speech and democracy, which are safeguarded well in their constitutions.

which consultations may be asked for if one or the other feels threatened by Germany or any country allied with her. Instead of a formal Northern Bloc, there emerged what may be rightly described as an informal "Northern balance." This "balance" should be considered in view of the fact that the whole northern area is some kind of a border area between East and West. As with any balance, this one remains at rest only as long as nobody rocks it. Any rocking in one place would most probably result in a similar rocking in another place by somebody else, in order to restore the balance. The components of this balance are as follows:

- Finland in the east is in a special position as a close neighbor of the Soviet Union. It seems somehow bound to be on good terms with the Soviet Union; partly as Finland has fought her for centuries without much success really, although many times the Finns won. Another reason is the already mentioned bilateral treaty. Finland also has limitations as to size and composition of its armed forces, enforced by the Peace Treaty after the Second World War.
- Sweden, a neutral country, keeping strictly to its traditional neutrality and having fairly strong military forces, seems determined not to make things difficult for Finland.
- Denmark and Norway, both members of NATO, with their own military forces integrated in the NATO command structure. Both have decided on special conditions in that there will be no foreign bases in the countries and no nuclear arms stored there -- in peacetime. Norway does not allow docking of non-Norwegian warships and landing of non-Norwegian military aircraft east of 24°E (except upon special permission).
- Iceland, a member of NATO, with no armed forces of its own but with a U.S. airbase (Keflavik) on Icelandic territory.

to Paasikivi of Finland before the Finnish-Russian war of 1939-1940: Nobody can change the geographic location of his country.

External Political
Considerations

While the postwar economic reconstruction of the northern countries took place, the political climate between East and West grew steadily colder. Given the strategic importance of the area, the northern countries were at a crossroads. It was first attempted to create a northern defense bloc. Considering Finland's situation after the war and Iceland's geographic location far out in the ocean, it was obvious such a bloc could only consist of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Negotiations took place, but it soon became apparent there was no common ground. Denmark and Norway wanted such a bloc to "lean" on the West, Sweden wanted it entirely neutral. Since Sweden at that time had a defense industry, and Denmark and Norway did not, Sweden would have to provide the weapons. But at that time Denmark and Norway were really not in too good an economic position. The Northern Bloc alternative aborted.

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and NATO formed, and Denmark, Iceland and Norway became members, while Sweden remained neutral. One of the reasons for this neutrality would seem to be concern for Finland. That country has also remained neutral but had in 1948 signed a Treaty with the Soviet Union (renewed in 1970) according to

Experiences were therefore very different in the Second World War. This led to different evaluations and views on the future. What had not been changed by the war were the internordic relations. They were based partly on the strong cultural ties developed throughout history and partly on a feeling that small nations have to stand together. In other words, past and recent history brought some kind of ambivalence in outlook both between and within countries.

It was probably because it did not seem strategically important in the larger context and to the powers of the day that the northern area was left peaceful for such a long time in history. With means of communication limited, it was a bit out of the way. But, the Second World War brought a change in this. The Murmansk convoys -- and the attacks on them -- gave clear and convincing proof of the overall strategic importance of the northern area. Admittedly that importance was of a different character from what it may be in a future war (if there is one).

The message of the Second World War was clear. The north was not any more to be left a quiet and almost forgotten area. It had been important and with better technology its strategic importance could not but increase. This was quite clear to the decision makers but it really meant a revolution in outlook for the populations. The key to somehow having to accept its consequences lay in that simple sentence, which Stalin said

alone and wanting to be left alone by the rest of the world. It could be said that this created inherent and hereditary attitudes that today are somewhat unrealistic, both within the northern population and in other European countries, i.e., in relation to the whole northern area.

The peacefulness of the region was dramatically changed with the watershed of the Second World War. Fate became very different for the five countries. Denmark was invaded, did not really fight and was occupied. The King and Government remained in the country. When the war was finished, Denmark had the same territory as before, except for Iceland, but was economically in a difficult situation. Finland fought the Soviet Union, being invaded and then invading in return. There were heavy losses. Territory was lost to the Soviet Union due to Finland's defeat. The country was in dire economic straits in 1945. Iceland, in union with Denmark, was not really invaded but was used, by the Allies, as a base from 1942. Iceland became an independent country in 1944, while Denmark was still occupied. Norway was invaded, fought and was occupied. King and Government left the country to continue the war -- on the Allied side -- with their forces. The country was impoverished after the war, but lost no territory. Sweden remained neutral. Sizable military forces were created, the war favored the Swedish economy as Swedish goods were in demand by both sides. Economically Sweden emerged from the war as a strong country with a quite considerable defense industry.

ago. Their religion is the same (Lutheran Protestant). Their ideals of integrity, liberty and freedom are the same. Throughout history, they have for long periods shared rulers and government.

The two other northern countries, Finland and Sweden, are neutral. They were in union under the same ruler for hundreds of years, until Finland in 1809 was lost to the Russian Empire. The two countries still have strong cultural ties. Their languages are very different and cannot be understood by the other nation. But one does, as already noted, find minorities of the other language in both countries. As in the other three northern countries, the religion -- Lutheran -- is the same in Finland and Sweden. They also share much the same ideals.

Of these five northern countries, two (Finland and Iceland) are republics, the other three hereditary kingdoms. Historically speaking, Denmark and Norway shared rulers from 1387-1814, Norway and Sweden from 1814-1905. The Danes, Norwegians and Swedes have no difficulties understanding each other's language. In view of the foregoing facts, it is no surprise that there is a strong feeling of cohesion and interdependence among the northern populations. Up through the 18th and 19th century, as well as during the first 40 years of this century, the whole northern area was really somewhat out of the way from the rest of Europe. With the exception of the years 1710-1720 and 1801-1814, it was a quiet and peaceful area, rather left

- Finland stretches right up to about 70°N from the Gulf of Finland, and borders on Sweden, Norway, the Soviet Union and the Gulf of Bothnia. It includes about 130,000 square miles and a population of nearly 5 million, of which 7.5 percent claim Swedish as their mother tongue, the rest Finnish. It is a country covered by forests, but also with a labyrinth of rivers and lakes (about 5,000). Industrialized, its main product is pulp and other wood derivations. The climate is temperate, but there are ice problems along the coast in wintertime. Somewhat colder than the Scandinavian Peninsula, the summers nevertheless are comparatively warm. The border with the Soviet Union is very long, but has no natural distinguishing characteristics. Good road-net also exists in the northern parts between Norway, Sweden and the Soviet Union, where terrain is hilly but not really mountainous.
- Sweden stretches from about 56°N to about 69°N, between Norway and the North Sea (including the Sound) in the west and the Baltic Sea-Gulf of Bothnia in the east. Bordering on Finland and Norway, it has about 174,000 square miles and a population of about 8 million, including a Finnish speaking minority in the north. (Swedish is very close to Danish and Norwegian.) Extensive forests cover two-thirds of the expanse. The terrain is fertile, flat agricultural land in the south, and hilly and mountainous with many rivers (running west to east) further north. There is a rich mining industry (iron ore and copper), and Sweden ranks as an industrialized, economically advanced nation. It is a rich country, with long, cold winters in the north, more temperate winters in the south, and warm summers.

Historical Reflections on the Northern Countries

From time immemorial, Denmark, Iceland and Norway, the three NATO countries in the north, have had strong cultural ties. Six hundred years ago the language was one and the same but has since developed into three. Iceland was originally populated from Norway, about 1,000 years

Sweden

The Swedish forces are impressive, given the size of the country. The navy has a large number of strongly armed small and fast ships but also 12 submarines and a very strong coastal artillery with 12 mobile and 45 static batteries. The main naval bases are found in the south and on the east coast. The air force consists of 420 fighting aircraft in addition to transport aircraft. Most aircraft are of Swedish construction. There are good air bases throughout Sweden, and the composition of the navy and the air force indicates quite considerable capability in defense against invasion. There is, however, limited capability for operations further out, i.e., in the Baltic and perhaps in the North Sea.

NATO Reinforcements

When comparing the capabilities of the Soviet Union and its satellites with those of the NATO countries in the North, the main picture, as shown above, is one of NATO weakness. This is so, even considering that NATO countries here seem to have given priority to antiinvasion defense, with emphasis on submarines, destroyers, smaller attack craft, attack aircraft and minelayers. Even though the topography and climate favors the defense, it seems unlikely that NATO countries would be able to hold their own for more

than a limited period of time. Including the land forces of both sides in such a comparison would not really alter this. Due to this factor, which is mainly a function of the small populations of Northern Flank countries, a number of reinforcement plans exist. Considerable preparations have been made to implement them, including prestorage. It is important to note that such plans cannot be executed unless the government of the country concerned asks for it and the country dispatching the reinforcements agrees. Suffice it to say that the plans exist. They include both naval, air and land forces.

Military Evaluations

The Norwegian Sea-North Sea complex looms as the center piece of the Northern Flank. Whoever dominates these seas has in the first place more or less free access from and to the Atlantic and thereby ability to harass or protect the vital sea lines of communication from North America to Europe. He also has a better possibility to fire his rockets or cruise missiles at shorter range, be it towards North America or the Murmansk area. In addition, of course, is the fact that dominance by one party will prevent the other from utilizing the sea areas for his own purpose. In other words, dominance of these sea areas is of both offensive and defensive value for both parties. It is arguable which of these is the overriding value to NATO and

to the Warsaw Pact, for to some extent it depends upon the eyes of the beholder. An important question, therefore, is, from where in the Northern Flank area could such dominance be prevented or interfered with?

Let us first attempt to look at this from a Warsaw Pact point of view. The Baltic exits with the Danish air bases would be the key to whether or not the Soviet Baltic Fleet could participate in combat further out at sea. The south coast of Norway with its air bases could, after an eventual capture of the Baltic exits, make naval operations further out more or less feasible. The air base complex of North Norway could make operations by the Northern Fleet in the Norwegian Sea, as well as exit of that Fleet from its basis in the Murmansk area, very difficult. Iceland (Keflavik) and the GIUK gap would influence operations in the Norwegian Sea as well as exiting from it into the the Atlantic.

Let us next look at it from a NATO point of view. There really does not seem much to add. A NATO loss of the aforementioned areas would seriously prevent operations. They are now all NATO areas. This being the case -- a loss of an area means more than a pure military loss. It would be a major political loss as well.

Peacetime Practice
in This Sea Complex

The most interesting facet of this issue seems at the present time to be the question of how Soviet forces practice in the area. Based on what has been published in the press and other official publications, the following picture emerges. The Barents Sea (not really part of the Northern Flank area) seems to be regarded as Soviet home waters. There is considerable naval activity here.

The Norwegian Sea serves as:

- A transit for Soviet submarines for patrolling in the Mediterranean where a fleet of about 10 submarines always is kept.
- A transit for both ballistic and cruise missile submarines to the Atlantic, apparently to be "on station" somewhere outside the U.S. east coast.
- The maritime stage for annual exercises by major components of the Northern Fleet, apparently joined by units from the Baltic Fleet. The size of these exercises, as well as their extent to the South, has varied throughout the last 15 years or so.
- A daily "presence area" for intelligence collectors from the Northern Fleet.
- The locale of almost daily patrols -- far south and well out at sea -- of Soviet naval aircraft.

The North Sea appears to be a subsidiary of the Norwegian Sea, perhaps the main characteristic being the transit of Baltic Fleet units to participate in Northern Fleet activities. Much speculation has been going on in the press as to whether the Soviet naval/air exercises already mentioned are of a defensive (cordon sanitaire) or offensive nature. They appear to exercise both options.

What, then, of NATO operations? Again, based on press and official sources, there does not seem to be much daily activity apart from the coastal activities of northern country navies. Time and again, with not too frequent intervals, bigger NATO exercises take place. At times, they include carrier groups and amphibious landings. It further appears that whenever NATO ships operate in open waters they are usually "tailed" by Soviet ships. It should also be mentioned that NATO air surveillance operations are carried out from bases in the surrounding NATO countries. Air cover given to the Warsaw Pact exercises is based mainly on Kola Peninsula aircraft circumventing Norwegian territory. Air cover given to NATO exercises seems to come from carrier-based and Norwegian-based aircraft.

Soviet Vulnerabilities/ Limitations

Vulnerabilities of different type ships will not be dealt with here. They are the same in all four Soviet Fleets and are considered a matter for specialists. Instead the paper will survey some other vulnerabilities and limitations in the North, trying to see it from the Soviet vantage point. It is, of course, very difficult to assess the purposes behind the build-up of these two fleets. The purposes of the Northern Fleet could be:

- To contribute to strategic strike operations (and to their protection.)

- To gain definite superiority in the Norwegian Sea and Greenland Sea, denying them to NATO forces.
- To attack shipping in the Atlantic, cutting NATO supply reinforcement lines of communications.

In particular, the Baltic Fleet could attempt to:

- Assist in strike operations.
- Gain supremacy in the Baltic.
- Master the Baltic exits (entrances) by means of amphibious operations, thereby gaining superiority in the North Sea and establishing a flank threat to NATO's center.
- Assist in Northern Fleet operations in the Atlantic.

The base area in the Baltic is not limited, quite the opposite. Furthermore, it does not seem to be particularly vulnerable, except possibly for Kronstadt in the Gulf of Finland (but then there would be a very limited threat in that area). The Baltic exits (entrances) limit Soviet use of the Baltic Fleet for operations in the Norwegian Sea area. Neither can Northern Fleet ships get into the Baltic and utilize its base and docking facilities. In Soviet eyes, this must be an overall vulnerability (or limitation). The question of whether or not to eliminate it would depend on the relative gain/loss analysis.

The Northern Fleet base area is the home base of their mightiest fleet with overwhelming strategic submarine strength. It is backed by 16 to 17 major airfields on the Kola Peninsula.

But what are the limitations and vulnerabilities as Soviet planners probably see them?

- The naval base area is very close (60 miles) to the border of a NATO country (Norway).
- The base area is fairly constrained and could, therefore, be vulnerable to air, cruise missile or rocket attacks.
- In wintertime surface operations out from the base area would be very limited to the east and north but not to the west, where their ships would have to pass through a passage not less than 150-200 NM wide.
- Their air support will have to use up fuel for 900-1100 NM from their bases in the Kola until they are able to operate in the Norwegian Sea south of say 68° N.

And what of experiences from recent history? The Soviets will remember that during the Second World War, aircraft based in North Norway partly played havoc with the Murmansk convoys. They realize that these airbases now could make life very unpleasant indeed for surface operations in the Norwegian Sea and for the passage of ships from the Barents to the Norwegian Sea. In Soviet eyes, the same Norwegian airbases could be used as a springboard for attacks on the Murmansk base area. (Considering there are only 5-6 airbases in North Norway compared to 16-17 on the Kola Peninsula, this is, in my eyes, rather far-fetched). Whatever the case is actually, the Soviets will feel very vulnerable due to the existence of the North Norwegian airbase system. They will also know that NATO, if it wanted to, could from North Norway keep count of Soviet naval movements westward from the Murmansk base area. That would mean to them and it might somehow be possible to deduce Soviet intentions, and give warning time. Elimination of

such vulnerabilities and limitations would again depend upon the costs involved.

Threats Posed to NATO

A less controversial expression would be operational possibilities against NATO. What might be the aim of an action by the Soviets? It could seemingly be of three different kinds. First of all, there might be a purely political aim, that of testing the cohesion of NATO. Secondly, there might be attempts to eliminate the limitations or vulnerabilities outlined above. Thirdly, it could be a simple offensive action, limited or as part of a bigger undertaking. If the aim was purely political, the operation would be limited and undertaken rapidly. The limitations could be geographic or in means and weaponry. Such an action would presumably not be undertaken unless the Soviets thought the cohesion of NATO was worth testing, and that the gains would be likely to outweigh the potential risks and losses. Opinions in the West vary on the likelihood of such an action. Opinions in the East might also vary, based on assessments of the risk run and losses sustained. As of today such an operation does not seem very likely but cannot be ruled out. It would rock the "Northern balance." Consequences would have to be considered.

Next, might the Soviet Union seek to eliminate its Northern Flank? First, action against the Baltic exits (entrances) would necessarily mean an invasion of Denmark.

The gain obviously would be high. The attacker would have primarily to count on opposition by all Danish Forces, the bulk of the German Navy (and naval air arm) and participation by the German Air Force proper. They would also count on general NATO participation as well as on a strictly neutral, but not very sympathetic, Sweden. Such an undertaking would touch the nerves of Central Europe. It can hardly be done unless in conjunction with a land invasion, along the coast, of Northern Germany. It would be high risk but -- if successful -- offer high gain.

Second, for a follow-up, it might be succeeded by an action against the south Norwegian coast. This would be a logical, but sizable operation. These two steps should be seen in conjunction with each other. They would probably in Soviet eyes constitute high risk.

Thirdly, an attack on North Norway with its airbases is a possibility. It would, in success, eliminate one of their major limitations or vulnerabilities on operations in the Norwegian Sea. It could in Soviet eyes also make the Murmansk area safer. It would gain them 900-1100 NM of range for aircraft operating in support of the navy and it would do away with the possibility of NATO monitoring their naval movements. It would furthermore give more extended harbor facilities to Soviet ships. Such an operation could materialize by sea, air or land or a combination of any of these. By land such a move would have to violate at least one neutral country, Finland. The operation would be very

difficult, offer great gain but most probably at a high price. The gain/loss analysis would decide if it were to be undertaken.

Fourthly, but very unlikely, is the possibility of a carefully limited operation against Iceland.

The third option, an offensive as such, would roughly cover the same possibilities as above, except one would have to consider Sweden and Finland. Sweden probably is not of high strategic importance to the Soviets, although they seem to use its coast as a training area for submarines. The Swedish forces, moreover, would be quite a match for the Soviet. Finland could be a stepping stone for a land attack against Norway. The Finnish forces are limited in size and weaponry but with excellent morale.

There exist, however, two additional "threats" or possibilities regarding the Northern Flank area. The first of these is a long-term one. That "threat" is to let naval practice develop in a way so that the Soviet navy more or less is the sole navy to operate in the Norwegian Sea. That again could lead to the Soviet Union considering this sea as home waters as they do with the Barents Sea. Sooner or later the result would be that Norway, particularly North Norway, would come behind a sort of "iron curtain" at sea. It is easy then to see what might be the consequence in the long run both for NATO as a whole and even more so for Norway. This type of "threat" or possibility is easily forgotten but could be very dangerous, and is to be dreaded, because the Soviet Union is a long-term chess player.

The second of these threats somehow is opposed to the previous one, the main point being that the Soviet Union is very sensitive about the Murmansk base area with its large strategic submarine fleet. Without wanting it, one might get some kind of escalatory effect through one's own movements, or a "threat" in response to one's own actions. NATO has no choice but to walk a tightrope, displaying firmness of will without provoking reactions that may trigger uncontrollable escalation. Soviet sensitivity concerning their Murmansk base area should not be ignored.

III. THE INTEGRATION OF THE DEFENSE OF THE FLANKS WITH THE CENTER

Although the linkage between defense of the flanks and NATO central theater seems clear, it is less obvious that the consequence should be operational integration. It could equally well be coordination. Admittedly, the Center and Flanks have major interests in common. They also have interests that are special and unique. An integration of the Command structure in NATO beyond what it already is, would be going too far. It would in practice lead to major HQ's concentrating even more on the problems of the Center and, possibly, at the cost of the flanks. Such a change should therefore not be advised. As a more reasonable starting point, let us therefore focus on coordination of efforts.

Assuming deterrence fails and a defensive battle has to be joined, how would interdependability and coordination manifest itself? Much, of course, would depend upon:

- The operational mode of the two Northern Soviet Fleets.
- NATO's strategic guidelines.

The guidelines carry two key terms -- "flexible response" and "forward defense." Forward defense may mean different things to different people. It could mean full defensive effort right from the borders or it could mean some "trading of ground." On the Central Front forward defense must mean what the two words literally say. Considering the importance of the Central Front, this means the strategy adopted on the flanks must support this forward defense in a war situation. In other words, this means that:

- o NATO forces must not be drawn away from the Center.
- o Arrival of reinforcements and supplies to the Center must be secured.

As for the Soviet operational mode, there are many opinions but none has yet penetrated the Soviet mind. The development of Soviet naval forces prior to the outbreak of armed conflict would give some indication, but a bit late. It probably would involve two distinct types of operation: high-sea operations and local waters operations. The high sea operations would in the main be carried out by their Northern Fleet, seconded by the Baltic. It would seem to be Norwegian Sea, North Sea operations, or operations based on these seas. If seconding was wanted, the Baltic exits (entrances) would have to be secured. One could see their submarine force used for two purposes -- carrying out strategic strikes from the Barents Sea and northern part of the Norwegian Sea, with the attack submarines used for:

- Preventing NATO forces from entering the Norwegian Sea in bulk; and
- Assaulting NATO shipping across the Atlantic.

Their surface units could be used to protect their submarine strike forces in the north, to assist in the assault of NATO shipping in the Atlantic and to establish superiority or even supremacy in the Norwegian Sea - Greenland Sea. The local waters operations would mainly be surface and amphibious operations, intended to make the Baltic a Soviet inland lake. Thus, it might include operations against the Baltic exits, depending upon two factors:

- How badly a seconding of the Northern Fleet was needed.
- How important it was to establish a strong position on the flank of Central Europe (i.e., the Jutland Peninsula).

Returning now to NATO considerations, what do both the NATO guidelines and the Soviet operational mode suggest? First and foremost, Soviet naval/air forces must not be allowed to master the Norwegian Sea - North Sea, which might allow them to pass the GIUK gap and get out into the Atlantic to cut the reinforcement/supply lines to the Center. Secondly, it means that the Baltic exits and the North German coastline must be held. Prevention of Soviet use of the Norwegian Sea has two major components on the NATO side. One is the holding of North Norway, the other is a NATO naval presence in these waters. The holding of North Norway is mainly a land/air matter. Presence in the Norwegian Sea is mainly a naval matter.

Holding the Baltic exits, apart from securing Denmark, is important for naval reasons (possibility of seconding the Northern Fleet), but even more so to prevent the development of a flank threat to the center. Such a development would jeopardize the "forward defense" in the center, a development that could be very serious indeed. The task of holding the exits is a joint navy-army-air matter. As the bulk of naval forces here are German and not under the same command structure as the land forces, this requires very conscientious coordination. Still, it is not thought proper to change the present command structure, nor is it really feasible. These undertakings, moreover, are means to support both the forward defense of the center, and a defense of the Northern Flank. Considering the small number of forces at the disposal of the northern countries, it means they ought to strengthen their defensive forces considerably. As has been touched upon earlier it would also mean that in order to be able to carry out a strategy of forward defense in the center, such NATO forces as could operate in the Norwegian Sea should be strengthened.

As far as peacetime goes, it is more difficult. A way would have to be selected which could not be construed as a change to the Northern Balance. That would not be to NATO's overall advantage. Besides, if pursued in a wrong way, it could in some countries lead to an increase in adverse public opinion. A better way to go about defense strengthening lies in a gradual step-by-step increase in

NATO fleets in the Mediterranean. The Warsaw Pact countries are superior to NATO only in the number of cruisers, fast patrol crafts, and mine-laying and mine-sweeper units. NATO's strongest points are its aircraft carriers, with their power projection capability, that remains today largely unmatched. In reality, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, which lacks adequate air cover and logistic support, might be roughly compared, in its conventional power, to the Italian Navy, and many Western analysts doubt that in case of an East-West conflict, it will be able to survive more than a few hours.

Third, it seems clear that the balance of land and air forces is less favorable to the West in the three geographically divided sub-theaters of operations in Southern Europe: the Italo-Yugoslav border, the Tracian and Bosphorus sector, and Eastern Turkey. As deduced from a recent NATO report on the East-West balance of forces,⁶ the situation does not look bad in Northeast Italy (the Gorizia Gap). Here 8 Italian divisions, with 1,250 tanks and 1,400 pieces of artillery face the potential attack of 10 Soviet divisions from Hungary, with 2,340 tanks and 1,560 pieces of artillery, that could be reinforced by 7 more divisions coming from the Kiev Military District, with 2,000 tanks and 1,300 pieces of artillery. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact has about 3 airborne divisions available for concentrated attack in any point of the Central Mediterranean. On the other hand, the seven divisions of

- The extension of the area of maritime patrolling by Soviet surface and submarine units in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. This capability should grow considerably with the next generation of conventional aircraft carriers of the "Sovetskij Sojuz" class, of which the first is under construction at the Black Seas shipyards. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron averages today a level of 40-50 ships, logging since 1979 about 16,500 ships-days.⁴
- The upgrading of Soviet air power projection, with the longer combat radius of the supersonic medium-range TU-22 M Backfire bomber, together with the improvements in the operational capability of the two new fighter-bombers about to enter service with the Soviet Frontal Aviation--namely, the MiG-29 Fulcrum and Su-27 Flanker.⁵
- The future deployment, on board Soviet medium-range and strategic bombers, of new long-range cruise missiles, which could be conventionally or nuclear-tipped, and could reach any target in the Mediterranean areas and beyond.
- The gradual acquisition of a significant, although still comparatively limited, power projection ashore capability, with the deployment of a larger number of variety of landing ships and amphibious craft. Based upon special Soviet units of naval infantry and airborne troops, this capability is particularly relevant in key geopolitical areas adjacent to the Soviet Union such as Southern Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.

Secondly, one must admit, on the other hand, that, according to the most recent data available on the East-West balance of forces in Southern Europe (NATO vs. Warsaw Pact countries), the situation does not look so bad for the NATO Mediterranean countries. Including the U.S. forces present in the area (mainly air and naval units of the Sixth Fleet), NATO retains a clear superiority in overall naval forces, and more so if we consider also the Spanish Fleet (see Table I). Although Spain has joined NATO, but not its military integrated structure, it could easily follow the pattern of France, which is more or less in the same position, and currently participates in joint naval exercises with other

simultaneous concurrence of many unpredictable factors complicating an already unstable interdependence between the East-West and the North-South axis of this broad regional system.

The Cradle of Tensions: The East-West, North-South, and South-South Lines of Cleavage

Any up-to-date political analysis could not fail to see the Mediterranean in the 1980s as an area where at least three lines of cleavage in international relations are converging and crossing each other: East-West relations, North-South relations, and South-South relations.

We shall try to assess briefly for each of the three cleavages the major politico-military trends that have taken place in these last two decades.

East-West Relations

If we consider the evolution of East-West relations in the Mediterranean over the last decade, several very important observations can be made. First, there has been a slow but continuous growth in the conventional and nuclear threat posed by the Soviet Union, as evidenced by such developments as:

- The deployment of SS-20 missiles that have reached the estimated number of 396, of which two-thirds are targeted directly or potentially (from the central areas of the Soviet Union) against Western Europe, the Mediterranean members of NATO, and the Middle East.³

of protecting the Central Region of the Alliance. This has been due to the objective worries that the principal NATO countries have concentrated in the Central European region, at least until the 1970s and the detente process that produced the Soviet-German and the Polish-German Treaties of Bonn's Ostpolitik, the new Berlin Agreements, and the Helsinki Final Act of the European Security Conference in Summer 1975. True, the Yom Kippur War and the first oil shock of 1973-74 compelled NATO politicians and generals to reconsider somewhat the "benign neglect" until then accorded to the Southern Region, prompting them to realize that the Western Alliance could not tolerate a continued weakening of what has been commonly labeled its "soft underbelly." But several more years needed to pass before the decline of East-West detente and major international crises in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Southwest Asia, led in 1979-80 to the proclamation of the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf, to the establishment of the U.S. Central Command and its Rapid Deployment Force, and finally, to the first thorough internal reappraisal of new NATO requirements for the defense of its Southern Flank and the Mediterranean. A special transnational report on the security of the Mediterranean was submitted to the NATO authorities by Italy, Greece and Turkey at the beginning of the 1980s. One of the main worries of NATO planners has been the perceptible loss of control of the main political-military trends in the Mediterranean due to the

NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK AND
MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY

by

Sergio A. Rossi

The Mediterranean: From Southern
to Central Front of NATO?

"The Mediterranean is not any more the Southern Flank of the Atlantic Alliance, because in the recent years the geostrategic situation has changed. The Mediterranean is part of the Central Front of NATO, while its potential 'Southern Front' ranges now from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf Region." This statement, by the former Italian Defense Minister Lelio Lagorio,¹ summarizes an objective situation in which "the strategic centre of Europe has moved Southward," as Admiral Crowe, former Commander in Chief of Allied Forces in Southern Europe, has recently underlined.² But a part of the problem is that if the countries located in the NATO Mediterranean region, and therefore, nearer to the tension areas in the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, are well aware of this evolution, it is time that the whole Atlantic Alliance comes to a similar conclusion, and acts in consequence. In fact, the term "Southern Flank" has often been coupled, at least in the mind of some NATO planners, to the operational concept of a narrow geographical area, with the principal function

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between short and long term interests. But the main thing really is that NATO maritime components must be dimensioned to take care of forward defense (of/in the NATO area) and the contingencies out-of-area. It is a fact of life that many European nations will not admit this. Somehow this has to be solved. One has to cover both tasks or NATO will not for long be able to survive in a war situation.

temporary or lasting military advantages lead us to actions that public opinion has difficulties in accepting. If so, we shall lose confidence.

A shift of emphasis to naval/air power will make it possible to "give" some ground in land/air negotiations. But there is a risk of being "tactical" here. So unless it is done openly it might be a dangerous course to pursue. As far as including maritime capabilities in future negotiations, it could be wise in order to strengthen our credibility in public minds. The proviso must, however, be that all types of arms are included in negotiations, or at least that special negotiations are coordinated to ensure nothing "falls outside." Militarily, there would be an advantage, negotiation-wise in having Soviet Fleet SLBM's and CM's included.

7. What is the relationship between the maritime components of NATO forward defense and out-of-area contingencies in which the vital interests of one or more NATO members might be at stake and in which naval forces would play an indispensable role?

Previously, the point of interdependability between the NATO area and areas outside it has been made. It goes without saying that the practical links of interdependability are by sea and somewhat less by air. This means that the maritime components are the ones to protect this interdependability. This again will influence forward defense in that it would draw on the same maritime resources. It will in practice have to come to a choice

As for the forward defense strategy, greater emphasis on naval/air capabilities would enhance its credibility. This is because it would really mean a strengthening of the flanks, a matter that has not always been given enough emphasis. On escalation control capability, it would increase with more naval/air emphasis, simply because it would be understood that the main reason was concern for human lives and European countries.

Again, it should be pointed out that the way this greater emphasis on naval/air capabilities is preserved requires careful thought and should preferably be based on "changed circumstances" and not on earlier wrong appreciations -- that is, if one does not want to raise questions as to why you are so much better than your predecessors.

6. How would such emphasis enhance the political flexibility of the United States and its Allies in INF and MBFR negotiations? What are the advantages and disadvantages of including or excluding maritime capabilities from those negotiations in the future?

Somehow, there has been some shift in public opinion that suspects our sincerity on arms control. There is no reason for such doubt, yet it does exist. The main point for public opinion nowadays is arms reduction and arms negotiation. This because public opinion is scared by the enormous arsenals of weapons. Whatever we do, we must not nourish this fear. We must not be thought to be letting

countries. That responsibility does not rest with any NATO authority. There are also many factors -- such as the economy, tradition, level of education, voluntary or conscripted forces and sheer practical realities -- that decide the build-up of forces in any country, even when the NATO guidelines are followed.

5. How might greater emphasis upon U.S. NATO naval/air/missiles capabilities enhance the credibility of NATO's deterrence, crisis management and forward defense strategies? How would it enhance the credibility of NATO's escalation-control capability?

These are many separate questions under one heading. They are separate -- yet they are somehow inter-related.

NATO's deterrence (i.e., the existence of NATO) is credible, and this is understood by the majority of public opinion. The number of doubting Thomases has increased. Although trends in public opinion may change again, there is some need to enhance the credibility of NATO's deterrence, just in case.

Concerning NATO's crisis management, it, too, is credible, but the public opinion seems to have its doubts. An improvement here is not a question of greater emphasis on naval/air capabilities. It is rather a question of information which should be better shared and coordinated between nations. Most doubters think our communications systems are not good enough to secure good crisis management, and this would not really change with more emphasis on naval/air capabilities.

NATO naval/air power should be increased. Militarily this would allow for more activity in the Norwegian Sea and it would make possible a redressing at sea of an overall imbalance. Politically both of these matters would be beneficial, when carried out in the proper way. Economically, it would be costly. But this should be looked at in a perspective broader than the services, considering for instance the unemployment factor. It is not yet clear that we are in an either/or position (naval/air power build-up as distinct from ground/air build-up). This is because, by nature of geography, public opinion in the center may have difficulties understanding and could interpret new moves quite differently. After all, the center is not yet from an overall point of view conventionally strong enough. This question leads to discussion of cost sharing, which is difficult to resolve, although a U.S. naval/air increase paralleled by a European land/air increase seems sensible.

4. How would answers to the foregoing questions differ if categorized by country? Here the effort would be devoted to comparing and contrasting the perception and attitudes of the principal Allies -- Britain, West Germany and even though not a NATO integrated member, France. Some appropriate attention must also be given to Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, Portugal and Spain.

National authorities are, as long as they stick to the NATO guidelines, best qualified to judge this. We must never forget that ultimately if worse comes to worse, national authorities are the ones responsible for their

not having analyzed well enough. It is probably that the present "trend in attitude" although not likely to change now, will change in the long run. Common sense usually prevails. If this belief is right, it would dictate efforts to show great care in change of policy to redress at sea rather than on land. Otherwise, one might fall into the trap of being accused of attempts at deception. Soviet propaganda would easily say that. In this case, also, our efforts might be counterproductive. Having said this and being aware that public opinion more easily reacts to what is seen all the time as opposed to what is believed to be the case, there is ground to believe that public opinion as of today would be more favorable to a redressing of the balance at sea rather than on land.

Regarding sea-launched cruise missiles, the answer is also in the affirmative as far as public opinion is today. Any change of policy -- as this would be -- will immediately be picked up by Soviet propaganda and made the most of. Our reactions to that must be preplanned. All in all -- if and when we have won the battle of convincing public opinion that we do and have done our utmost in the field of arms reduction/arms negotiation -- then a change (to redress at sea rather than on land) could be done advantageously. But that battle for public opinion has not been won yet.

3. What are the relative political, economic and military advantages and disadvantages of building up NATO naval/air power capabilities as distinct from ground/air forces in Western Europe and its environs?

strengthen European confidence? In the first place, we have to have that maritime capability, and today we do not have enough. Secondly, information on such matters must be thorough and careful. It must be given in a way that increases confidence in deterrence as the aim, and not using "winning of war" as the aim. There is difference here, in the psychological impact on public opinion. Thirdly, the picture of the decreased risk factor to human beings and countries by transferring capabilities and actions to the sea areas must be made clear. This should be very carefully done, since wrong words at a wrong time may mean the efforts are counterproductive. Remember, it is a question of "turning the tide" of public opinion in Europe. That has to be done by people who are very familiar with European psychology which at times differed from that of other parts of the Alliance.

2. In view of changing political attitudes in Western Europe during the last three years, are defense elites and publics likely to be more favorable to NATO efforts toward redressing the East-West regional imbalance on the seas rather than on land? Would sea-launched cruise missiles, for example, be politically attractive to the West Europeans as a supplement to whatever land based systems are deployed with or without an arms control agreement in the Geneva negotiations?

There has been a change in Western European attitudes. But there still is the question of whether or not the present "trend of attitude" will continue if matters are left unchanged. This is important to analyze. Changes in investment take time. One might be out of step again if

naval exercise activity to make certain there is a change in the present tendency of the Soviet Navy to "monopolize" the Norwegian Sea. Such an increase would also have to be gradual when it comes to how far north one would exercise. In other words, decreasing the pressure on the Central Front should be done in a way so that it does not increase the pressure on the Northern Flank. This is not easy, but could be done. One would have to take due consideration of the Soviet sensitivity regarding their Murmansk base area.

Several very important questions, however, remain to be answered.

1. Given the indisputable fact that the West Europeans are much more interested in deterrence than defense, how can NATO exploit its maritime capabilities to strengthen West European confidence in the effectiveness of Western deterrence and help to attenuate recent fears resulting from speculation about the possibility of fighting, limiting and winning a nuclear-war speculation which invariably frightens the West European allies because it plays into the hands of Soviet propagandists who want the Europeans to think that the United States is planning a war confined to Europe?

In the first place, real deterrence and defense are just two words for one aim, preventing war. Of course, Soviet propaganda, very subtly set up, has influenced European public opinion. But as touched upon earlier, that public opinion somehow has not yet grasped all NATO efforts at arms negotiation/reduction talks. This is due to our not having been able to present a good enough information picture. That must be done and any repetition of the "neutron bomb" affair must be avoided. It shakes confidence. But, how can we exploit maritime capability to

Kiev MD are in a low state of readiness, and any land attack against Italy must cross Yugoslavia and overcome its almost certain armed resistance. Finally, the Italian Armed Forces have undertaken an extensive modernization program.

Fourthly, much more worrisome in strictly military terms is the situation in Northern Greece and Thracian Turkey, where NATO faces 34 Soviet, Rumanian and Bulgarian divisions, largely mechanized, with 6,570 tanks and 6,400 pieces of artillery. Twenty-two of these divisions are forward positioned or have a high state of readiness, and could easily outgun the 25 Greek and Turkish divisions in the area, which are mainly infantry, and do not have enough depth of maneuver in the narrow territory between the borders and the Aegean Sea.

Twenty other Soviet Divisions, with 4,300 tanks and 4,800 pieces of artillery (12 forward positioned), are facing Eastern Turkey, where in 72 hours they could attack, with additional airborne and assault divisions, the 8 Turkish divisions in the Northeastern Sector and the other 4 deployed southwards along the border. There is scant hope that the Turkish Army, formed mainly of infantry units with largely obsolete equipment, could offer more than a temporary resistance. It is estimated that at least 1.5 billion dollars per year would be needed until 1990 just to give the Turkish Army an average fighting capability.

Fifth, the political situation in the Mediterranean, on the other hand, looks relatively calm. Political

relations between the NATO southern countries and the Danubian and Balkan members of the Warsaw Pact are generally good, except for the temporary dispute between Italy and Bulgaria over two alleged Italian spies arrested in Sofia and the possible involvement of the Bulgarian Intelligence Service in the attempt to assassinate the Pope. Italo-Hungarian and especially Italo-Yugoslavian relations are steadily improving. Greece has hinted that it may be willing to reduce its troop levels along the Bulgarian border and has bought auxiliary military equipment from the Soviet Union. Soviet-Turkish trade and industrial cooperation is progressing, and relations between Madrid and Moscow are now "normal." In spite of the INF issues, the East European countries clearly prefer continued good political and trade relations with the West and the United States, which may have contributed to a slow down, or even a drop (i.e., Rumanian) in East European military spending during the seventies. Only under repeated Soviet pressure has this trend changed in the last two or three years. In turn, it is significant that the Soviet Union, even in the recent period of tension with the United States over INF and other political-strategic issues, has refrained from adopting an interventionist attitude in the last Middle East crisis in Lebanon, which clearly involved its client state, Syria.

For all the foregoing reasons, as well as growing domestic problems in allocating resources to the defense

sector, the Soviet Union seems to have endorsed a period of relative political-military stabilization insofar as East-West relations in the Mediterranean are concerned. This means that the men in the Kremlin, while steadily upgrading their nuclear and conventional military capabilities, prefer to adopt a course of diplomatic and economic pressures and inducements in relation to NATO and nonaligned Mediterranean countries. In their present judgment, this is the best way to try to create fissures in NATO solidarity (see for example the Greek attitude toward INF and the denuclearization of the Balkans and the Mediterranean) and to accumulate a political capital that sooner or later might be translated into strategic military gains in the appropriate circumstances. One small example is the Soviet offer to help to clear old naval wreckages from the waters of LaValletta harbor, on the island of Malta, at a time of difficult relations between Malta and Italy over their bilateral treaty of military and economic cooperation, and in the wake of the signing of a Maltese-Libyan treaty of friendship and cooperation.

North-South Relations

A definitely higher degree of instability and potential security risks for the NATO countries can be connected with various political and economic issues coming under the general heading of North-South relations in the Mediterranean and the Middle-East. First, one of the most

severe security risks to emerge in the seventies has been the threat of an oil embargo against NATO countries, as in 1973 during the Yom Kippur War. Since then, the European NATO countries have developed several combined approaches to diminish somewhat this kind of risk. One approach followed by Britain, Norway and partially by Holland, has been to develop the new oil and natural gas resources in the North Sea. Another approach, taken up by such industrialized Mediterranean countries as Italy and France, has been to draw their energy resources from more diverse geographical areas, including Nigeria, North Africa, (e.g., Algerian liquified natural gas), and the USSR. Meanwhile, efforts have gone forward to develop new alternative energy sources, such as solar power.

Still another approach, followed especially by France and Italy (and to a lesser extent by Spain), has consisted of increasing trade and industrial cooperation with the countries of North Africa and the Middle East in order to offset the oil bill with an adequate level of exports. The result has been, as Table II confirms, that France and Italy are playing in the 1980s a relevant role in economic relations with virtually all the principal Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries. Italy is the first trading partner of Libya, Malta, Syria and Lebanon; the second of Tunisia, Egypt and Iran; the third of Greece, Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Iraq. France is the first trading partner of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia; the second of Spain and

Portugal; the third of Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. It is clear that such a web of economic interests, even if it may be subject to some problems emanating from political crises and instability in the Southern Mediterranean, presents nevertheless a useful means of influence on the development and orientation of several non-NATO Mediterranean countries. A similar stabilizing role is played in the Mediterranean by West Germany, which is the first trading partner of Greece and Portugal; the second of Turkey, Algeria, Libya, Malta, Yugoslavia, Israel and Iraq; the third of Spain, Morocco, Egypt, Syria and Iran. (These data refer to 1982.)

In more strictly military terms, the NATO Mediterranean countries have witnessed the emergence of new potential threats from the South, represented by certain North African countries -- specifically, Libya -- who espouse disproportionate political-military ambitions and adventuristic foreign policies. But a more careful analysis tends to minimize the real direct threat from such countries because of their limited capacity to conduct sustained and long-range military operations in the face of stiff opposition. These shortcomings are due mainly to the lack of trained military manpower and effective logistic support. Moreover, their domestic political fragility and the presence on their borders of antagonistic and generally pro-Western countries, e.g., Egypt and Israel, represent additional constraints. Much more relevant, for the

security of NATO South European countries, is the possibility that these countries may be used, willingly or not, as staging areas and logistical bases for Soviet forces in the Mediterranean, with an overall effect of significantly upgrading the military threat to NATO, and complicating its defense planning.

Another new and nonnegligible threat is represented already in peacetime by the indirect strategy of "destabilization" sponsored by some Muslim countries in North Africa and the Middle East, with or without the tacit consensus of the Warsaw Pact countries. This strategy is manifested, above all, in the form of active financial and organizational support to terrorism movements and groups operating in several NATO and other Mediterranean countries. Particularly worrisome, in this context, has been -- and still is -- Libyan adventurism. Colonel Qadhafi's regime has compelled France to intervene militarily in Chad, has subsidized Basque separatists and ETA terrorists in Spain, has conducted execution of Qadhafi's political opponents who have escaped to Italy, and from time to time makes outrageous political and economic demands on NATO countries, including the withdrawal of cruise missiles from Sicily and the severing of military ties with the United States. Therefore, the elaboration of a common political and military approach among the NATO Mediterranean countries more interested in a firm policy to stabilize Libyan behavior should be a top priority in the near term.

A special security issue in North-South relations in the Mediterranean is the neutrality of Malta. It is indeed of paramount interest for NATO to avoid the risk that this island might be used as a logistic and intelligence base by Warsaw Pact forces, namely by SOVMEDRON. To this purpose, it is important that the bilateral treaty signed by Italy and Malta in 1980 to guarantee Malta's neutrality remains in effect. In light of recent overtures by Malta to the Soviet Union and to Libya, including the signing in December 1984 of a bilateral treaty with Libya to guarantee Malta's neutrality, it is essential that Italy and NATO take at least two steps. The first is for Italy to extend to Malta new financial aid and trade facilities, overcoming the present misunderstanding that has provoked the compulsory freeze on activities of the Italian military mission assigned to the island. The second is that the other NATO Mediterranean countries, possibly including France, join Italy in its political-military guarantee of Malta's neutrality.

Finally, there is the issue of Spain's controversy with Great Britain over the future status of Gibraltar, a debate that could hamper Spanish participation in NATO. Here a guarded optimism is in order, especially after the decision in late 1984 to reopen the land frontier between the Rock and the Spanish mainland, and the consequent opening of negotiations between Madrid and London in early 1985.

South-South Relations

The major South-South issue, one that for several years has considerably weakened NATO's solidarity and defense posture, and that is particularly acute at the present time, is the Greek/Turkish dispute . Its several aspects, from the division of Cyprus to the militarization of the Greek islands in the Aegean (namely Lemnos), the delimitation of FIR (Flight Information Regions), the establishment of a new ATAF command in Larissa, the delimitation of territorial waters and continental shelf zones in the Aegean, need not be discussed in detail. Suffice it to say that the end result is that Greece does not participate in NATO maneuvers in the Aegean Sea. There is the potential risk, moreover, that the new Greek defense plan just announced by the Papandreu socialist government will not be able to sustain a real defense of the northern border with Bulgaria. Yet, the five NADGE radar sites in northern Greece are essential for an adequate early warning to the correspondent NADGE sites in Italy, to defend against air incursions coming from Southeastern Europe. Unluckily, given the recent positions stated by spokesmen of the two countries,⁷ no real improvement of the situation is apparent, at least not in the near term.

Some hopes of rapprochement, nevertheless, do exist, according to U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, with respect to Cyprus, where a compromise plan more or less acceptable to both the Greek and Turkish communities is

being worked out. Misunderstandings and deep suspicions, however, still linger over the economic and military control of the Aegean, preventing proper utilization and normal defense operations in this critical geostrategic area. The fact is that in the last years, except for some tentative proposals by General Bernard Rogers, the Supreme Allied Commander of European Forces (SACEUR) on a new redistribution of Regional Commands between Greece and Turkey, NATO political authorities, namely the Secretary General, have studiously avoided taking sides or undertaking more energetic initiatives of mediation between these two allied countries. In spite of the obvious difficulties and political risks involved, it would be much more productive for the internal cohesion and the external image of the Alliance if the key to a settlement of the Aegean dispute could be found in the framework of a NATO-sponsored political initiative. Given the present state of affairs, Greece and Turkey look like the NATO countries most exposed, for obvious reasons, to effective political pressures and economic inducements from the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries, especially on such delicate issues as INF deployment and logistical support for possible RDF operations by the United States in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The other major South-South issue in the Mediterranean (with obvious East-West implications) concerns Lebanon, the PLO and the quest for an Arab-Israeli

settlement. Since the failure of the peace-keeping mission in Lebanon sponsored by the United States, Italy, France and Great Britain, the state of affairs in the Near East has not really improved. Without going into details, it also appears that, politically speaking, the solidity of peace between Israel and Egypt has been damaged in the process. While military relations between the United States and both Egypt and Israel have improved, with joint air, land and naval exercises conducted in 1984 with both armies, of course separately and at different times, these events should not give rise to illusions. Some hope for new movement may emerge from the decision by Israel to withdraw from Southern Lebanon. In any case, an important role in contributing to the search for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute could be played by the NATO Mediterranean countries who sometimes have more room for maneuver in the regional context than do the superpowers. For example, on the PLO issue, the web of contacts with the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat woven by some Mediterranean politicians, including Italian Premier Bettino Craxi, should not be wasted, but rather utilized at the European and Atlantic level.

A more limited issue, involving two Southern Mediterranean countries, one of which is a member of NATO, is the territorial controversy between Spain and Morocco on the future of Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves on the North African coast near the approaches to the Strait of

Gibraltar. Here the future is uncertain, as Madrid does not seem very keen to open formal negotiations to settle the matter. The situation has become even more complicated since the signing in Summer 1984 of a "Unity Pact" between Morocco and Libya, and subsequent Libyan public statements attributed, as usual, to Colonel Qadhafi, that Ceuta and Melilla are "Arab cities."

Other existing or potential South-South flashpoints in the North Africa area, directly or indirectly involving Libya, that might damage Western interests or positions, are Chad where there are some hopes that the 1984 agreements between France and Libya for the disengagement of military contingents might eventually be honored by Qadhafi; and Tunisia, where the domestic social and political situation remains rather fragile, although vigilance against Libyan subversion, after the last attempted coup d'etat, has been strengthened.

A final mention should be made of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict in the Persian Gulf in view of its potential consequences for the security of oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz. One reason why this conflict has until now caused only limited damage to the oil flow to the West is that in spite of Western naval intervention and patrolling in the Hormuz waters, the conflict has so far maintained a prevailingly South-South character (with the sporadic involvement of Saudi Arabia), and has not assumed a decidedly East-West dimension. For different reasons, both

the United States and the Soviet Union have supported Iraq. However, given the volatility of many political factors in the Middle East and the Gulf, there is always the possibility that local threats and issues may combine in several ways that might escalate from regional crises and conflicts into a full-blown East-West confrontation throughout the Mediterranean area, gradually involving the two superpowers and their NATO and Warsaw Pact allies.

Three Security Factors in the Mediterranean

For a more complete picture of the security situation in the Mediterranean, the evolution of three additional factors should also be considered.

Defense Spending and Economic Growth

From 1979 to 1982, defense spending as a percentage of the national product of the Danubian and Balkan East European members of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania) actually decreased or remained constant, reflecting a relative calm in Mediterranean East-West relations.⁸ At the same time, there was a general decline in the economic growth of CMEA countries. But in 1983, defense spending picked up again. In Hungary, for instance, the percentage of the state budget devoted for defense increased from 4 to 6 percent.⁹ At the same time, all NATO countries except Portugal have increased somewhat the percentage of their GNP devoted to military expenditures, despite very low or even

negative economic growth and high rates of inflation. This reflects the overall trend toward defense modernization, as well as increasing concern over instability in North Africa and the Middle East. Here among Israel or the Arab countries, the defense spending picture is mixed. States that registered a higher economic growth rate in 1982-83, such as Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, have decreased their national share of defense expenditures, while others, including Morocco, Israel, Lebanon and Sudan, have increased defense spending percentages, registering in the meantime a very low or negative economic growth. However, significant military aid by the United States (3.2 billion dollars in 1983 to Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Lebanon) and by the Soviet Union (to Syria) should be factored into the picture. Growing militarization is also apparent among the Persian Gulf states, where, besides Iran and Iraq, currently at war, all moderate Arab countries have increased their defense share of the GNP. The only exception is Saudi Arabia, which has witnessed a decline in its oil revenues, but devotes nevertheless 17.7% of its GNP to the military budget.

Arms Trade and Cooperation in Defense Industry

According to SIPRI estimates for 1979-83, nine of the top twelve importers of major weapon systems in the Third World were Mediterranean or Middle Eastern states. Conversely, apart from the two superpowers, three out of the first seven industrialized exporters of major weapon systems

to the Third World in 1983 were Mediterranean countries: France (8.9%), Spain (3.8%), and Italy (3.4%).¹⁰ On the other hand, there is a growing participation of NATO Mediterranean countries in European arms collaboration and a gradual integration of the defense industry at the continental level.

A precondition for these developments has been the rapid growth of the Spanish and Greek defense industries in the early 1980s, which are more and more export-oriented. The Italian defense industry had already established itself as one of the major world exporters in the mid-1970s, especially toward the developing countries. According to ACDA sources,¹¹ total military exports by Italy reached the level of 1 billion dollars in 1978 (at constant 1981 prices for the U.S. dollar), with a five-fold increase since 1972. In 1983, this figure was estimated at over 2 billion dollars.¹² In the decade 1972-1982, military exports rose from 155 to 443 million dollars for Spain, and from 213 to 350 million for Greece (again in constant 1981 dollars). The best example of this trend is the Italian and Spanish participation in the EFA (European Fighter Aircraft) project for the 1990s, alongside Britain, France and Germany. All five NATO Mediterranean countries plus Portugal are involved, to various degrees, in the European arms collaboration projects discussed and developed within IEPG.

(b) Stimulate more horizontal economic and industrial cooperation, not only among NATO and North African and Middle Eastern countries, but also "critical area" countries, for example in the Horn of Africa. Here, not only is the present contribution of such NATO industrialized countries as France, Italy and West Germany essential, but also the increasing concurrence of the other NATO southern countries -- Spain, Greece and Turkey -- that often maintain special relationships with North African and Middle Eastern countries. Of particular importance would be a more coordinated policy among NATO countries on civilian cooperation with Mediterranean developing countries and on military sales and assistance (especially in regard to clearly offensive, long-range weapons or nuclear energy technology) in the whole region.

(c) Establish some kind of Mediterranean crisis management machinery, until now utterly lacking, involving all actors in the region, or at least, certain more homogeneous regional subgroups. If this has not been possible until now, it has been due to formidable obstacles of a political, ideological and religious-ethnic nature. Far too little thinking has been devoted to this particular field.

- 3) To encourage, within the objective limits of Western NATO action and capabilities, the resolution of South-South multiple cleavages and the aggregation of stabilizing sub-groups of non-NATO states in the Mediterranean region, which means:

(a) Prepare and organize, more effectively than in the past, for multinational peacekeeping missions, or such

(b) Develop, under careful scrutiny, a web of economic and industrial relations with the Danubian and Balkan East European states in order to encourage (without illusions) internal economic reforms and a strong vested interest in maintaining East-West relations, stable and free from political-military turbulence.

(c) Exert pressure in East-West political diplomatic negotiations for better and cogent confidence-building measures (notification of significant military movements, exchange of observers in major exercises, periodical meetings between military leaders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as suggested by SACEUR).

(d) Establish more stable and effective consultation between the two superpowers and their allies on the main issues of regional security. The recent Soviet-American understanding for new consultation on the Middle East is an example in this direction.

2) To reduce the present and potential level of conflict along the North-South cleavage

(a) Improve NATO/Western conventional deterrence of local crises and conflicts with better coordination of national Rapid Deployment Forces, and even multinational Western contingency planning for limited crisis management in the Mediterranean-Middle East Areas. This would mean transforming NAVOCFORMED into a permanent multilateral naval force and assisting militarily (with aid and training) the more friendly non-NATO riparian states.

next few years. Yet, this is not likely because of political and economic constraints. The reality is that the current Italian navy, and even more so the Spanish, Greek and Turkish navies, are mainly calibrated for limited and separated operations in not too distant waters.

The operational limitations of European NATO navies would become glaringly evident if the Sixth Fleet were even partially engaged in providing badly needed support to other, simultaneous U.S. military operations in the Middle East and/or the Gulf. To cope with this kind of contingency would demand from NATO a complete rethinking of the present role of the AFSOUTH Command in Naples and the setting up of a framework for genuine allied combined operations by more integrated and multinational naval forces in the Mediterranean.

NATO and Mediterranean Security:
An Agenda for the 1990s

Principal steps needed to improve NATO's Mediterranean security may be summarized as follows:

1) To improve stability along the East-West cleavage

(a) Take appropriate measures to maintain and upgrade, wherever necessary, the NATO defense posture in the Southern Flank, employing emerging technologies and coordinating better, if not integrating, the defense operational and industrial activities of NATO countries (as well as other pro-Western Mediterranean countries).

This ideal scenario, however, can by no means be taken for granted under the present strategic and operational conditions. Some analysts doubt that even with two aircraft carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. Sixth Fleet would be able to withstand the quantitative, if not qualitative/technological, saturation (and actual risk of destruction) by Soviet air and naval forces in this area, except perhaps by going nuclear very early. In this case, a more prudent deployment of the aircraft carriers to a safer distance from Soviet air-controlled areas would automatically imply, in a conventional conflict, forfeiting the option to defend effectively or retake quickly the Turkish straits, thereby allowing a Soviet naval thrust toward the Central Mediterranean. This situation is likely to worsen in the future, with the entry into service of the first Soviet conventional aircraft carrier now under construction.

Furthermore, in the present circumstances, it cannot be assumed that the Italian Navy, even in combination with, say, the Spanish and the French navies, will have the operational capabilities to conduct extended protection of naval convoys in the whole Mediterranean in the presence of a certain degree of opposition and, consequently, of a certain rate of attrition, while simultaneously carrying out other tasks, such as coastal defense. To perform both missions, a far more ambitious plan of modernization and expansion of the existing fleets will be needed over the

as the shortcomings of the NATO defense posture in the Southern Flank, NATO planners must consider in the initial phase of the hostilities at least the partial success of a Soviet surprise attack against the Turkish Straits. In this event, the conventional NATO scenario calls for the following measures. First, the deployment of at least two U.S. aircraft carriers with their task forces, and also with at least four nuclear submarines, in the Eastern Mediterranean, in order: (a) to neutralize as soon as possible the Soviet Mediterranean squadron; (b) to strike quickly against the Soviet air and naval bases from which Backfire bombers and other air and naval units could threaten directly, especially with cruise missiles, the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the NATO targets; and (c) to bottle up the Turkish Straits and to prevent any Soviet reinforcement to the south.

Secondly, there should be simultaneous deployments by the other NATO forces, principally the Italian Navy in the Central Mediterranean, in order to support the U.S. Sixth Fleet and to guard its rear against any surprise attack coming from Soviet air or naval units (especially submarines) already in place, or coming from possible staging areas in North Africa and the Middle East. Moreover, NATO European navies would have the vital task of protecting the main Mediterranean sea lanes up to Gibraltar and the Suez Canal (even if Suez would probably be blocked, as in past wars), and deterring or countering hostile actions by non-NATO riparian states.

political-military terms, given the difficulty of timely action to control or prevent Soviet air and naval activities, without the neutralization of SOVMEDRON (and, therefore, the launching of a decisive NATO attack), it appears at least on paper that it could be more difficult to contain the crisis than in the Yugoslav case, and to prevent escalation into an extended East-West conflict.

Still another possible scenario involves an extended East-West conflict, including Soviet attack on NATO's Southern Flank, especially against its weakest spot, the Greek-Turkish sector. In conventional NATO scenarios, there are several avenues of possible attack by Warsaw Pact forces: the Corizia Gap in Italy; through Yugoslavia and perhaps Austria; the Thracian and Bosphorus sector; through Bulgaria and the Black Sea; and the Northeastern Turkish border with the USSR. By far the most important military objectives for the Soviet Union in case of an East-West conflict in Europe and/or in Southwest Asia, would be: one, the swift seizure of the Turkish straits in order to control the sea access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, and two, the prompt elimination of the aircraft carriers and nuclear missile submarines of the U.S. Sixth Fleet deployed in the Mediterranean, in order to prevent NATO and U.S. conventional power projection and nuclear attacks against Soviet territory.

Unfortunately, in a realistic scenario, considering the slowness of Western political decision-making, as well

military assistance (sending arms, ammunitions and supplies) to the Yugoslav Armed Forces, and on the other hand, a naval blockade of the Strait of Otranto, to prevent the intervention of the Soviet Naval Squadron in the Mediterranean. NATO countries have the ability to do this, except for the absence of leakproof surveillance and detection of submarine activities in the Strait of Otranto, where for obvious political reasons pertaining to Albania, there are no comprehensive underwater sonar array systems, as there are in other sea chokepoints in the Mediterranean and the North Sea. Naval blockage of the Bosphorus and the Aegean Sea to prevent Soviet naval reinforcement from the Black Sea would also be possible, but much more likely to provoke direct Soviet reaction and escalation to a major East-West conflict.¹³

There is also the possibility of a limited conflict arising from an Israeli-Arab war in the Middle East, or an intra-Arab war or revolution, especially in the Gulf, involving direct Soviet intervention with airborne units and naval support in the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and the Gulf. In this classical "out-of-area" case, NATO/Western capability to react and control events had diminished over the last two decades in technical-operational and comparative terms, at least until the establishment of CENTCOM. But the capacity to respond has increased in terms of potential political willingness to face squarely the new strategic challenges to NATO interests in the region. In

ten years ago, can be ascribed largely to the relatively weaker Western demand for oil. No more than one-third of the reduction in dependence can be traced to technical efforts, oil substitution and alternative energy development. In sum, this is not altogether a healthy condition for Western and NATO political-military solidarity in times of future emergency. Besides the United States, only the United Kingdom and Norway have significantly improved their energy situation in the last decade, thanks to the North Sea oil. This fact might prove even more divisive for the Alliance, especially in the other, less well-endowed, European NATO countries.

East-West Conflict

At least three different kinds of scenarios involving East-West limited or general conflict may be considered. First, there is the possibility of limited conflict arising from Soviet and Warsaw Pact intervention in Yugoslavia. In this very difficult "grey area" case, involving a nonaligned country whose government (or part of it) might call for NATO/Western military assistance, we can assume that the Soviet Union would want to pursue a limited objective, trying to avoid an open and direct clash with NATO, combined with a declaratory policy that would put on NATO the responsibility for an East-West escalation in case of Western intervention in favor of Yugoslavia. A possible limited Western response, at least in the early stages of the crisis, might involve, on the one hand, logistic

The other scenario, much more likely in the present politico-strategic setting, would envisage a conflict between moderate and radical Arab states, or a revolution in Saudi Arabia, with the attendant risk of the disruption of important oil facilities. Such events could lead to open NATO European military and logistic support to possible intervention by the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force, or to a possible request for assistance by the more friendly Arab countries. In this case, the use of national RDF forces from NATO countries such as France and Italy might even be possible.

In any case, taking a more realistic view, sensitive to the greater vulnerability of the NATO European economies to an oil embargo, as well as to the diversified economic interests of the major European countries, notably France, Italy and West Germany, in both moderate and radical Arab states (including Libya and Iran), one reaches the inescapable conclusion that, in any crisis, the European allies will tend to behave much more cautiously than the United States, giving preference to diplomatic, political and economic means of pressure and persuasion over military means. The basic reason for this attitude is that even in these past few years of oil glut, the Western nations, particularly the European countries but also the United States, have done far too little to lessen their structural economic dependence on imported oil. The more favorable present situation in oil supply, in comparison to that of

major Western countries that have naval units in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area, or which may more easily send them there. No other NATO-Mediterranean country has declared itself ready to send naval units to the Gulf, both for political (especially domestic) and technical-operational reasons. This is notably the case of Italy, but the same can be said of Spain, another NATO country with a sizable navy, including a light aircraft carrier. On the other hand, it is clear that the NATO Mediterranean countries are quite willing and able, more than in the past, to enforce, if necessary, protection of sea lanes in the whole Mediterranean.

In any scenario of conflict in the Mediterranean involving major regional actors, the decision of the NATO European countries to intervene, politically and militarily, in coordination with the United States, will depend to a great extent on the assessment of the risk of another oil embargo by moderate Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Two different scenarios may be envisaged. One, involving a new Israeli-Arab war (which is unlikely in the near-medium term) could easily prompt the NATO European countries to adopt an attitude similar to that of 1973, when all but Portugal refused logistic support to U.S. military supplies headed for Israel. This could be the case especially if there was some uncertainty as to who initiated hostilities.

reaction depends very much on the perceived degree of political priority. The peacekeeping mission in Lebanon was considered very important, at least in Europe, but in the final analysis not essential, while helping to guarantee the security of such international sea lanes as the Suez Canal and the Red Sea was considered vital. On the other hand, when crisis or contingencies in the Mediterranean have been complicated by manifold political aspects, involving internal relations among NATO allies, relations with other non-NATO riparian countries and also East-West relations, the outcome has been far less satisfactory, as in the case of Cyprus or the containment of Libya.

Extended Crisis and Regional Conflicts
Involving Risks of Increasing East-West
Confrontation

Are the NATO allies today any more prepared to cope with risky conflicts in the Mediterranean and the Middle East than, say ten years ago, when the first oil shock swept away many illusions and hopes of unabated economic prosperity in the Western world? The answer must be rather guarded, because, while some progress clearly has been made, many weaknesses still persist.

Consider, for example, the question of Western military operations to safeguard oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Readiness to intervene and coordinate for the protection of sea lanes has been demonstrated by the United States, France and the United Kingdom, the three

capitals. Moreover, political objectives and national interests somewhat differed among France, Britain and Italy, and between the United States and its European allies. One consequence of this was an informal but limited military cooperation, conducted mainly by officials in the field, without any kind of joint command or operations. At most, we may speak of various degrees of coordination among the commanders of the Western contingents. The failure of the Lebanon mission was in fact due, on one hand, to the objective impossibility of reconciling the different interests and political and military objectives of the countries involved, and, on the other hand, to the lack of a clear Western strategy.

On the positive side, however, it should be noted that a similar multilateral operation involving the United States, France, Britain and Italy would have been politically unthinkable only ten years ago. Then, the Europeans would have preferred to delegate the task to the United States, as happened for all practical purposes in the Lebanon crisis of 1957. Moreover, subsequent Western multilateral cooperation in the mine clearing operations conducted in the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, although managed -- once again, for political considerations, through bilateral agreements with the Egyptians -- show that NATO, or rather Western, action may be effective when there is a clearly identified and shared objective, especially in military operational terms. In addition, NATO/Western

A third consequence is that the proliferation of light but effective air and naval weapons systems among all the riparian states has reduced the former freedom of action of the NATO countries in the Mediterranean, and increased the risk of military engagements in any regional political crisis. On the other hand, this diffusion of military power among smaller states is restricted to lower intensity operations in limited crises.

Likely Scenarios: Limited Crisis,
Extended Crisis, East-West Conflict

Today, the capability for adequate reaction by NATO countries to a number of crises or contingencies arising in the Mediterranean and/or in related areas such as the Persian Gulf must be realistically evaluated. Among the more likely scenarios would be limited crises involving mainly local actors, even if some of them may be "client states" or proxies of a superpower. One of the most recent examples has been, and still is, Lebanon, where Western diplomatic and military efforts, notably through the deployment of a multinational peace-keeping force to Beirut and offshore have failed. However, the case of Lebanon, a typical "out-of-area" issue, should not be taken as a general purpose model of Western action. Since it was not conducted for obvious reasons within the formal NATO framework, it was not a truly multilateral action, except for the multi-bilateral political consultations among the four governments involved, conducted from their respective

The Technical Factor

What has just been said helps to underline the need to avoid or minimize the risk of a technological-military gap with other Western industrialized countries. Otherwise, there could be further marginalization of the political-strategic role of the Mediterranean states. The need for joint research and development in air defense and support, in naval and antisubmarine warfare, and in other military fields important to Mediterranean security is, therefore, the focus of increasing attention. It is indeed a fact that the recent technological developments of weapon systems for air and naval warfare (such as accurate long-range, antiship cruise missiles deployed on small and high-speed platforms, sophisticated airborne reconnaissance and early warning, ocean surveillance satellites linked to ASW special sensors afloat or undersea, and nonmetallic mine warfare ships) have brought about significant changes in operational terms. One consequence has been the gradual "shrinking" of the Mediterranean Sea into a sort of a giant lake, where detection, deployment and engagement of military forces is much quicker.

A second consequence has been that in spite of all the progress in electronic warfare (ECM and ECCM), the bigger ships and even the most powerful naval forces of the industrialized countries have become vulnerable to surprise attack and strikes from the small but lethally armed ships that can be afforded by most less developed Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries.

vital international security operations as mine-sweeping from sea lanes, civil shipping protection, etc.: and to supply military aid and assistance to the weakest parties and states in the region, in order to foster an adequate balance of regional forces in the Western interest.

(b) Be ready to offer and supply special trade and industrial cooperation packages to non-NATO states integrating or establishing South-South regional subgroups that are more likely to contribute to the overall stability of the area (e.g. U.S. economic package aid to Israel and Egypt, EEC financing of industrial cooperation projects in the Maghreb countries, etc.)

(c) Make available Western political mediation services and diplomatic good offices (as requested, and compatibly with local nationalistic feelings) and to exert friendly pressure for arms control negotiations and confidence-building measures in the Mediterranean-Middle East area, acting especially on behalf of the more moderate and pro-Western states.

The Growing Role of Italy in NATO's Southern Region

The New Defense Model

"The control of the Mediterranean, which in the past was guaranteed by the large superiority of Allied air and naval forces, today is countered by the massive Soviet presence, and is made more difficult by the changed policy

of several riparian states. Hence, the necessity of a high capability of integration on the air and naval forces of the Atlantic Alliance and an improvement in the operational capability of national forces."¹⁴ This excerpt from the Italian Defense White Book indicates clearly the current trends in the security policy of Italy. After almost three decades of a low profile foreign and defense policy within the NATO and EEC context, Italy has been, perhaps surprisingly, one of the few NATO countries to take up with renewed energy the security challenges of the 1980s, starting with the issue of deployment of Intermediate Nuclear Missiles (INF), approved in 1979 and reconfirmed in 1984 by the Parliament. In the meantime, defense spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product has rapidly increased in these five years, from its lowest point of 1.71% in 1980, to 2.29% in 1984, with a real growth normally exceeding the minimum target of 3% per year agreed by NATO. This has been achieved in spite of a period of very low or even negative economic growth, and relatively high rates of inflation (16-20%) and unemployment. Moreover, Italy guaranteed by treaty in 1980 Malta's neutrality and for the first time in the post-war period sent in 1983-84 a sizeable contingent of troops to Lebanon, taking part in the multinational peacekeeping mission with the United States, France and Great Britain. In fact, Italy has started a process of extensively rethinking its security needs and responsibilities in the Atlantic, European and Mediterranean

contexts, aiming at a new defense model for the 1990s, in the framework of a more adequate balance between Italy's economic role as one of the seven western industrialized countries and a more dynamic foreign and defense policy.

The five-point Spadolini program for a growing political-military role of Italy in NATO and Europe, contained in the Defense White Book 1985 (only the second ever published after a first venture in 1977), along with the project for an extensive reform of the Ministry of Defense more or less along the path recently followed by the British (enhancing the role of Chief of Defense Staff and of the National Directors of Armaments), contains some domestic and international initiatives to foster West European cooperation in defense industry (within IEPG and a revitalized WEU). Above all it lays new foundations for an Italian defense modernly conceived for the first time along five interservice missions, for which an entirely new interservice budgeting system is foreseen, with a provisional forecast of 60,000 billion lire (over 31 billion dollars) for arms procurement in the next 15 years (an average of 4,000 billion lire, or 2.1 billion dollars per year).¹⁶

Briefly, the five defense missions are:

- 1) The defense of the North-East border. After the full normalization of the relations with Yugoslavia in the mid-1970s, the Italian security perception of an immediate air and land threat from the North-East is more relaxed.

This is not to suggest that the Gorizia Gap can be dismissed as the main axis of potential military penetration of the Italian northern plains in the case of an East-West conflict. Therefore, steps are being taken to correct some key deficiencies in present weapon systems and logistical support for the Italian Armed Forces, with a new Italian tank, new low- and medium-altitude air defense systems, and new antitank weapons, including attack helicopters (the Mangusta A-129). Considering R&D expenses for air support (development of the AM-X aircraft and the C³ Catrin system), at least 1.2 billion dollars will be spent in the next few years for the defense of the North-East border.

2) The defense of the South and the Sea Lanes. The shift in the threat to Italian security from the North-East to the South and the Mediterranean is leading to a natural increase in the role of the Navy, which seeks to deploy two task forces operating at long range westward and eastward of the Sicilian Straits. A key and rather debated point is the establishment of a Naval Air Force, with the possible acquisition of 18 V/STOL aircraft for the new "through-deck" cruiser Garibaldi, already at sea, but not yet operational. This matter, involving for the first time a power-projection capability and therefore a slightly more offensive orientation of the Italian defense model, would require Parliamentary approval. Over 1.7 billion dollars are budgeted for two new G.W. destroyers, two frigates, six mine sweepers, the upgrading of coastal defense, and R&D for 36 new ASW EH-101 helicopters.

3) Air defense. With some 1.4 billion dollars, Italy should be able to modernize its F-104 S interceptor aircraft; reinforcing the bases in the South; complete the procurement of 100 new multirole combat aircraft (MRCA Tornado); and continue R&D for the future European Fighter Aircraft. Another 1.3 billion dollars will be badly needed for a complete overhaul of the air defense system, replacing old Nike and Hawk missiles, and above all procuring Spada, Syguard-Aspide, Stinger missiles and modern antiaircraft guns for point-defense.

Italy is also thinking about the U.S. Patriot missile system, preferably in the future improved version, which might include an antimissile capability (although the costs appear staggering). Moreover, new bi- and tridimensional radars will be deployed in three new sites in Sardinia and Calabria to plug the present holes in the radar warning systems in Southern Italy.

4) The territorial defense. Here some improvements are expected in the mobility of land and amphibious forces, such as the San Marco battalion, in addition to the Carabinieri, in order to cope quickly with potential limited landings or attacks at any point along the 8,000 kilometers of Italian coast, especially in the more vulnerable south. Two engineers battalions have been redeployed to Sicily and projects for upgrading this presence to two infantry brigades are envisaged.

5) Actions of peace, security and civil protection.

While a special quick-reaction force for civil emergencies (FOPI) has been already formed (with a budget over 300 million dollars), the establishment of a genuine Italian Rapid Deployment Force (FOIR) still is under study.

The Defense White Book 1985 explicitly recognizes this necessity in order to cope with peacekeeping or security missions for limited crises in the Mediterranean, but it is clear that FOIR could be used also in support to territorial defense. Although some discussions are still going on, it will not be a large force, like the French FAR (47,000 men), but rather a smaller force, perhaps composed of some two brigades, with a permanent command, but with different units "on call" (airborne, mechanized, amphibious, alpine and logistic) normally assigned to other corps. Finally, the new long-term defense budgeting program includes over 2.5 billion dollars for ammunition, telecommunications and defense electronics, and infrastructure development.

A military and economic role of stablization

The stabilizing role of Italy in maintaining and developing economic and political-military relations with the other Mediterranean countries, inside, but also outside the Atlantic Alliance, may be envisaged along several lines. Starting with the neighboring East European countries, particular attention should be given to relations with Yugoslavia and Albania. Today, Italy is already one of

the major trading partners of both countries. The political normalization with Belgrade, which has taken place in the postwar period, has been embodied in the Treaty of Osimo, signed in 1975. With full respect for the current Yugoslav policy of nonalignment between NATO and Warsaw Pact, further progress is indeed possible not only in the economic and industrial field, already pretty developed, but also in the security field. For several years, Italian contingency planning for the defense of the North-East border has counted as an asset the possibility of a stiff Yugoslav resistance against any possible invader from the East before he approaches the Gorizia Gap. However, prospects for even a limited Italo-Yugoslav military cooperation have not been seriously considered. In fact, some preliminary hints from Belgrade of its readiness to explore opportunities for some cooperation with Italy in the domain of defense industry have not had any real follow-up. In addition to political and technical cooperation, one wonders if some kind of security cooperation in the form of a partially shared early warning system on the Yugoslav border with the Warsaw Pact countries might be envisaged. This could be done, for example, in the framework of future East-West agreements at the Stockholm Conference on European Disarmament as a measure to prevent surprise attack in the region.

As for Albania, the case is very different, and given the very careful and hyper-nationalistic attitude of this country, any kind of security cooperation with Italy, at

least in peacetime, has to be ruled out. However, Italy continues to be effectively the only NATO country to maintain extensive diplomatic and economic relations with Tirana, and recently Rome received the visit of a top official of the Albanian Government. Given the propinquity of the Albanian coast to Southern Italy, namely across the Strait of Otranto (only some 50 miles wide), it is of paramount importance for Italy and NATO that Albanian air and naval bases, especially the port of Durresi, should not be available to Soviet surface and submarine units. In fact, it is clear, and the Albanians are well aware of it, that relations with Italy present the least risk of Albanian sovereignty, while providing a quite necessary political and economic meaning.

Coming now to NATO countries, and namely Greece, with the recent peculiar position of Papandreu's government within the Alliance, here, too, Italy has a natural function of serving as a bridge to Athens, since Socialist parties have been brought to power in both countries. Italy throughout the postwar period has exerted a moderating influence on Greece, irrespectively of the contingent political shade of the Rome Government. It would be interesting, although slightly premature, to verify to what extent this link has been enhanced by the common participation of the Greek and Italian Prime Minister in the international meetings of the European Socialist Parties.

Besides relevant trade and economic ties with their inherent political value, a significant role in trying to inject more stability in the Greek link to NATO has been performed by Italy in the field of military cooperation with Athens. This includes bilateral and multilateral air and naval exercises in the NATO framework (NAVOCFORMED), some limited military training exchanges and, above all, a recent general agreement of cooperation in the procurement and supply of defense materials. The balance of military trade is largely favorable to Italy (by a 5-to-1 ratio) with an estimated export of more than 100 billion lire (70 million dollars) in 1982.¹⁷ For the future, several projects of cooperation in the field of corvettes, helicopters and mines are under study. Under the strategic and operational aspect, it has to be remembered that cooperation between Italy and Greece is essential for the air and naval control of the Ionian Sea and the Central Mediterranean, and that the NADGE radar sites in Greece provide timely warning to the Italian peninsula.

While concerned about Greece, Italy does not neglect at all the other key ally in the Eastern Mediterranean , Turkey. On the contrary, all the signs are that the Italian defense industry will play a significant role in the crucially necessary modernization of the Turkish armed forces. Negotiations are going on for the supply, under favorable financial agreements, of G-222 tactical transport planes, Lupo frigates, mines, overcrafts, patrol boats,

A-212 ASW helicopters, fire control systems, IVECO military vehicles, equipment for telecommunications, electronic defense, and spare parts. In 1983, Italy supplied Turkey with about 322 billion lire (about 180 million dollars) of military hardware.

At the opposite end of the Mediterranean, Italy carries on more limited, but gradually increasing, military relations with Spain, now that she has been admitted to NATO. There are no comparable joint naval exercises, although Italy in 1982 sold about 50 billion lire (30-35 million dollars) of defense hardware to the Spanish Government. Military cooperation between the two countries could in fact significantly improve in the next years, with the present Spanish participation to the EFA (European Fighter Aircraft) Program; with Madrid's interest in other possible ventures in the procurement of surface-to-air missiles and helicopters and with the development of second generation antitank missiles and of a new tank (perhaps in a trilateral format with Egypt).

Conclusions: The Long Road
to Mediterranean Security

The foregoing analysis gives rise to the following conclusions with respect to the role of the Southern Region within the NATO security system.

First, there has been a perceptible trend toward increasing stability in most NATO Mediterranean countries. If we compare the political situation in the late

1970s-early 1980s with the present one, we find the gradual overcoming of rather critical situations in Portugal, Spain and Turkey (although in quite different ways). Even Greece, which remains the more unstable country from NATO's standpoint, has shown some positive signs, especially where practical political and economic realities are involved. Italy, at another level, has succeeded in improving the continuity and stability of its political system in a very different domestic phase, overcoming terrorism and experiencing the first government coalitions in the postwar period led by lay parties other than Christian Democrats -- namely, Republicans and Socialists.

Second, there has been an objective convergence of political and security interests among the NATO Mediterranean countries because of the more or less parallel access of Socialist parties to power and governments. This has raised the possibility of a new preferential political-ideological channel of consultation and cooperation to the normal inter-government, diplomatic and economic-industrial channels. Although this factor should not be overvalued, it has demonstrated its utility in accelerating the resolution of such key-issues as the enlargement of EEC to include Spain and Portugal, a development with obvious security implications.

Third, the NATO Mediterranean region has shown in recent years in increasing responsiveness to the new needs felt and initiatives undertaken within the Atlantic Alliance

to improve Western security. An objective strengthening of formal and informal ties with NATO as a whole (e.g., in the cases of France and Spain) has been translated into more active participation by the countries of the Southern Region in a number of issues and initiatives ranging from INF to Mediterranean security to collaboration in defense industry.

Fourth, if on one hand the NATO Mediterranean countries, as a subsystem of the Alliance, have responded in a more positive way to the new requirements to modernize their armed forces and undertake additional security tasks in the region, they have, on the other hand, also started to demand more from NATO in terms of:

- a) resources devoted to the security of the Southern Region in comparison with the usual priority until now assigned to the Central Region of NATO;¹⁸
- b) the sharing of responsibility and effective decision-making with the major European countries of NATO (and also with the United States) in determining the future political and strategic course of the Alliance, both along the East-West and the North-South axis.

Fifth, one of the principal weaknesses of the NATO Southern Region is the economic and industrial sectors. Of course, the level of development varies greatly in the different countries, but as the capability for a full social economic recovery in the near to medium term may be judged as relatively limited, the capability of NATO Mediterranean countries to allocate more resources to defense and security needs will remain similarly limited.

Sixth, another weakness in the future role of the Mediterranean countries in the debate over Western security

is their limited capability, for historical, institutional and political-educational reasons, to elaborate original contributions and proposals for solving the major strategic issues affecting the Alliance. Although this aspect is slowly improving, with a growing public and professional interest in national security and political military issues, there is still a long way to go to reach the level of sophistication and in-depth analysis more common in the major North-Central European countries, not to speak of the United States.

Seventh, this mixture of strengths and weaknesses, coupled with rather young political institutions in most NATO Mediterranean countries, and often with a still unstable domestic consensus on key security issues, leads to a final development: Overcoming their past "marginalization" in comparison with the political and technical core of the Western security system, the Mediterranean countries now exhibit a strong "reformist trend," at least conceptually, within the NATO and West European context.

This reformist trend must be carefully channelled to adapt and improve the NATO institutional and operational framework in the light of the new challenges of the next decade: it can be exploited as a driving force for the gradual building of a more mature European identity in the field of security, from North Cape to the shores of the Mediterranean.

TABLE I

The East-West Naval Balance in Southern Europe

| <u>Naval Units</u> | <u>NATO (1)</u> | <u>Spain</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Soviet</u> | <u>Non-Soviet (2)</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|------------------------|-----------------|--------------|--------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| Submarines | | | | | | |
| -- cruise missile | 46 | 8 | 54 | 1 | | 1 |
| -- attack | 3 | 1 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 35 |
| Carriers | 3 | | | 2 | | 2 |
| Cruisers | 3 | | 3 | 11 | | 11 |
| Destroyers | 39 | 11 | 50 | 23 | | 23 |
| Frigates | 49 | 11 | 60 | 53 | 3 | 56 |
| Corvettes/Large Patrol | 43 | 22 | 65 | 10 | 3 | 13 |
| Fast Attack Patrol | 61 | 12 | 72 | 30 | 110 | 140 |
| Mine Counter Measures | 82 | 12 | 94 | 95 | 46 | 141 |
| Amphibious | 196 | 35 | 231 | 25 | 27 | 52 |

(1) NATO: Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal, France, U.S. Sixth Fleet

(2) Non-Soviet: Romania, Bulgaria

Source: Drawn from The Military Balance 1984-85 (IISS, London)

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THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATO MARITIME
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
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
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TABLE II
Major Trading Partners of the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern Countries

| | | | |
|------------|--|--------------|---|
| Spain | : U.S.A., France, West Germany, Saudi Arabia, Italy | Lebanon | : Italy, Saudi Arabia, France, U.S.A. |
| Algeria | : France, West Germany, U.S.A., Italy | Syria | : Italy, Iraq, West Germany, France |
| Libya | : Italy, West Germany, Spain, United Kingdom | Djibouti | : France, Japan, Kenya, Bahrain, Italy |
| Morocco | : France, Spain, West Germany, Italy | Saudi Arabia | : U.S.A., Japan, France, Italy |
| Tunisia | : France, Italy, U.S.A., West Germany | Somalia | : Italy, Saudi Arabia, West Germany, U.S.A. |
| Turkey | : Iraq, West Germany, Iran, Libya, U.S.A., Saudi Arabia, Italy | Ethiopia | : USSR, U.S.A., West Germany, Italy |
| Cyprus: | : United Kingdom, Iraq, Italy, West Germany | Iraq | : Japan, West Germany, Italy, France, Turkey |
| Greece | : West Germany, Saudi Arabia, Italy, France | Iran | : Japan, Italy, West Germany, Holland, India, France |
| Malta | : Italy, West Germany, United Kingdom, U.S.A. | Jordan | : Saudi Arabia, U.S.A., United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, Japan, France |
| Portugal | : West Germany, France, United Kingdom, U.S.A., Spain, Italy | Sudan | : U.S.A., Saudi Arabia, United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy |
| Yugoslavia | : USSR, West Germany, Italy, U.S.A. | Onan | : Japan, U.S.A., West Germany, Holland, U.E.A., United Kingdom, France, Italy |
| Israel | : U.S.A., West Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy | | |
| Egypt | : U.S.A., Italy, West Germany, France | Yemen A.R. | : China, Saudi Arabia, Japan, France, Italy |

Source: United Nations Statistics for the Year 1982.

TABLE III

Defense Expenditures and Economic Growth
in Mediterranean and Middle East Countries

| Country | <u>Defense Expenditure</u> <u>in Percent of GNP</u> | | <u>GDP Growth</u> <u>(in Percent)</u> | | <u>Inflation</u> <u>Rate</u> |
|-------------------------|--|------|--|-------|---------------------------------|
| | 1979 | 1982 | 1982 | 1983 | 1983 |
| Bulgaria | 3. | 2.9 | 4.2 | 3.0 | n/a |
| Hungary | 2.4 | 2.4 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 7.3 |
| Romania | 2. | 1.4 | 2.6 | 3.4 | 5. |
| USSR | 13-15 | | 4. | 4. | n/a |
| France | 3.9 | 4.2 | 1.6 | 5. | 9.9 |
| Italy | 2.4 | 2.6 | -0.3 | -0.3 | 15.9 |
| Spain | 2.3 | 2.5 | 1.2 | 2.3 | 16. |
| Portugal | 3.5 | 3.4 | 3.5 | -5. | 38. |
| Greece | 6.3 | 7.0 | | 0.5 | 2.0 |
| Turkey | 4.3 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 4.1 |
| U.S.A. | 5.1 | 6.5 | -1.3 | 3.3 | 3.2 |
| Yugoslavia | 4.5 | 5.2 | 1.5 | 0 | 3.5 |
| Algeria | 2.2 | 1.9 | 4.2 | 7.3 | 4. |
| Morocco | 5.8 | 9.0 | 5.6 | 0.6 | 7. |
| Tunisia | 5.0 | 3.0 | 0.3 | 4.5 | 9. |
| Libya | 1.8 | n/a | -2. | -2. | 9. |
| Egypt | 9.5 | 8.6 | 6.5 | 7.3 | 16. |
| Israel | 29.8 | 35.7 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 150. |
| Syria | 21.1 | 13.4 | 6. | 7.3 | 7.5 |
| Lebanon | | (15) | -2.5 | -6.0 | 12. |
| Sudan | 3.2 | 3.7 | 4.6 | -2.7 | 31. |
| Jordan | 17.2 | 12.1 | 6.0 | 5.5 | 5. |
| Saudi Arabia | 20.8 | 17.7 | 1.7 | -10.8 | 0.1 |
| United Arab Emirates | 5.6 | 9.8 | -5. | -7. | 0. |
| Kuwait | 4.1 | 5.7 | -7.6 | 4. | 4.7 |
| Oman | 22.9 | 23.8 | 4.9 | 5.5 | -2.0 |
| North Yemen | 15.7 | 16.4 | 5.3 | 4.2 | 5.0 |
| Iran | 11.5 | 14.2 | 5.6 | 5. | 20. |
| Iraq | 10.0 | n/a | -5. | -7.4 | 18. |

Source: The Military Balance 1984-1985, (London: IISS)

FOOTNOTES

1. "Interim Report of the Subcommittee on the Southern Region," presented by Ton Frinking to the Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Doc AB206-PG/SR (84) 2, p. 47 (French version).
2. Ibid., p. 50.
3. SCG Chairman's Press Statement, NATO Press Release (85) 1, Brussels, 9 January 1985.
4. M. Cremasco, "The Southern Flank of NATO: Problems and Perspectives," AIA Paper 23/84, IAI-TEPSA Seminar, Rome 19-20 October 1984, p. 1
5. Soviet Military Power, Second Edition, U.S. Department of Defense, 1984.
6. "Interim Report," op. cit., see note (1), for all the levels of forces here indicated.
7. "Interim Report," op. cit.. See also the interview with the Greek Alternate Minister of Defense A. Drososyannis published in the special supplement "Close up Greece," Military Technology, vol. VIII, issue X, 1984, p. 5.
8. The Military Balance 1984-85, IISS, London 1984.
9. "World Armaments and Disarmament," SIPRI Yearbook 1984, SIPRI, Stockholm 1984.
10. "World Armaments etc.," op. cit.
11. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1979-82, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, April 1984.
12. S.A. Rossi, "The Italian Defense Industry with Respect to International Competition," Defence Today, N. 78, October 1984, pp. 406-408.
13. The USSR has a vital interest in the Turkish Straits; in 1983, 8,000 Soviet ships have crossed the Dardanelles and 50% of Soviet trade depends on it. See "interim Report," op. cit.
14. La Difesa, Libro Bianco, 1985 (Defense White Book 1985), Ministero della Difesa, Rome 1984.
15. Among the industrialized countries, Italy has the highest dependence of its GNP from foreign trade, that is, 46%.

- 16.. "Nota Aggiuntiva allo stato di previsione per la DiFesa." (or) Additional note to the Defense appropriation bill" presented to the Parliament by the Minister of Defense, Sen. Giovanni Spadolini on 10 October 1984, Ministero della DiFesa, Rome 1984.
17. The source is an unclassified, but limited circulation document, "Dati de Base" (Basic Data) prepared by the General Secretariat of the Italian Ministry of Defense on occasion of the First National Conference on the Defense Industry, Rome, July 1984.
18. See the press declarations of the Italian Minister of Defense, Giovanni Spadolini, on 5 December 1984, after the NATO Defense Planning Committee, on the need to implement adequately the new NATO infrastructure program in the Southern European region.

FRENCH NAVAL FORCES AND THE
MARITIME STRATEGY

by

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French Peculiarities

In imparting below some of my thoughts on the role which should be assigned to naval forces in "Free World" strategy, the author places himself in a strictly French perspective, since it is France's peculiarities which may be of interest to U.S. readers. Of course, he assumes sole responsibility for the ideas included in the present study, even while making every effort to reflect the most commonly held French views whenever it is possible to do so. This approach will be facilitated by the general consensus in France concerning its foreign policy and above all, its defense policy, the continuity of which over the last 25 years should be underlined. Thus it may be useful to begin with a discussion of the main principles underlying that policy.

First, while France is well aware that it no longer holds the preeminent place it held for so much of its history, it has, nevertheless, refused to give up its global role. More than any other European country, it still has major interests and close friends all over the world. Above all, it senses that it still must convey that universal message, which originated in the Age of Enlightenment and which was expressed by the French Revolution and the Declaration of Rights.

Second, the awareness of this mission sometimes prompts French leaders to deliver speeches with an "unilateralist" or "Third World" emphasis and, often, to proclaim that will to national independence and concern for independence of decision which were at the heart of France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military organization. But this withdrawal has in no way disengaged France from the Atlantic Alliance; France has remained entirely faithful to its Atlantic friends and has proven this with deeds whenever its partners were confronted with adversity. The French people continue to view this solidarity, particularly with the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, as an absolute necessity.

The third and last peculiarity of French policy deserves to be emphasized, since it is almost unique in the West: in France, there is no panic fear of the nuclear developments, whether civilian or military and the pacifist "capitulationist" trend is quite negligible in our country. Both phenomena are interconnected, of course, but above all they illustrate the general consensus on French defense policy, as well as the feeling of national identity which is deeply rooted in French history and culture. As a matter of fact, this defense policy is essentially aimed at preserving peace by attempting to establish regional military balances of power at the lowest possible echelon and by managing crises, using a mixture of determination and negotiation. To these ends, France has given priority to the strategy of

nuclear deterrence as far as Europe is concerned, and to the strategy of external action for the rest of the world.

Many people in France, being well aware of the limitation of its resources and desirous of drawing its European allies with it so as to remove the temptations of neutralism, and restore confidence in its common destiny, also wish that the defense of Europe may be organized in a "more European" posture. It must, of course, be well understood that the French are in no way contemplating questioning the active participation of the United States in such defense, which is considered to be irreplaceable.

One must add, since this comment will justify the following study, that the possibilities offered by the naval forces to support such policies are favorably perceived in France, at least at the echelon of the higher political and military decision makers. Such a point should be emphasized for it is quite new. In spite of its geographical situation at the extreme cape of Europe, with two long sea-frontiers on the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, France has for a long time had an essentially continental defense policy. Still, there have been many periods in its history, and most of the time glorious ones, when France has turned to the high seas, such as that which had decisive consequences for the American Independence.

Evaluation of the Threat

The priorities given to the strategies of nuclear deterrence and external action in French defense policy have resulted from valuation of the threats to our security and interests, both in Europe and outside of Europe. Therefore, I think it proper to mention the main conclusions of this evaluation, as they are generally seen in France.

First of all, it is clear to the French people that these threats are mainly due to the Soviet Union, since that country obviously has a formidable capability for aggression all over the world and particularly in Europe.

On the continent, the French generally feel that, in view of the nuclear deterrence which they continue to consider efficient, the French are vulnerable above all to the potential for selective blackmail which the Soviet Union is afforded by the conventional and nuclear arms massed opposite our territory. In fact, the fear engendered by a Soviet military superiority in all aspects could result in separating Western Europe from the United States over the long run, or perhaps sooner in case of crisis. It could also separate the Federal Republic of Germany from France, in order to neutralize and then "Finlandize" France before making it a satellite, all without combat.

Outside of Europe, the situation seems to be more complex. First, it is obvious that nuclear deterrence, by rendering any East-West military confrontation near "sanctuaries" suicidal, contributes to the transfer of such

confrontation to the Third World, where it has the opportunity to creep into the crises which prevail there almost permanently. It is also obvious to us that the Soviet Union, with the assistance of its satellites of the "Socialist camp," plays an active role in these areas particularly through extensive weapon transfers and military assistance to ambitious or unstable states, and to revolutionary movements in order to entice them to its side. Finally, it appears clear that the Soviet Union is aspiring to play a leading role at sea and overseas, and to that end equipped itself with a first-rate ocean going fleet and large airborne forces which have already started to extend Soviet influence by demonstrating their power.

Here, too, the French feel that the Soviet Union is pursuing a largely political rather than military design and that consequently its strategy (as in Europe) is essentially indirect. We also feel that it is a cautious strategy. We can observe, during crises, that the Soviet Union carefully avoids any direct encounter between its forces and those of the United States, and in general, those of any nuclear power. Finally, we believe that it would be dangerous to exaggerate either the military or the political potential of the Soviet Union, as this would inspire fear and capitulation. Actually, Soviet military forces are without their weaknesses, especially in the naval area. The Soviet strategic posture has also experienced setbacks, especially in Africa.

However, the French also feel that it would not be very realistic to limit the military threats to their interests outside of Europe to those posed by the actions and capabilities of the Soviet Union. Third World states have their own motives for creating disturbances and wars which may threaten world peace because of their regional consequences or the risk of spreading elsewhere. These states, the majority of which are coastal or insular, are equipped with often highly sophisticated military -- especially naval and air -- weaponry, which is generously supplied by East or West, or which they produce themselves. They may be tempted to use or threaten to use these weapons against French nationals, friends, sources of supply or lines of communication, in order to support Third World complaints and claims against the nations of the "North."

If we look at the world's current trouble spots -- the Near and Middle East, Saharan Africa, Southern Africa, the Caribbean and Central America, and Southeast Asia -- the French can see how great their vulnerabilities are.

Evolution of Our Assets

For the above reasons, France has given priority to nuclear deterrence and external action strategies in its defense policy. Yet, what resources, one might ask, does France currently have at its disposal to implement these strategies, and to promote its evolution and refinement between now and the end of the century.

As far as deterrence at the strategic level is concerned, France has to date clung to three means: aircraft, silo based ballistic missiles and sea launched ballistic missile on nuclear propelled submarines, all of which are considered complementary. However, Annex A, below, which sums up the composition of their nuclear forces, shows that the part played by the Navy component is getting progressively bigger. France already has five submarines each of which carries 16 single nuclear warhead missiles, and a sixth submarine is currently being commissioned with missiles of increased range, equipped with six nuclear warheads. This gives them a total of 176 SLBM warheads as against 34 airborne and 18 ashore.

For the future, the recent five-year military program included the adaption of four of the above ballistic missile submarines to carry these new missiles and the order of a seventh SSBN of a new generation. However, no funds have been provided yet for the construction of a new mobile land ballistic missile currently under study, or for the reconnaissance satellite planned several years ago and obviously necessary for both deterrence and external action. No decision has been reached yet about the possible development of a long-range cruise missile like the "Tomahawk."

Regarding the weapon systems equipping our tactical nuclear forces, two major developments have been programmed: first, replacing airborne bombs with mid-range

operated in Egyptian waters exploded approximately twenty mines dating from the 1973 war. Mine hunting is a technique for which the French Navy is particularly well equipped. It participated actively in the 1972-1974 mine clearing operations in the Suez Canal and from 1980 to 1983 maintained a mine hunter group in Djibouti in order to be operationally ready to intervene quickly in the Strait of Hormuz, if it were to have been mined by Iran.

From these three operations, many lessons may be derived as to the possibilities, and also the limitations, of military actions in a crisis. The author would emphasize the following key points:

- All these operations were started at the express request of the governments concerned.
- They proved that France had significant intervention capabilities at her disposal, especially in the naval area covered by this study.
- From a political and psychological standpoint, naval-air task groups are much easier to handle than air-land forces wherever they can be used.
- Finally, it is better to use air-land forces only for "coups de poing" operations -- that is, very quick reactions of limited duration, as provided for in French military doctrine.

Participation in the Defense of Europe

Previously, the author has only mentioned the Mediterranean theater in talking about Lebanon although it has permanent priority in our planning for external action. In fact, we have kept many important interests in the

months and required the permanent presence in Beirut of over 1,500 men from elite units, permanently supported from the sea by a naval-air task group which most of the time included one aircraft carrier and which sometimes consisted of almost half of our combat ships. It was this group which successively evacuated over 1,000 Western nationals, and later Palestinian combatants encircled in Beirut camps; cleared the port of Beirut of mines, exchanged 4,500 Palestinian prisoners for eight Israeli prisoners; and escorted 4,000 Palestinians who remained faithful to Arafat from Tripoli to Yemen.

It was also the carrier aircraft of the naval task group which flew two retaliation raids, one against a Syrian battery after the bombing of the French Embassy, and another against a camp in Baalbek after the criminal attack against one of our barracks in Beirut caused the death of fifty eight French soldiers. This latter raid, which was a technical success, failed from a psychological standpoint as a result of an unskillful handling of information on our side, as well as a clever disinformation campaign on the other side, which serves to remind us that now a military intervention is often won or lost on television.

The latest operation in which the French Navy has participated was the mine hunting operation in the Gulf of Suez and in the Red Sea. At the respective request of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two mine hunter groups were sent to this area as soon as the alarm was given, and the group which

These facts are confirmed by the French intervention experience over the last few years, the locations of which are detailed on Appendix F. The most recent ones occurred in Chad, Lebanon and in the Red Sea. The operation in Chad was still going on when this paper was written, since the simultaneous withdrawal of Libyan and French troops, although negotiated, still was in suspense. After the French had given up trying to stop the Libyan invasion by an air raid right at the start of hostilities, they did succeed in limiting it, at the cost of considerable effort. The French had to keep up over 3,000 men from elite units in the middle of the desert for 15 months. They were equipped with armored vehicles and combat helicopters, supported by Air Force attack and fighter aircraft, and protected by Navy radar aircraft. They received logistical support by air over 10,000 km distances (Algeria did not authorize the overflight of its territory), while heavy equipment was transported by sea via the Cameroons which did authorize transit.

In Lebanon, the French contingent of the Multinational Security Force (FSMB) was the last to leave Beirut, but the French have kept over one hundred military observers in the city at the request of the Lebanese Government, as well as a naval-air task group at sea. France's participation in the United Nations Interposition Force (UNIFIL) on the Israeli-Lebanese border was also raised to 1,500 men. The operation proper lasted for 22

Navy for the same purpose; this was the case in Chad, recently, and in Mauritania beforehand.

Naval diplomacy, however, has its limits when it does not by itself result in negotiation. There is the possibility of military intervention to settle a crisis by force, or at least to permit a favorable outcome. The author will not concentrate on the political, legal, diplomatic and psychological precautions which must accompany such a decision, in order to justify it before national and international public opinion. In its military component, our doctrine emphasizes, although cannot necessarily guarantee, that military intervention must be a quick reaction, prepared in secret; planned in relation to the available means; strictly limited as far as its objective and duration are concerned; and, of course, closely controlled by the highest echelon of political power. A close inter-Service cooperation is essential for success, a success which is imperative since failure would certainly entail very serious psychological and political consequences. This cooperation poses few problems of jurisdiction in France, since all high political and military commands are now well aware that air-land means are generally essential to act promptly and occupy the terrain, while the naval-air forces are irreplaceable, if there are no bases within reach, or if there are plans to hold out, or withdraw.

states. French permanent military forces overseas, therefore, include approximately 30,000 men, who are distributed as indicated in the enclosed Annex E. The French bases we have, in Western Africa and at Djibouti in particular, also facilitated the deployment of its Rapid Action Force based in metropolitan France, where one-third of its strength, i.e., in the near future 15,000 men, are kept in an operationally ready condition, the other two-thirds being able to follow within a very short period of time.

There is no need to dwell on the possibilities offered in time of crisis by French naval forces, a large portion of which are permanently deployed overseas and are reinforced, when required by the situation, by aircraft carriers and attack submarines sent to the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific in particular. As a matter of fact, due to their legal status, their ability to remain on station, their low profile and flexibility of employment, with means well adjusted to actions abroad, e.g. aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, specialized commandos and mobile logistical equipment, French naval forces can be used in close support of diplomacy, in a way sometimes referred to as "naval diplomacy." When naval diplomacy cannot be used because the sea is too far away, the "AWACS diplomacy" can sometimes usefully replace it. France has no AWACS yet, but it is contemplating obtaining them. For the moment, France often uses the shore-based maritime patrol aircraft of the

Obviously, the limitation of the French national military forces us to limit our ambitions to regions of the world where our national interests are the most important -- that is, the Mediterranean, Africa, the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific and the Caribbean.

The author will briefly mention the passive measures included in French strategy of external action, namely the technical military assistance the French are providing to approximately thirty Third World states at their request, and French transfers of weapons to these states, and to many others, regrettable though it may be, without always determining the strategic advisability of such transfers. French transfers consist mainly of airborne weapons, naval weapons representing less than 10 percent of the arms sold by France, which is, as everybody knows, the third ranking exporter of weapons in the world, mainly to the Maghreb and the Middle East. In mentioning the latter area, it should be noted that France also contributed to the creation of a Pakistani Navy, and is currently delivering a "turnkey" fleet to Saudi Arabia. Mention has already been made of the part played in the Gulf conflict by Iraq's Super-Etendard aircraft carrying Exocet missiles.

When the French think now of active crisis prevention, they give priority to the prepositioning of forces -- that is to say, to military presence, with its heartening effect on friends, its pacifying effect on unstable countries, and its convincing effect on restless

of the energy supplies and raw materials needed for economic and social survival. This dependence generates the most significant sea-borne traffic in Europe and makes France as dependent upon maritime trade as the United States.

Therefore, France is obliged to have a strategy of external action. It is perfectly aware of the fact that this strategy must not be exclusively military or even mainly military, and attaches an importance to the political, economic and social aspects of the North-South relationship which its allies sometimes consider exaggerated. As for French diplomacy, it is a means of conducting dialogue with Third World states, especially those which are French-speaking, and using bonds of friendship maintained to former colonies, long established ties to Arab countries, or more recently, with the so-called "nonaligned" countries.

While giving the priority to diplomacy, in order to remain credible French strategy of external action abroad should not exclude the possibility of military action. The existence, presence and demonstration of military power is unquestionably of political significance. Further, if in our times, it has not generally resolved political problems, one cannot deny that military force has often helped give solutions an opportunity to develop. To this end, however, military power, or better its demonstration without actual use, must be used in direct support of diplomacy, so as to continuously combine determination and negotiation.

In France, these fears also resulted in a renewed interest in the reorganization of the defense of Europe, in a "more European" direction, as will be explained later.

Exterior Action Strategy

We must first analyze France's strategy of external action since it is considered as closely complementing the French strategy of deterrence.

Although France wants to pursue a worldwide policy in the diplomatic and cultural fields, it has also retained substantial responsibilities overseas, especially in defense, exceeding those of all its European partners. First France is responsible for the security of its Overseas Departments and territories, spread around the ocean, and a geostrategic reality, which has placed France second in the world (together with Great Britain) for overall sea surface, with 11 million km² of "exclusive economic zones," which ranks just behind that of the United States. It is also responsible for the protection of the 1,500,000 French citizens who live in overseas territories, and of the 1,500,000 other French nationals scattered all over the globe. It is, finally, responsible for assisting friendly states to which it has promised help, all of which are located in Africa and the Indian Ocean, and which have shown their trust by signing mutual defense treaties or military assistance agreements with France. It must also be added that France depends on overseas sources for practically all

as far as their capacity to protect the national sanctuary against a nuclear attack is concerned. On the other hand, none of the French political parties or significant currents of opinion recommend theories of the "no first use" type, as in the United States, or unilateral renouncement of nuclear weapons, as in Great Britain. Finally, the complete delegation of power to the President of the Republic for the decision to use nuclear weapons is absolutely unquestioned, the President of the Republic being the Chief of the Armed Forces according to the constitution of France.

Nevertheless, the protests over nuclear deterrence which are getting more and more blatant among our allies, both in the United States as well as Europe, are beginning to alarm France seriously, as is the development of destabilizing technologies, which in the long run could make our weapon systems more or less obsolete. In the forefront of these technologies is, of course, the American project of "Star Wars" (SDI). The French consider it will have a destabilizing effect in the transition period, since it will entail a new qualitative armaments race and risk seeing one of the contenders take advantage of a temporary superiority. It was for these reasons, plus the latent fear of strategic uncoupling between Europe and the United States, which led the French Government to propose an international moratorium on the military use of space at the UN Disarmament Conference in June 1984.

stated, since "the certainty of uncertainty" and the "unpredictability of course of action" are fundamental principles of deterrence. Thus, the deterrent effect is not limited to the national sanctuary alone, since, as was recognized in the Ottawa declaration, France's independent nuclear strategy introduces an additional factor of uncertainty for the aggressor by confrontation with multiple decision makers.

However, as far as the French deterrence concept at the tactical level is concerned, it is much different from the doctrine of flexible response which is still in effect in NATO. We contemplate using our tactical nuclear weapons -- that is, ground missile or aircraft-borne bombs and, soon, air-launched missiles -- in a single strike linked to the maneuver of our air-land battle corps. The military effect on the aggressor would be as an "ultimate warning" before the use of French strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, this concept, too, has an essentially political finality, and in order to emphasize it, the decision has just been made to call French tactical nuclear weapons "prestrategic" weapons. For the same reason, it is planned to separate their command from the battle corps command as soon as the weapon range has been increased with the new Hades missile.

It must be noted that both concepts, strategical and tactical which together make up our nuclear deterrence doctrine, are not seriously questioned in France, at least

The French system is thus technically reliable and it is considered in France, as in the United States, that there is no foreseeable technical revolution in submarine detection which could seriously challenge their relative invulnerability. However, the expected improvement in ballistic missile defense (BMD), which is so much in question at present, is more disquieting over the long run. Although no one hundred percent efficient system can be envisaged, the submarine will retain the ability to get closer to its target in order to reduce the time required for the missile to cover its trajectory and to adopt a semi-orbital trajectory (FOBS). The submarine also could be adapted to launch cruise missiles.

The French doctrine of strategic nuclear deterrence is still called the "weak to strong" doctrine, for its purpose is to submit a possible aggressor to a threat the damages of which would be out of proportion to the advantages derived from the aggression. Thus, it is essentially the threat of massive anticity reprisals, even though with the larger number of nuclear charges we now have at our disposal, it probably aims at economic and administrative targets as well. It has, therefore, something in common with the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), all things being proportional. As a result, the threat this doctrine implies can only be credible when France's vital interests are at stake -- the limits of these vital interests not being, of course,

by a recently launched telecommunications satellite; and a permanent organization of joint commands all over the world. Its weakness, in addition to the lack of a reconnaissance satellite, is the inadequacy of long-range and high capacity military airlift capabilities, although here the recent operations in Chad showed that the requisition of civilian aircraft could make up for it.

Therefore, French naval-air and air-land capabilities for nuclear deterrence and external military action are far superior to those of all France's European allies, including Great Britain. They may look modest when compared with those of the United States, but their impact can exceed their relative size depending on how and where they are used.

Nuclear Deterrence Strategy

For France, the mission of strategic nuclear deterrence is now essentially the responsibility of the French Navy. With its six ballistic missile submarines, the Navy has 176 nuclear warheads at its disposal, and this number will be increased to 496 at the beginning of the next decade through the progressive replacement of existing missiles by the new multiple warhead and increased range missiles. For the past two years, we have kept three missile-launching submarines permanently on patrol, and since the commissioning of our first SSBN in 1971, they have carried out approximately 150 patrols without any problem.

the construction of ballistic missile submarines for the Strategic Ocean Force (FOST). As a result, there is a plan for renewing the fleet through the Year 2000 timeframe, the main objectives of which are summed up in Annex B. The 1984 military five-year program mentioned earlier has begun the implementation of this renewal. The Program's decisions to order a new nuclear propelled aircraft carrier of approximately 40,000 tons, as well as three landing ship docks equipped with helicopters, confirm, in particular, the will to reinforce our external action forces.

This is also evident in the air-land forces' program, especially through the already started build up of a 47,000 man Rapid Action Force (FAR) including five highly mobile professional divisions, the resources of which are summed up in Annex C. The creation of this multi-purpose force, also adapted to rapid intervention in Europe, will multiply by two our assets specialized in external action.

It must be added that France has a strong infrastructure overseas: a network of bases and facilities in its Overseas Departments and Territories (DOM TOM) in the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific, South Atlantic and Caribbean, as well as in a number of African countries bound to France by reciprocal defense agreements; air-land and naval-air forces routinely prepositioned in these strong points, including approximately 30,000 men under normal conditions; a worldwide military communication network using stations located in these strong points, and now reinforced

air-to-ground missiles (ASMP), which also will affect carrier borne Super Etendard attack aircraft; and second, replacing the Army's 150 km range "Pluton" missiles with the new 350 km range "Hades." On the other hand, the decision to build neutron bombs, for which France already has the necessary technical expertise, has not yet been reached. There are no plans to equip our surface ships, other than aircraft carriers, or our attack submarines with nuclear weapons. However, it must be recalled that these ships are already equipped with many conventional warhead antiship missiles of the Exocet family which became famous in their air-to-surface version carried by Argentine Super-Etendard aircraft during the Falklands conflict, and by Iraqi planes in the Gulf conflict.

If one briefly reviews the conventional resources of the French Navy, one discovers that it is equipped with approximately 125 combat ships, including two aircraft carriers, one helicopter carrier, twenty attack submarines, and over 200 carrier or shore-based aircraft and helicopters. Its antisubmarine and antimine warfare capabilities are satisfactory. The Navy also has a sufficient number of amphibious transport ships and logistical support ships to meet its normal requirements, and can requisition merchant ships in periods of crisis, as it was the case during the recent operations in Lebanon.

However, French conventional ships are starting to get old, because for twenty years priority has been given to

Mediterranean area. These are not only historical, cultural and economic, but also geostrategic, since the Maghreb is for France as Mexico is for the United States. In addition, the Mediterranean is still one of the world's continual trouble spots, with many potential conflicts: in the North-South, South-South and even North-North contexts, if we consider the permanent disagreement between Greece and Turkey. This is why the hope the French have periodically expressed for a Mediterranean Pact among bordering states has always been doomed to failure.

We are well aware that the Mediterranean is also extremely important in the East-West confrontation and consequently in the defense of Europe. It remains a vital, but highly vulnerable, route for international trade: 140 merchant ships cross the Strait of Gibraltar each day, and sixty, the Suez Canal; Marseille is the eighth largest port in the world and the second oil port in Europe, behind Rotterdam and before Le Havre. It is through the Bosphorus that the Soviet naval forces transit to patrol the Mediterranean, as well as the Indian Ocean. Also, the Mediterranean is strategically essential for the protection and support of NATO's Southern Flank military dispositions, as indicated by the permanent presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Eskadra.

All these North-South and East-West considerations have led France since 1972 to concentrate the "hard core" of its conventional naval forces, i.e., the two aircraft

carriers and most of their modern attack submarines, in the Mediterranean. The attention of foreign readers should be drawn to the dilemma which possession of two sea fronts has always posed for France, and the importance which the French attach to free traffic through the Strait of Gibraltar traffic which is as significant to the French as that of the Panama Canal for the United States. The naval and air control of the Western Mediterranean which the French want to keep -- in close coordination with Spain and Italy -- is a point worth mentioning, not only for the Atlantic Alliance, but also for the West in general.

The author now comes to the position of France in the defense strategy of Europe. Basic to the understanding of what follows is the thought: for the French, in the field of strategy, the word "defense" is an antonym for "deterrence," since the purpose of deterrence, which for them can only be nuclear, has always been to prevent war, while the word "defense" implies the possibility of a conventional or nuclear battle and, as a result, the failure of deterrence. With this interpretation, defense is an insurance against the risk of the failure of deterrence, and the French, consequently do not question its military necessity. However, they do think it has a mostly political importance, that of showing our allies our complete solidarity and equally that of informing a possible aggressor of France's determination, since the French consider that the military threat which hangs over all of Europeans due to the Soviet

Union is dangerous mostly because of the fear it entails.

The French, therefore, consider their strategic nuclear deterrent to have a deterrent effect which goes beyond the limits of French national security. The concept of deterrence at the tactical level, as summarized above, undoubtedly poses serious problems, political as much as practical, at the allied level. This subject needs to be fully and frankly discussed with the Federal Republic of Germany, and if that country so wishes, consider the possibility of cooperation. Surely it is possible to find solutions for this cooperation which would be acceptable to all.

Such a cooperation would of course give rise to difficult problems of practical application, but these would not be more difficult than those posed by the possible commitment of our five-division Rapid Action Force (FAR), the innovation of which consists mainly in its helicopter-equipped airmobile division. In preparing for this eventuality, the French must show their will to strengthen military solidarity with Federal Germany, so as to be able to intervene sooner and closer to the "iron curtain" than our battle corps, as it is currently deployed, could do. We must also be able to tackle the Soviet "mobile operational groups" which would have gone through the "forward defense." The French battle corps, made up of the 1st Army and supported by the Tactical Air Force with its 300 aircraft, includes eight divisions, and that one of its

three armored division corps is deployed in the Palatinate and Baden-Wurtemberg, where it constitutes an essential part of the reserves of the Central European theater. Obviously, since after the withdrawal of France from the NATO integrated military organization, this commitment of the French battle corps (or, for that matter, the FAR) cannot be assumed automatic, but there are permanent liaison teams on both sides at all command echelons and some very precise technical agreements have been concluded to cover the different circumstances.

The same trusting cooperation exists in the maritime field, that is to say, in the Mediterranean between the French Commander-in-Chief (CECMED) and NATO or U.S. counterparts CINCSOUTH/COMNAVSOUTH or COMSIXTHFLT, and in the Atlantic Ocean, between CECLANT and SACLANT or COMSTRIKEFLT. As noted, French sea and air control in the Western Mediterranean is an important safety factor for NATO, as is French control of the Atlantic approaches, between Gibraltar and the Strait of Dover, where over 350 merchant ships transit each day in the immediate vicinity of French coasts. From a more concrete standpoint, NATO has often expressed the desire to rely on the use of French sea ports and airports initially for transportation of the U.S. reinforcement forces, to the Central European theater of operations, and later for transportation of the logistical support of these forces. Although, there is no doubt that these facilities would be put at the disposal of France's

allies, this is not a major problem for the military efficiency of common defense since the Atlantic Alliance could not afford, and therefore could not intend to conduct, a prolonged war against the Soviet Union. Therefore, French strategy can only be based on deterrence which must be essentially nuclear, and which is also nuclear for French allies, even if they are tempted to rely also on the "deterrent" effect -- using this term in a sense with which the French do not agree -- of new nonnuclear, but "intelligent" weapons, which will be extremely efficient due to their accuracy and surface effect, and their capacity for deep strikes.

Aside from maintaining effective military control over the above sea areas which is carried out under all circumstances as part of its national responsibilities, but which also meets NATO requirements, the French Navy gives priority to nuclear deterrence in Europe. In fact, with its missile-launching nuclear submarines, whose security it must ensure, the French Navy is essentially responsible for France's strategic deterrence. Since its carrier aircraft are equipped with nuclear weapons, the Navy may also have to participate in nuclear deterrence at the tactical level, that is to say with their "ultimate warning" strike. Finally, as it is trained to operate with and in support of the air-land elements of the FAR, the Navy would be technically capable of participating in possible allied operations on the Southern Flank of the European theater, as the Royal Navy does on the Northern Flank.

In addition to the political solidarity, often asserted in principle and confirmed in practice during major crises, there is a de facto complementarity in Europe between the French Navy and that of its allies. This complementarity, moreover, also exists outside Europe.

Allied Cooperation

First, it is worth considering briefly one aspect of the allied cooperation which is currently a focus of European and American preoccupation -- namely, the "Europeanization" of the defense of Europe.

The French generally hope for a more European defense of Europe, mainly for political and psychological reasons, rather than for military reasons. Like all Europeans the French feel that U.S. participation in this defense will remain irreplaceable for a long time. Yet, it seems that the wish for Europeanization expressed in the United States, after a long period of reluctance, has opposite motivations. Many Americans now feel that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is no longer credible for the defense of Europe, especially in the case of a conventional aggression and that the Europeans must consequently take a progressively larger part in their own conventional defense. This presumably would lighten the heavy burden on the United States, and permit it to redeploy its forces outside of Europe, where military threats are most likely to appear. A military disengagement of the United States from Europe is not a

possibility, for it would mean at the very least a Soviet political domination over our continent in the near future, and as a result, the fall of the United States to the rank of a secondary power. But the problem of a new distribution of responsibilities among the Allies is none the less pressing.

A complete analysis of the possibility for Europeanization of the defense of Europe is beyond the scope of this paper. That for the French, it is necessary to point out such a prospect rests essentially on a reinforcement of Franco-German solidarity and complementarity, in armaments as much as in strategy. In the latter regard, as mentioned previously, the possible commitment of the new FAR in Germany is of significance. In armaments, however, it has become necessary for cooperation to be extended to all European countries, if France expects to take up the financial, industrial and social challenges -- that is to say, the fundamentally political challenge, resulting from introduction of new advanced technology in conventional weapons and the prospect of new space weapon systems. It would not be acceptable for Europe to become completely dependent on the United States in both fields, when it has shown strong capabilities in forefront techniques, whenever it chooses to unite its efforts (for example, successful Ariane or Airbus programs). This is why France has just made new concrete proposals to its European partners about an observation satellite and, in particular, a space craft.

Another important aspect of the Europeanization of defense must be mentioned -- namely, the possible organization of a European nuclear deterrent. The particularities of the French doctrine of deterrence contribute to extending its effect beyond our national sanctuary, without its being actually possible to give formal guarantees to our neighbors in this respect. This is especially true since the Americans themselves say they are currently unable to do so. Also previously mentioned are the possibilities of a closer Franco-German cooperation concerning the use of French tactical nuclear weapons. There remains, however, the possible organization of a strategic deterrent for a specifically European purpose. This is highly unlikely since the opportunity for Franco-British cooperation in this field was so deplorably missed, although some people in both countries are still pining for it. The decision to replace Polaris with Trident missiles actually integrated the British strategic deterrence into the U.S. system, even though Great Britain retains the freedom to decide whether they will be used.

An interest is unlikely to be aroused at the political level in the proposal for a Multilateral Naval Force (MLF) consisting of submarines and/or surface ships carrying a specifically NATO or European deterrent system. This point is mentioned here because it is possible that the idea could be taken up again in the future with respect to intermediate nuclear forces, on the occasion of new

East-West negotiations on these weapons, or to allay the fear aroused by their installation in certain European countries. However, the cure would be worse than the problem, since the true question is that of our determination facing the Soviet blackmail. In any case, France would not be favorable to such a deployment.

In the following section, cooperation will be examined with emphasis on naval matters outside the area covered by the Atlantic Alliance. The possibility of a geographical extension of the Alliance's responsibility constitutes a longstanding problem which was already subject for debate in the early fifties, when the author was a member of the French delegation to the NATO Standing Group in Washington. Other proposals put forward have met with no greater success. First, General De Gaulle suggested to General Eisenhower in 1959 that there be established a three power directorate of the Free World. Then, in 1981, a proposal was made by the directors of four institutes of international relations -- one each in the United States, France, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany -- who took up an idea of Mr. Brzezinski and suggested the establishment of a world directorate with political competence. Political competence would evolve from the regular meetings of the seven major industrialized western countries -- Italy, Canada and Japan, in addition to the four countries already mentioned. In reality, all they achieved was a declaration of principle made in 1983 when

the group met in Williamsburg: the security of the seven countries was considered to be indivisible and was to be perceived as a whole, worldwide.

After these setbacks and the unhappy experiences with CENTO and SEATO, it would be pointless to persist in the attempt to institutionalize allied cooperation outside the NATO area. Institutionalization of this type has no particular value and could even prove harmful to the proper interests of the Free World.

Restricting our study for the present to naval matters, institutionalization of cooperation is unnecessary at a technical level, since allied naval and air forces are already prepared to operate together without advance notice. These forces already exchange information regularly, they use the same tactical rules, their communications are compatible and they undertake regular exercises to check their ability to act together. Lastly, the supervision of allied commercial shipping, the only area where improvisation is impossible, has long been the subject of satisfactory cooperation agreements.

A new organization would be useless also from a practical standpoint, since outside of the United States, only France and Great Britain have military forces adjusted to fairly extensive actions abroad. Moreover, this will be true for Great Britain only for a short period because, contrary to all expectations after the Falklands affair, that country has confirmed its former decision to limit its

military ambitions to deterrence and the defense of Europe. In addition, with the recent exception of Italy, which participated in the Security Multinational Force in Lebanon, and then, in the mine search in the Gulf of Suez, only these three countries have proven they were politically willing to involve themselves in actions overseas. It appears from the above considerations that the only allied cooperation which can be contemplated abroad ultimately depends on bilateral, or possible multilateral, agreements applying to particular circumstances, and not on new institutions or new treaties.

However, it is the French view that new treaties announced ostentatiously, can only be prejudicial to the well understood interests of the Free World. In fact, they inevitably evoke opposition from Third World states, although such states often wish to ask for assistance in time of crisis, provided the French retain a low profile beforehand -- that is, "remain beyond the horizon." As far as efficiency is concerned, a complete alignment of the major powers would also deprive us of the tactical options permitted by the diversity of our diplomatic relations with Third World countries. Additionally, the U.S. leadership implied, by the proposed institutionalization, a level of global interallied cooperation has not proven attainable in recent crises. In particular, it has often appeared that the Executive Branch in Washington has been constrained in its actions, by the limitations imposed by the Congress, by the constant violation of military secrets by the media, and

by the pressures of a public opinion which does not easily put up with failures and losses of men. The best alternative to do is to stick to a "discreet" but loyal partnership for action abroad, with the understanding that such a partnership implies total unity of action in cases of serious events.

As far as France is concerned, its resources -- naval forces, mobile air-land forces and permanent installations throughout the oceans -- enable it to act differently from and in other places than the United States. Thus it contributes more effectively to the cause of the Free World, than if French forces were totally integrated into the U.S. system, where their weight might only be marginal. This is particularly true in the Mediterranean, in Africa and in the Indian Ocean, and the French wish it could also be true in the South Pacific, where they still have important interests and significant assets, but where they have come up against intrigues by some "Anzus" members. These intrigues have something to do, among other things, with the difficulties the French are now experiencing in New Caledonia, especially considering the geostrategic importance of this island.

International Restrictions

The present study is not complete without reviewing the possible strategic consequences of existing international agreements or the possible adoption of new international agreements on the quantity, quality or deployment of military forces.

First, concerning the Law of the Sea, after some hesitation, France approved and signed the new convention of 1982, feeling that the guarantees it offers in respect to free passage in territorial waters and international straits, in particular, surpassed possible disadvantages, for example, in regard to the exploitation of ocean resources. With the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Greece, France distanced itself from the other sea powers of the Alliance. The United States voted against this, and Great Britain, the Federal German Republic and Italy abstained and did not later sign the convention, as the Warsaw Pact countries did after also having abstained from voting.

On the level of national legislation, France has marked off and declared its exclusive economic zone around its Overseas Departments and Territories and off the Atlantic coast. So far, it has not done so in the Mediterranean, as was agreed by the riparian states. This consensus, however, has just been broken by Egypt, and many maritime sovereignty cases are at issue in the Mediterranean, specifically those resulting from Libya's claim to the Gulf of Sidra, and from the competition between Greece and Turkey over the territorial waters and continental shelves around the Aegean Sea islands.

Concerning free passage in the straits, it should also be noted that France found itself forced to regulate seaborne traffic in the English Channel, where more than 350

ships, including many oilers, transit each day. It did so with the approval of other riparian states and of the qualified international organizations, with the hope of avoiding the recurrence of very severe pollution which had devastated its seashore after several wrecks. Another agreement on the prevention of sea pollution was signed with Mediterranean states, but covers mainly measures to be taken ashore for preservation of the sea environment against pollution. In this case, France's interest is only of a political nature, inasmuch as the organization concerned is the only one in which all Mediterranean states could get together to achieve a common end.

France has unpleasant memories of naval disarmament agreements, because they suffered the limitations imposed between the two World Wars under the joint pressure of the United States, (which was concerned about the rearmament of Japan), and Great Britain, (which wanted to keep an absolute superiority in Europe). Indeed, England did its best to keep the French fleet at the level of the Italian fleet, and then agreed to release Hitler's Germany from the naval limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles without consulting France. These historical recollections may have something to do with French opposition, in principle, in 1983, when the UN decided to deal with the problem of worldwide naval arms limitations.

The stated position of France on nuclear disarmament is to base its participation in international negotiations

consequence is that the Navy is a contributor to strategy formulation, but certainly not a prime mover as to what the strategy is to be. Indeed, the Soviet Navy appears to be viewed as a cousin rather than a brother-in-arms by members of the other services. For example, writing in Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, a volume in the Soviet Officers Library series and edited by Colonel General N. A. Lomov, Major General V. V. Voznenko stated that the "navy, due to the specific missions carried out by it, has always been an independent service of the armed forces."¹ In his The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, the former Minister of Defense Marshal A. A. Grechko described "the operational art of the Navy as standing somewhat apart."²

The writings of Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the Navy's Commander-in-Chief, provide some glimpse into the priority accorded the Navy in the formulation of strategy. That Gorshkov has caused to be published under his name two major book-length works since 1972 extolling the virtues of sea power and what a navy can do for a country is itself of significance. No other service chief for at least three decades has found the need to do the same vis-a-vis his own service. Also of significance are some of Gorshkov's assertions. Early in the first of the works, a series of eleven articles collectively entitled "Navies in War and Peace," Gorshkov wrote of "Russia's Difficult Road to the Sea," and he argued how the:

SOVIET NAVAL FORCES AND THEATER STRATEGY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO PLANNING

by

Donald C. Daniel and Gael D. Tarleton

Outlined below are some features or elements of Soviet military strategy for a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Europe. Within that context an attempt is made to specify where the Soviet Navy of VMF (Voyenno Morskoy Flot) fits in and offer implications for NATO planning.

Soviet Theater Strategy
and the Role of the Navy

Our discussion here is divided into four topics that focus on: (1) the formulation of Soviet strategy; (2) its changing emphases over time on the warfare possibilities which must be prepared for; (3) the overall goals and operational requirements embodied in it; and (4) a central Soviet perspective on warfighting affecting implementation of the strategy.

The formulation of
Soviet military strategy

An important starting point for considering the role of the Soviet Navy in a European war is that the strategy for such a war is formulated by the Soviet General Staff. This group is dominated by a ground forces orientation. The

SOVIET NAVAL FORCES AND THEATER STRATEGY:
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
by

Dr. Donald C. Daniel

Ms. Gael D. Tarleton


MIDDLE EAST

MINESWEEPING OPERATIONS



APPENDIX E

FRENCH MILITARY DEPLOYMENT



EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC AREAS

| | Surface Area (km ²) | Surface Area ZEE (km ²) | No. of Inhabitants | Status |
|---|------------------------------------|---|---|--------------------------|
| <u>Atlantic:</u> Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon | 242 | In the process of defining (approx. 50,000) | 6,000 | DOM |
| Madagascar, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Saint-Martin | 1,800 | 170,900 | 380,000 | DOM |
| Guadeloupe, Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and Saint-Martin | 1,100 | | 355,000 | DOM |
| French Guiana | 91,000 | 130,140 | 73,000 | DOM |
| <u>Indian Ocean:</u> Island Territories of the Indian Ocean Tromelin Bassas da India, Europa Juan da Nova Glorieuses | 2,500 | 312,360 276,290 246,980 66,040 68,300 | 500,000 | DOM |
| Mayotte | 380 | 50,000 | 40,000 | Collective Individual |
| Reunion Saint-Paul and New Amsterdam Chapelle des Crozet | 7,215 107 212 | 583,430 509,760 658,500 | Negligent Negligent Negligent | TOM* |
| <u>Arctic:</u> Marie Coast | 432,000 | 112,080 | Negligent | TOM* |
| <u>Pacific Ocean:</u> New Caledonia Guam, Chesterfield, Hawaii, Hunter Ellis et Futuna French Polynesia Marquesas, Tuamotu, Pitcairn, Tubuai, Palmyra, to which Johnston is added) | 19,000 280 4,000 | 2,105,090 271,050 5,300,000 | 140,000 10,000 140,000 | TOM TOM TOM |

(*) These two together constitute an administrative unity, the Territories of Australia and French Antarctica (TAAF).

APPENDIX C
RAPID ACTION FORCE

This force of 47,000 men will be flexible, mobile, and equipped with great fire power.

It will consist of:

- essential elements of command and support
- a logistical brigade
- a division of parachutists
- an aeromobile division
- a naval infantry marine
- a light-armored naval division
- an alpine division

It will dispose of:

- 210 helicopters of which 90 are antitank
- 180 armored engines
- 80 pieces of artillery and 120 mortars of 120 mm
- 24 armored vehicles equipped with Hot missiles
- 490 launching stations for Milan missiles
- 220 Antiaircraft missile systems

Its general headquarters is at St. Germain en Laye (near Paris).

APPENDIX B
FRENCH NAVAL FORCES

417.

| SHIPS | PRESENT NAVY | NAVY IN 2000 |
|---|-------------------------------|--------------|
| <u>Strategic Naval Forces</u> | | |
| Nuclear submarine launch missile (SSBN) | 5 | 6 |
| <u>Combat Ships</u> | | |
| • Aircraft carriers (CVA) | 2 (+ 1 helicopter carrier) | 6 |
| • Antisubmarine ships (DD) | 14 | 18 |
| • Antiaircraft ships (CG, DDG) | 6 | 9 |
| • Dispatch vessels (FF) | 22 | 18 |
| • Patrol ships (PG) | 24 | 10 |
| • Antimine ships (MSO) | 24 | 40 |
| • Submarines : SNA (SSN) | 1 | 10 |
| Diesel (SS) | 18 | 4 |
| <u>Support Vessels</u> | | |
| • Operational transport (LPH, LPD, LSD) | 10 | 9 |
| • Logistical support (AO, AE, AS) | 10 | 14 |
| <u>Patrol Aircraft</u> | | |
| • ATLANTIC | 40 | 40 |

| PROGRAMS 1984-1988 | ORDERS | | DELIVERY | |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|
| | 1984-1985 | 1986-1988 | 1984-1988 | AFTER 1988 |
| <u>Ocean Strategic Forces</u> | | | | |
| • New Generation SSBN | -- | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| • Recast of M4 from SSBN | 1 | 2 | 1 | 3 |
| • Transformation SUPER ETENDARD (ASMP) | 10 | 40 | 40 | 10 |
| <u>Combat Vessels</u> | | | | |
| • Nuclear Aircraft Carriers (CVN) | -- | 1 | -- | 1 |
| • Corvettes and Dispatch (DD, FF) | -- | 3 | 3 | 7 |
| • Nuclear Submarines (SSN) | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| • Antimine Ships (MSO) | 6 | 5 | 14 | 6 |
| • Patrol Ships (PG) | 4 | -- | 10 | -- |
| <u>Support Vessels</u> | | | | |
| • Logistical Ships (AD, AR) | -- | 2 | 1 | 2 |
| • Landing Barge Transport (LPD) | 1 | 2 | -- | 3 |
| <u>Patrol Planes</u> | | | | |
| • ATLANTIC (new generation) | 2 | 14 | -- | 16 |

APPENDIX A

FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCESSTRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES

- 18 ICBM : SS 3 missile - range 3500 km - warhead 1 MT
- 5 SNLE : 16 MM 30 missiles - range 3000 km - warhead 1 MT
- 34 MIRAGE IV : 1 AN 22 bomb of 60 KT - combat range 1600 km (4000 km with in-flight refueling)

TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES

- 42 PLUTON missiles : range 120 km - warhead 10 KT
- 64 MIRAGE III and JAGUAR Aircraft : 2 AN 52 bombs of 15 KT
- 36 SUPER ETENDARD Aircraft : 2 AN 52 bombs of 15 KT

PLANNED DEVELOPMENT

(Programming Law 1984-1988)

- Deployed in 1985 the 6th SNLE armed with M4 Missiles (range 5000 km - 6 warheads 150 KT)
- Reconstruct M4 Missiles from 4 SNLE (1 before 1988)
- Order a new generation from the 7th SNLE (service 1996)
- Achieve hardening of command network to ground (RAMSES) and create airborne command network (ASARTE)
- Missile armament ASMP (range 300 km - warhead 150 KT) of MIRAGE IV (18) then of MIRAGE 2000 (36) of the SUPER ETENDARD (43)
- Replace PLUTON missiles by HADES missiles (warhead 350 km) (in service 1992)
- Pursue strategic mobile missile studies SX (service 1996)

countries, they should most often be interpreted as an asset to the Free World, to the degree that our common security does not rest solely on our military power, but also on the political power which results from this pluralism and testifies to our real freedom.

In conclusion the greatest advantage of the naval force can be found in its ability to support the national policy in a discrete manner, whenever this policy is expressed by the diplomacy. That French Naval Forces can act elsewhere and differently from those of the United States is an additional asset for the Alliance. It must be understood, of course, that members of the Alliance must all be interdependent in case of severe circumstances, at least this is the general feeling of a large majority of French people towards the United States, as was confirmed by a sample survey conducted a few days before the recent reelection of President Reagan. As President Franklin D. Roosevelt put it, "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

has independent control of its deterrence, with all the associated responsibilities as to world peace and the future of mankind that such independence brings. It alone, or almost alone, on behalf of Europe if desired, has the necessary military forces and the political will to carry out a strategy of external action or to participate in the settlement of crises overseas, as consistent with the well understood interest of our many friends in Third World countries. Finally, France alone could take the initiative, through close cooperation with the Federal German Republic and in loyal coordination with the United States, of a more European organization of the defense of Europe, and thus contributing to a restoration of confidence in the destiny of "our old continent."

Since European sentiment is that the United States remains the essential and irreplaceable guarantor of a balance of power and consequently of peace in Europe, a better sharing of tasks among Europeans, according to their respective capabilities, would make it possible to optimize our joint military power and, hence, that of the Alliance. Therefore, France should be considered as a particularly reliable and faithful ally, even though it may sometimes appear to be a difficult partner. This situation probably results for the most part from an awareness that the French remain responsible for their national destiny, given our independent defense policy. As for the possible differences in the perceptions and relations of France with Third World

priorities -- namely, the relative importance given to each strategy and, as a result, to the forces best suited to external action and to the defense of Europe. This dilemma is not unlike that with which the United States itself is confronted, as evident in writings of Robert Komer, Stansfield Turner, and Edward Luttwak. In France there are also supporters of a largely "maritime" strategy, tempted by some kind of "unilateralism" and supporters of a mostly "continental" defense strategy which would favor "coalition" aspects.

However, the choice in question is more imperative and decisive for France than for the United States because of its limited financial and industrial resources. So far, the decision has not been definitely reached, since the French Navy still gets less than 20 percent of the defense appropriations, while the deterrent gets over 30 percent. Furthermore, the austerity imposed upon France by its economic situation does not foretell any significant evolution in the near future. However, the recent Five Year Military Program has shown a certain trend towards more "navalism," as in the order of a new SSBN and a new CVAN together with the organization of the FAR, which will multiply by two French air-land capabilities for external action.

Before concluding, it is important to emphasize the responsibilities falling to France as a result of its defense orientations. France alone, of all European powers,

Atlantic, where the European Space Test Center is located on the Kuru site in the Department of Guiana. So, French and U.S. concerns are converging to a certain extent in each of these ocean areas.

It was this same concern for complete freedom of movement and deployment at sea which prompted France to refuse, with its Western allies, proposals that the Conference on Disarmament in Europe should extend its competence to naval forces, as the Soviet Union hoped. French diplomacy has thus been working with international authorities towards maintaining and developing naval strategies.

French Responsibilities

This is not to suggest that naval strategies, and more generally speaking, indirect strategies, are a panacea. However, the naval approach is often an answer to our needs in perennial crisis situations, and that France has important assets at its disposal. Still, a country located as France is at the end of a continent and submitted to the threat of considerable air-land forces cannot disregard continental strategies, and the consequent armed forces equipment that such strategies entail.

Since French feel that it is in all cases essential for them to possess a nuclear deterrent in order to avoid having to "defend" Europe, and to enable them to "act" abroad, the French are confronted with a problem of

on: 1) a previous large and verifiable reduction in the nuclear "overarmament" of the two superpowers; 2) the significant progress toward conventional and chemical disarmament in Europe; and 3) the absence of new ballistic missile defense capabilities. Meanwhile, in order to keep complete freedom of action in the build-up of its nuclear forces, France did not sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), although it stated that it would comply with its provisions. Nor has France signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Sea Bed Treaty (SBT), although it gave up tests in the atmosphere. For the same reason, France has strongly protested Soviet insistence on taking French nuclear forces, and those of Great Britain into account in U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

In the same spirit, France wants to keep complete freedom of deployment for its nuclear forces where ever French security rests on deterrence. This is the reason why Paris has always been opposed to the establishment of denuclearized areas in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. It is also opposed to any limitation on the movement of nuclear-propelled ships, or ships carrying fissionable material. In this regard, France is mostly concerned about: the Indian Ocean, in which its Department of the Reunion and Territory of Mayotte are located, and where French naval-air forces are permanently deployed; the South Pacific, where it is also a riparian state and where the Mururoa nuclear test center is located; and the South

". . . opponents of Russian seapower have widely used and are widely using falsification of its military history. In particular they assert that all of Russia's victories have been gained only by the Army and that it can be powerful only by strengthening the Army at the expense of the Navy."³

In the second edition of the second work, a book entitled Sea Power of the State, Gorshkov included a section on "The Strategic Employment of the Fleet." He emphasized the unity of Soviet military strategy, but he did it in such a way as to leave the impression that he was not entirely satisfied with the role assigned the VMF in that strategy. He asserted several times the need to pay proper attention to oceanic as well as land theaters, and he was critical of Napoleon, the epitome of the ground forces marshal, for his preoccupation with land warfare and his failure to recognize the contribution which naval forces could have made to France's overall military effort. He was also critical of the Czarist leadership at the time of Russia's defeat in the 1904-05 war with Japan. While the land strategy for the war had, he writes, "been thoroughly worked out in Russia," that for the Navy had not because,

". . . at the end of the nineteenth century in Czarist Russia insufficient attention was being devoted to theoretical thinking on the patterns of armed combat in sea theaters."⁴

With these and other assertions Gorshkov hints at some dissatisfaction with the recognition given the Navy and maritime warfare in Soviet military strategy. It must be

stressed, however, that the dissatisfaction can only be relative in that, as documented by numerous Western writers, the VMF has come far in the last two or so decades. Now equipped with aircraft carriers, impressive nuclear submarines, and formidable antiship missile-carrying bomber aircraft, it has extended outward the distance from the homeland where it can bring power to bear during war. Nevertheless, the point remains that the VMF's mission and resource allocation priorities for a European war will be determined by a General Staff and a wartime command structure generally characterized more by a continental than a maritime perspective.

Warfare scenarios

Ever since the late 1950s to early 1960s the USSR has clearly exhibited its readiness to fight not only in a nuclear environment but in chemical and biological ones as well. Indeed, at least through the mid-1960s, the principal war scenario underpinning Soviet strategic thought seemed to be that for a short, quick, NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict where central as well as theater nuclear systems would be used by both sides from the start of the war. Naval developments clearly reflected this scenario in terms of the assets allocated to the VMF, the research programs it instituted, and the operations it undertook.

Among the assets (many of which remain in use today) were missile-armed submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. Cruise missiles were placed on all of these platforms and

ballistic missiles only on submarines. The ballistic missile shooters were intended for use against land installations as were some of the early cruise-missile submarines, but as guidance systems were developed to track mobile at-sea targets, all cruise missile shooters were dedicated to striking principally at high-value surface ships. Of the latter, American aircraft carriers were the primary target since they could launch nuclear-armed aircraft against the Soviet homeland.

Consistent with their expectation of a relatively short and quick nuclear war, Soviet naval platforms constructed during this period were, for the most part, expendable, having little sustainability and few, if any, onboard reloads for their major weapons. In particular, those units armed with antiship cruise missiles faced the prospect, as Norman Friedman put it, of being able to fire only one salvo before essentially disarming themselves.⁵ A result was that the "battle for the first salvo" became an obsessive concern, i.e., they had to place their hope in getting in the first telling blow and doing so preemptively, for not only might they not get a second chance, they might not even get a first chance against a fully prepared, fully alerted enemy.⁶

A great deal of Soviet naval research during this period concerned missile systems. As noted above, much effort was devoted to developing and improving guidance systems for antiship cruise missiles. Some of these

missiles were also designed to allow for their underwater launch from submarines, thereby enhancing the survivability of the shooter. Underwater launch was incorporated as well into submarine-launched ballistic missiles. In addition these missiles were given greater range, thereby increasing both the targeting flexibility and survivability prospects of the carrying platform by widening the area of water in which it could hide and still be target-effective. VMF research also stressed the detection and tracking of surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, and of submarines, especially American ballistic missile submarines since the threat they posed to the Soviet homeland was certainly no less than that of the carriers.

The desires to neutralize both the carrier and ballistic-missile submarine threats and to place VMF's own land-attack missile shooters in proper position to fire had very strong impact on VMF operations, for these desires drew the Soviet Navy onto the high seas. They dictated that the Soviet Navy would have to venture forth to where the carriers and ballistic-missile submarines could operate to launch strikes on the homeland. Indeed, the ideal situation called for destroying the American units at a range beyond which they were in position to launch strikes. In the early 1960s this meant an operational horizon whose outer limits could stretch as far as 2000 or so kilometers from the homeland. Thus the Soviet Navy slowly established itself as a regular fixture in the Norwegian and Mediterranean Seas,

and beginning in the early 1960s it carried out large annual exercises which throughout the course of the decade concentrated on massing units to strike at aircraft carriers. As will be discussed below, major open-ocean antisubmarine exercises did not begin until 1973 (partly due to a shortage of appropriate ASW platforms), by which time the Soviets may have already decided that they wanted the bulk and the best of their operational ASW capabilities to be concentrated closer to the homeland rather than spread over the oceans in an essentially fruitless search -- until they achieved a breakthrough in ASW detection -- for very stealthy U.S. SSBNs which now had missiles with a 4600 kilometer range.

The decision to concentrate in-hand ASW capabilities closer to home was probably an offshoot of an overarching decision reached in the late 1960s or early 1970s, and which remains applicable today, to place greater emphasis on the possibility of nonnuclear, protracted war scenarios. We must emphasize that we say "nonnuclear" rather than "conventional" because we do not know where chemical or biological weapons fit into present Soviet strategy. As argued in the final section, this uncertainty is a major concern for which NATO will have to prepare.

Emphasis on the possibility of nonnuclear conflict has been evidenced both in writings and exercises, and the emphasis reflects at least three factors. One is an obvious and understandable desire to avoid any nuclear attacks against the homeland and against Warsaw Pact forces operating on the Western fronts. The Soviets seem especially concerned that even a very limited use of nuclear weapons raises too many uncertainties about the course and outcome of a war, and they offer the prospect that they themselves would then be forced to respond with large-scale use rather than suffer further damage and see their forces and associated command-control-and-communications seriously degraded.

The second and third factors are closely related. The USSR's achieving parity or better with the United States in intercontinental and European theater nuclear systems has given Moscow that sense of assurance that it can deter Western nuclear use should a NATO-Warsaw Pact war break out. In addition, the USSR's remarkable buildup in conventional ground, air, and sea forces since the mid-1960s provides Moscow with the possibility that it might achieve its own war aims through the use of nonnuclear systems only. In short, the Soviet pledge of no-first-use in the event of war indeed may be sincere, for Soviet forces are striving to be in a position to defeat Western forces in nonnuclear combat.

The changing makeup of the Soviet Navy has paralleled the emphasis given to preparing for nonnuclear, protracted war. Over the last ten years or so, and especially since 1979, VMF ships and submarines have been larger and more sophisticated, with greater sustainability and firepower, than their earlier counterparts. For example, the 37,000-ton Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carriers were not only the first fixed-wing aircraft carriers in the Soviet Navy, but also its largest-ever surface combatants. The 25,000-ton nuclear-powered Kirov battle cruisers are the heaviest combatants (other than aircraft carriers) found in any of today's navies. New Soviet conventionally-powered cruisers now average roughly 12,000 tons displacement and destroyers about 8,000 compared to roughly 8,000 and 4,000 tons respectively for units produced in the early 1970s. Both the 25,000-ton submerged displacement Typhoon ballistic missile submarines and the 14,000-ton submerged displacement Oscar antiship cruise missile submarines are respectively the biggest naval strategic and tactical submersibles ever built anywhere. Supplementing these water-borne units are Backfire air-to-surface missile bombers, which have nearly doubled the combat radius of earlier VMF antiship aircraft.

In short, it is no longer appropriate to regard the Soviet Navy as an expendable force which must survive only long enough to get off one nuclear salvo in the first few moments of war. The possibility of a longer war means that units are no longer expendable, particularly in view of the

present-day strategy which it never had in the past: guardian of the nation's strategic nuclear reserve embodied in the missiles found in the Navy's modern SSBNs. Until the early 1970s or so, the SSBNs were probably intended to participate extensively in initial (retaliatory) or follow-on strikes which might occur in a war, but as the Soviets built up their land-based missile arsenal and as additional and presumably more survivable SSBNs came into service, military planners could contemplate having in the submarines a sizable strategic reserve less susceptible to sudden and extensive attrition than the fixed land-based force. The reserve presumably guarantees that no matter how much the West might be tempted to resort to nuclear threats or attacks on the Soviet Union and its strategic forces, the USSR would always have an assured residual capability to respond and dissuade such Western moves.

The dissuasion role is doubly important because the Soviet Union will probably remain unable for the foreseeable future to put at risk the United States' own SSBN strategic reserve. Thus, until the Soviets achieve an ASW breakthrough (which they are striving mightily to do), they are driven to concentrate on dissuading America from using missile submarines for either blackmail or attack.

Somewhat ironically, while Soviet SSBNs may themselves be the most survivable of that country's strategic forces in the face of an American nuclear strike, they are also the most vulnerable to destruction by

conventional weapons in the course of a nonnuclear protracted war. Unlike Soviet antisubmarine warfare (ASW) forces, which, as noted above, are not credited as having much capability against U.S. SSBNs, American ASW forces have been perceived as having the potential to detect and destroy elements of the Soviet SSBN force, particularly those which might remain unprotected. This perception has had significant impact on Soviet strategic planners, for it is now generally accepted among Western observers that a (if not the) primary task of VMF general purpose forces in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict is protecting Soviet SSBNs. Since 1973-74 new units have been equipped with missiles able to hit sites nearly 7000 kilometers distant. Thus, these boats can remain in waters close to the Soviet homeland and still be effective against most of the critical targets in North America. Most of these SSBNs will remain in those waters in war where they will benefit from a layered defense maintained by the tactical naval forces. Indeed, even the best and the bulk of the VMF's ASW assets will not be out on the high seas seeking out U.S. SSBNs; rather, as Secretary Weinberger has pointed out, they will be retained generally near or in the maritime approaches to the homeland in order to protect the ballistic missile shooters from American general purpose submarines, probably the most effective of the U.S. ASW platforms.⁷

The above activities will occur within the larger context of Soviet military and naval activities expected to

take place in the presently emphasized wartime scenario. These are discussed in the next section.

The goals and operational
requirements of present
Soviet strategy

One can identify at least three overlapping and closely related general goals in present Soviet strategy: (1) preventing all attacks (especially nuclear) on the homeland; (2) preventing enemy forces from occupying any part of the homeland or Eastern Europe; and (3) taking the war to and capturing intact as much of Western Europe as possible. In support of these overarching goals Soviet forces will strive to achieve three subsidiary goals: (1) protect their strategic reserve; (2) quickly destroy NATO theater nuclear weapons, command-control-communications-and-intelligence capabilities, large military formations, staging areas, nodal points, and military-economic targets such as maritime ports, railroad yards, commercial airports, and electrical generating plants; and (3) penetrate quickly and deeply into NATO (and possibly non-NATO) territories to disrupt NATO's war effort (and possibly the defense efforts of non-NATO states which might support NATO or whose territories are important to the Soviet war effort).

As the Soviets see it, these subsidiary goals can best be achieved, in turn, through the combined arms efforts by all Soviet forces working within a "theater of military operations" (or TVD) structure. A combined arms perspective places great emphasis on differing forces both within and

across services supporting one another, and that perspective is given concrete reference in TVDs.

"The control of the military forces (fronts, armies, and fleets) in each of the Theaters would come under the authority of a TVD commander who, in turn, would be subordinate to the General Staff and Supreme High Command."⁸

Soviet strategy for a war in Europe is premised on having three continental TVDs -- Northwestern, Western, and Southwestern -- and two maritime -- the Arctic and Atlantic theaters.

Western analysts foresee that Soviet forces operating out of their respective theaters will undertake at the onset of war to conduct throughout the NATO area:

". . . strikes by conventionally-armed surface-to-surface missiles and artillery, as well as attacks by airborne, air-assault, and special purpose troops coordinated with strikes by frontal and strategic aviation."⁹

These strikes and attacks would precede by several hours the attacks of the first echelon Warsaw Pact ground forces into Western Europe. Through battalion or regimental size "raiding detachments" and division or corps size "operational maneuver groups" (or OMGs) the Soviets hope to break through weak spots in NATO's front lines. These detachments and groups would seek also to "destroy NATO air and nuclear capability; destroy and disrupt command, control and logistics; and seize river crossing sites and other terrain needed to facilitate rapid advance of the main body."¹⁰

They would draw NATO's attention away from the main fronts

and aim to open up corridors or soft spots in NATO defenses for exploitation by main Warsaw Pact forces.

The Navy has much to do in support of this strategy beyond protecting the strategic reserve. In the continental theaters it will come under TVD commanders primarily concerned with the war on the ground. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets and parts of the Northern Fleet will provide maritime flank support to the ground forces. This can consist of gunfire, amphibious landings, the transport of troops and materials, the protection of coastal sea lines of communications, and the engagement of any NATO naval and marine forces affecting the conduct of the land war. In addition, naval special forces units may act against coastal targets such as ports (discussed below), maritime intelligence collection, processing, and C³ sites, and other naval facilities.

In both continental and maritime TVDs -- the latter probably coming under the operational control of naval commanders -- much of what the Soviet Navy will do will be strategically defensive in orientation. This will include the protection of the SSBNs and the forward interdiction with naval surface-to-air missiles of any U.S. strategic bombers flying over the Arctic area to strike at targets in the USSR or Eastern Europe. Those activities will take place within the context of the Soviet Navy's establishing a maritime defense perimeter or buffer around the homeland roughly analogous to the continental defense perimeter

arising out of Soviet control of Eastern Europe. Unlike the situation in Eastern Europe, however, the maritime perimeter will actually encompass two areas: an inner zone where Soviet forces probably expect to control the ocean's surface and the air above it, and an outer zone which they may view as too distant for long-term and widespread Soviet control (at least in the initial period of a war) but not so distant that the Soviet Navy could not contest attempts at widespread and long-term control by NATO forces.

The inner defense zone would probably encompass the Baltic, Black, and Barents Seas. The outer zone would go beyond those areas, possibly out as far as 1,000 to 2,000 kilometers. How far may well depend on what happens to NATO control of Norway, Svalbard, Jan Mayen Island, Iceland, Turkey, Greece, and on the continued viability of NATO bases and assets (such as those for C³ and ASW surveillance) in those areas. The worst case situation would be that of the Soviets having access to those bases, for it would greatly facilitate their moving outward the boundaries of the inner and outer zones.

VMF use of such forward bases would also markedly facilitate its anti-SLOC activities, a mission area about which we have uncertainties concerning Soviet priorities and intent. It may be, for instance, that Soviet planners do not view the resupply of NATO by sea (as opposed to the air-delivered REFORGER units) to be of great consequence, at least in the initial period of a war. They may feel that

the war will essentially be over before NATO is able to coordinate the resupply effort. In addition, the Soviets view SLOCs as encompassing not only the loci between ports but also the ports themselves. As a result, Soviet planners may view measures taken against the ports (aerial bombing, sabotage by special warfare or other forces, and mining of port approaches) as severely crippling the sea lines even though no merchant ships or arms carriers were sunk or crippled at sea. Especially attractive targets would be the loading and unloading facilities for the container and other specialized ships which now carry so much of Western trade.

Nevertheless, some of VMF's submarines and aircraft will attack high-value transports at sea. For instance, it is not unusual for the VMF in peacetime to have few submarines in the Indian Ocean or off the coast of West Africa. At the outbreak of war, these could immediately strike at oil tankers, and with the covert or overt support of states such as Ethiopia or Angola, they could sustain their threat to the tanker lines for quite some time.

Ships carrying war materials from the United States to Europe will also be attacked. A study completed in the late 1970s under the direction of Paul Nitze and Leonard Sullivan remains the most comprehensive unclassified analysis of the problem. Concluding -- and we believe correctly -- that the vast majority of the VMF's best forces will be retained within the defense perimeter, the Nitze-Sullivan analysts estimated that the Soviets would,

in the following: Vice Admiral V. Babiy, "On the Problem of Evaluating the Relative Strength of Opposing Forces," Naval Digest (in Russian), No. 12, 1980, pp. 18-23; Major General V. Ryabchuk, "Troop Control, Leadership," Soviet Military Review (in English), No. 3, March 1984, pp. 29-31; Army General P. Lashchenko, "On the Work Style of Military Leaders," Military-Historical Journal (in Russian), No. 1, January 1984, pp. 10-21. U.S. authors have described the Soviet perspectives on correlation of forces; see R. W. Barnett, "Soviet Strategic Reserves and the Soviet Navy," (unpublished manuscript), January 1981, pp. 8-9; and Theodore A. Neely and Donald C. Daniel, "A Soviet View of Soviet Naval Doctrine and Perceptions," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1981, pp. 120-121.

15. Numerous articles have addressed the U.S. Navy's superiority in acoustic ASW vis-a-vis the Soviet Navy. Additional commentary has examined the Soviet effort to overcome this discrepancy. Good discussions occur in: Roger Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s, Hoover Institution Press (Stanford University, 1979), pp. 57-63; Paul H. Nitze and Leonard Sullivan, Securing the Seas: The Soviet Naval Challenge and Western Alliance Options (with the Atlantic Council Working Group on Securing the Seas), Westview Press (Boulder, CO: 1979), pp. 92, 178, and 393; Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Western Naval Threat to Soviet Military Dominance: A Soviet Assessment," Armed Forces Journal International, April 1983, pp. 17-18; and Joel S. Wit, "Are Our Boomers Vulnerable?", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1981, pp. 62-69.
16. Nitze and Sullivan, ibid., pp. 84-85; Cordesman, ibid., pp. 17-18; and Gordon H. McCormick and Mark E. Miller, "American Seapower at Risk: Nuclear Weapons in Soviet Naval Planning," Orbis, Summer 1981, pp. 353-54.
17. The Soviets prefer and plan for a rapid thrust across Europe in order to preempt U.S. reinforcement of Europe. Whether or not the Soviets could achieve their objective has been a subject of contention.
18. This estimate was provided at the conference in January 1985, during discussions.
19. Admiral MacDonald's comments were the subject of a brief essay by Commander Bernard D. Cole, "Atlantic First," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August

FOOTNOTES

1. Lomov (ed.). Scientific Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs, trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974) (originally published in Moscow, 1973), p. 101.
2. Grechko. The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, trans. U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975) (originally published in Moscow, 1974), p. 282.
3. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 3, 1972, p. 20.
4. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State, 2nd edition. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1979), Chap. 4.
5. Friedman, "U.S. vs. Soviet Style in Fleet Design," in Paul Murphy (ed.), Naval Power in Soviet Policy (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1978), Chap. 11.
6. The term "battle for the first salvo" is from Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 2, (1973), p. 22.
7. Weinberger, FY83 Annual Report of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), pp. 11-13 to 14.
8. U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power 1984 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1984), p. 8.
9. Philip Petersen and John Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in Soviet Theater Strategy," Orbis, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Fall 1983), p. 708.
10. Ibid., p. 717.
11. Paul Nitze, Leonard Sullivan, et al., Securing the Seas (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1979), p. 380.
12. See Stansfield Turner, "The Naval Balance: Not Just A Numbers Game," Foreign Affairs (January 1977), p. 347.
13. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," Morskoy Sbornik, No. 11 (1972), p. 26.
14. Soviet views on the "correlation of forces" concept permeate Soviet military literature. Discussions of the quantitative and qualitative measurements occur

and NATO naval forces can conduct effective offensive operations and support the reinforcement of Europe. Successful achievement of these missions, however, will require careful preplanning and consideration of roadblocks that could hinder efforts to counter Soviet naval strategy in the Atlantic.

extremely unlikely that the Soviets will initiate the use of nuclear weapons at sea prior to employing them in Europe.²¹ The U.S. Navy, therefore, must resolve to avoid the first use of nuclear weapons at sea; the longer the conflict remains conventional, the more likely it is that conditions will begin to favor U.S./NATO naval forces.

The final, and perhaps most sensitive, issue that NATO will confront is Soviet pressure on the European allied governments.²² The latter undoubtedly will come under intense pressure from Soviet propaganda and diplomatic moves to remain neutral. As a last resort, the Soviet leadership probably will attempt to paralyze the Europeans' will to resist any Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack. Therefore, it is critical that U.S. decision-makers remain sensitive to NATO morale and responsiveness to Soviet overture. The paralysis of our European allies would mean the loss of the Central Front. They need assurances and demonstrative evidence that the United States will respond immediately to any Soviet attack on the West German border.

Soviet naval forces in the Atlantic are currently postured to assume a primarily defensive orientation in wartime. The Soviets believe that arraying the forces in this manner will serve three objectives simultaneously: (1) protection of the homeland from sea-based attack; (2) prevention of NATO reinforcement of the Central Front; and (3) protection of the strategic ballistic missile submarine force. In spite of Soviet naval force capabilities, U.S.

NATO's approach to the fourth set of challenges can be most creative. The U.S. and NATO must begin not only to think creatively, but to act creatively, in implementing protective measures for high-value surface platforms, such as the carriers. More creative treatment of the SLOC problem would also be useful. In terms of carrier protection, the problem may be solved largely by employing certain deception techniques. Electricker, seeking cover by advantageous use by poor weather conditions, and feinting destination points are all possibilities. We emphasize that an effective deception campaign for the protection of carriers and other surface targets would have to begin in peacetime, if it is hoped to be successful in wartime.

Protection of the SLOCs is another avenue for creative resolution of problems. NATO must begin to look at SLOCs not only as extended lines, but also as the termini that complete the line. Perhaps the U.S. Navy might also consider dispersing reinforcement convoys; dispersal of forces would mean a less lucrative target for Soviet submarines, aircraft, and mines.

One issue that we continue to confront, but cannot resolve, is the issue of the survivability of the U.S. fleet if nuclear weapons are used at sea. It seems that the Soviets and U.S./NATO allies prefer the conflict to remain conventional. In the event that nuclear weapons are used on the Central Front, it seems nearly inevitable that they will eventually be used at sea. On the other hand, it is

A second significant issue confronting NATO planners is how to deal with a major Soviet mining campaign. The Soviets have the largest stockpile in the world, numbering approximately 300,000 mines. While one response is that Soviet naval assets will not be in position to mine, it is also true that the Soviets would probably employ unconventional mining techniques, such as special purpose (SPETzNAZ) forces. It must also be remembered that Soviet submarines can mine ports and harbors;²⁰ and finally, that merchant ships or third-party ships flying foreign flags could be in the employ of the Soviet Union. The mining threat at SLOCs needed for Europe's reinforcement is very real. Perhaps NATO allies need to consider investing in mine countermeasure ships, and to expand anti-SPETzNAZ efforts in order to protect ports and key military facilities in the coastal areas.

It is a well-known fact that NATO's efforts in air defense have been far less energetic or effective than the Soviet Union's. As the air- and sea-launched cruise missile threat looms ahead, it would probably be wise for NATO to begin investing in more sophisticated self-defense assets. Land-based aircraft and antiship cruise missiles would be useful as defensive measures as well as in a more offensive role. In any event the more capable Soviet naval surface forces demand a more sophisticated, suitable defensive response.

SACLANT, has raised another relevant issue, that is the distribution of U.S. naval assets at the outset of war. Since timing of mobilization and reinforcement is so crucial, the Navy must look carefully at the normal distribution of its fleet.¹⁹ How will carriers be sent to the North Atlantic when forces are dispersed in the Caribbean, Indian Ocean, and Mediterranean? The U.S. and NATO planners must coordinate the forces to be redeployed and prioritize force reallocation, because the U.S. Navy cannot be everywhere at once.

A related issue of force allocation involves the positioning of U.S. SSNs in the Norwegian Sea in preparation for the anti-SSBM campaign. The key question of timing again emerges. Those SSNs must be positioned prior to conflict, since it should be assumed that transit through the GIUK gap will become extremely difficult after D-Day. Likewise, the positioning of carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean will have to be determined -- perhaps an initial pull-back towards the western Mediterranean -- in order to prepare for wartime employment.

A final mobilization and force deployment issue concerns the rules of engagement during the process of reinforcing Europe. U.S. and NATO allies must agree to a policy for the "first shot," an appropriate response to a Soviet initiation of conflict, and the like. The time to make decisions about these issues is before conflict ensues, since little reaction time will be available after the initial outbreak.

United States and NATO may require U.S. naval involvement; however, they focus on policy decisions for responding to the Soviet threat.

U.S. and NATO Allied Responses

Soviet theater strategy in Europe calls for a rapid thrust across the Central Front and taking of ports and facilities on the Atlantic within a two-to-three week period. Such a scenario conjures up nightmares for U.S. military planners and logisticians. It is common knowledge that U.S. reinforcements to Europe cannot be there in two weeks' time. Even if they had arrived at European ports after two weeks -- a highly optimistic assumption -- it would be at least another two weeks before materiel would be distributed to troops, far too late to have an impact, if things go according to Soviet plans.¹⁷

The point to be made here is not whether the Soviets can achieve the advance across Europe, nor how long it takes to distribute reinforcements to the Central Front. The critical issue is recognizing that who mobilizes and deploys first is pivotal to the question of resupplying Europe, and reinforcing Norway in particular. There are basic concerns that reinforcements will be hampered by any number of transport and logistic shortcomings. Included among these are calculations on the numbers of merchant ships that will be required, in addition to military craft. One estimate is that 1,000 ships will be needed.¹⁸ Admiral MacDonald,

In addition to the use of SSNs, the U.S. Navy must seek to establish permanent barriers to contain the VMF within the defensive zone. As mentioned earlier, effective barriers will prevent Soviet naval forces from conducting any number of other missions, such as anticarrier warfare and active SLOC campaigns. Barriers can be established with SSNs at the GIUK gap, and at key ports and facilities. CAPTOR mines could be very effective in this mission. It is recognized that SSNs will be sorely stretched to act as barriers and conduct offensive strategic ASW operations. It is clear that they are an extremely versatile and relatively inexpensive asset.

The effective use of barriers produces a positive chain reaction. Major objectives such as holding Norway on the Northern Flank and Turkey on the Southern Flank could be served well. Protection of the GIUK Gap would also mean retention of control over facilities in Iceland, such as the SOSUS/SURTASS surveillance systems. Other ocean surveillance capabilities are also protected. Most importantly, the effective containment of Soviet naval forces would leave the lines open for the reinforcement of Europe and the Central Front.

The U.S. Navy clearly has an important role to play in defeating Soviet theater strategy in Europe. Some of these actions require offensive naval operations; some simply require intelligent application of naval forces at the appropriate time. A broader set of implications for the

advantages over its Soviet counterpart, most importantly in its superior acoustic sensing and quieting.¹⁵ The SSN can force the Soviets to consider that even a defensive naval posture will not necessarily ensure the survival of their sea-based strategic strike force. An offensive-minded SSN posturing will encourage the VMF to remain on the defensive, in frame of mind as well as militarily.

It has been argued in several circles that the Soviets consider attacks on their strategic strike forces as destabilizing. The argument suggests that an aggressive U.S. strategic ASW campaign will only lead to a more rapid collapse of deterrence and encourage spasmodic launches of strategic missiles. It is difficult to test the validity of this argument, since so little is known about how the Soviets allocate targets among their strategic assets. Yet, it seems unlikely that the Soviets do not expect an active strategic ASW campaign from U.S. naval forces. In fact, their efforts to protect their SSBNs are proof that they consider the SSN threat very real and very serious.¹⁶ Therefore, we must assume that the Soviet Navy expects to lose a certain percentage of the SSBN force to attrition. While we cannot pinpoint the number at which the attrition rate becomes destabilizing, we can say that the U.S. Navy must take the risk. The benefits of such a campaign are central to maintaining the upper hand in the naval face-off, and justify the potential costs.

Given the emphasis, then, on a defensive force orientation in wartime, how will Soviet naval theater strategy influence U.S./NATO planning?

Implications for NATO Planning

The lack of an offensive Soviet naval wartime posture does not in any way mean that there is no threat to NATO. Just as naval forces are only one element of Soviet theater strategy in Europe, so is Soviet naval force disposition only one element of the total threat to the United States and her allies. NATO planning must be broad in scope. National security and foreign policy considerations together must guide the planning of any response to the Soviet threat. Two sets of implications are examined below. The first addresses specific measures that the U.S. Navy may have to initiate in order to respond to the VMF threat. The second examines the broader demands that will be placed on U.S. and NATO decision-makers when confronting Soviet theater strategy against NATO.

The U.S. Navy's Response

The fact that the Soviet Navy chooses to operate in protected sea areas, close to home, should not mean that the naval forces will operate with impunity. A defensive posture on its part should not preclude U.S. naval forces from "taking the war to the enemy's territory." The most effective weapon the Navy has to wage these battles is the nuclear attack submarine (SSNs). The SSN has numerous

Soviet Principles of Warfighting

As outlined above, the Soviet Navy will seek to retain control over the maritime defense perimeter. This overriding wartime objective will occupy the majority of the VMF's general purpose forces. The concentration of forces in this region will allow the Soviet Navy to focus on achieving a limited number of objectives. Soviet strategic writings consistently express a preference for appropriate concentration of forces to achieve the most important condition for victory: a positive correlation of forces. In general, the VMF will achieve a positive correlation of forces by assuming a primarily defensive posture and arraying its forces to protect two strategic targets: the Soviet homeland and the strategic ballistic missile submarine forces.

The Soviets measure the correlation of forces in a number of ways.¹⁴ The ability of Soviet naval forces to retain control of the maritime defense perimeter will depend on several quantitative and qualitative factors. Among the former, of course, are sheer numbers of platforms and adequate ammunition stores for protracted conventional conflict. The latter takes into account troop morale, willingness to fight, force multipliers such as command and control, and adequate reconnaissance capability. It is clear that the Soviet Navy achieves the best quantitative/qualitative correlation of forces when it remains close to its homeland, protecting the periphery of the USSR and its own assets.

German submarine at sea there were 100 British and American antisubmariners One can hardly find a similar ratio of forces between attacking and defending forces among all other branches of the armed forces.¹³

Regardless of whether Gorshkov has the numbers right, the ratio of defenders to attackers in this area of warfare is considerable. That being the case, Soviet General Staff planners may well agree that a SLOC campaign against ships at sea is worthwhile, not only because it will damage Allied shipping, but also because it will dissipate NATO's ASW assets. As a result, fewer of those assets will be available to go after Soviet general purpose submarines maintaining the defense perimeter and Soviet SSBNs kept behind the perimeter.

Indeed, it is because of this concern for the integrity of the defense perimeter that we agree with the Nitze-Sullivan analysts that number and relative quality of VMF units assigned to interdicting supply ships will be limited. This is because the General Staff planners will insist that the Navy retain whatever forces are necessary in the defense perimeter to protect SSBNs, keep enemy naval forces far from the homeland and Eastern Europe, and otherwise support the continental TVD commanders. In calculating the forces necessary to achieve those aims, we believe Soviet planners will probably be very conservative in their judgments as to what proportion of forces should be retained inside the perimeters. Our conclusion is based on our understanding of the correlation-of-forces perspective which will guide their decision-making.

over the course of 90 days, commit only 60 torpedo-attack diesel-electric submarines to the anti-SLOC task, and they calculated the gross outcomes of a SLOC campaign under a variety of circumstances. Their overall conclusion after studying different cases was that NATO could eventually secure the SLOCs in the course of a 90-day war, but that it would also experience very severe losses in the first few weeks. As the study put it:

In the absence of some technological improvement making Soviet submarines much more vulnerable to prompt detection and localization than they are today, there appears to be no way to avoid high shipping losses during the early days of a European conventional conflict if the Allies chose to maintain a major Atlantic resupply effort during this time. The uncertainties in predicting the outcome of the antisubmarine battle warrant the adoption of techniques and approaches that minimize the impact of poor estimating.¹¹

That conclusion is consistent with the generally-held view that SLOC-interdiction constitutes "guerrilla warfare at sea" because only a few anti-SLOC submarines can force a great expenditure of resources on the part of the SLOC defense forces.¹² Admiral Gorshkov has made reference to this in his writings, and he has no doubt made certain that his argument has come to the attention of General Staff planners:

Soon after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, more than 2,000 British and American ASW combatants and specially configured merchantmen and several thousand aircraft were in operation against German U-boats in the Atlantic theater. For each German U-boat there were 25 British and U.S. warships and 100 aircraft, and for every

1982, pp. 103-106; also Tomas Ries, "Defending the Far North," International Defense Review, July 1984, p. 875, which examines force pre-positioning requirements in the North Atlantic.

20. Nitze and Sullivan, footnote 15, p. 86; and John Erickson, "Soviet Seapower," Defence, Communications and Security Review, Number 81/1, p. 5.
21. McCormick and Miller, footnote 16, pp. 351-367.
22. Ries, footnote 19, pp. 875-77; and Marian Leighton, "Soviet Strategy Towards Northern Europe and Japan," Survey, Autumn-Winter 1983, pp. 112-151.

THE SOVIET ENVELOPMENT OPTION IN A NATO CONTINGENCY :
IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE STRATEGY

by

Dr. Milan Vego

The SOVIET ENVELOPMENT OPTION IN A NATO
CONTINGENCY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ALLIANCE STRATEGY

by

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The geopolitical and strategical importance of the North European and adjacent waters has been growing since the late 1960's as a result of the combined effects of political, military and economic developments there. Nowhere is the Soviet threat to NATO more acute than to its Northern Flank, an area which extends from the Elbe-Trave Canal in the south to the North Cape in the north, or a distance equal to that between Hamburg and the southern tip of the Iberian Peninsula. The principal vulnerabilities of NATO's Northern Flank are those of geographic cohesion, the narrowness of land area, its proximity to heavy concentration of Soviet military power on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic, and the extreme inadequacy of the standing forces and reinforcements assigned to its defense. The Soviets could exploit these vulnerabilities in wartime and achieve a rapid breakthrough on the NATO Northern Flank, thereby fatally weakening the Allied effort on the Central Front. Here the Soviet-Warsaw Pact military potential in Northern Europe and adjacent waters is addressed in some detail, followed by an analysis of likely Soviet offensive moves against NATO's Northern Flank.

Soviet Military Potential
on the Kola Peninsula

The Soviet military buildup which started in the mid-1960's, and still continues (although at a slower rate), was perhaps most visible on the Kola Peninsula and in the adjacent seas. The Kola Peninsula today is often referred to as the largest military complex in the world. The shores of the Kola Peninsula and the White Sea are the home base of the Northern Fleet, the largest and the most formidable among all four of the Soviet Navy's fleets. Over the past two decades an even larger number of highly capable submarines and surface combatants and high-performance combat aircraft have joined the Northern Fleet.

By the end of 1984 the Northern Fleet consisted of about 340 warships, and 205 auxiliaries, and some 370 combat aircraft. The fleet's personnel strength then stood at approximately 120,000 men, (Figure 1). The Northern Fleet is in the administrative chain of command, directly subordinate in peacetime to the Navy's Commander-in-Chief and the Main Naval Staff in Moscow. Operationally, however, the Northern Fleet is controlled by the Main Operation Directorate of the Soviet General Staff.

By the end of 1984 about 180 submarines (including 111 nuclear-powered), or almost a half of all the Soviet submarines in active service, were assigned to the Northern Fleet. The Fleet currently has in service thirty eight "submarines of strategic designation" (SSBNs/SSBs), or about

two-thirds of the total Soviet SSBN force. Besides twenty-one Deltas and fifteen Yankees, the first two 32,000-ton Typhoon-class SSBNs, the world's largest submarines, are also assigned to the Northern Fleet. The Fleet submarines of "operational-tactical designation," or attack submarine force presently comprises thirty six cruise missile-and 103 torpedo-armed submarines. The first include roughly one-half of all the Charlie-Is-IIs and the Echo-IIs in service. The first two of the 11,000-ton Oscar-class SSGNs are also deployed with the Northern Fleet. The force of torpedo-armed submarines include forty four SSNs or more than a half of all the Soviet SSNs. All but one of the six Alfas, the world's fastest and deepest-running (titanium-hulled) submarines, are assigned to the Northern Fleet, as are reportedly the first of the new 9,700-ton Mike- and the 6,500-ton Sierra-class SSNs. In addition, twenty nine of the modern Victor-class SSN and nine aging Novembers/Echo-Is are deployed there. The entire fleet's force of about sixty SSs consists of the boats capable of sustained employment on the open ocean. About one-half of all the Tango-class SSs and two-thirds of the Foxtrots in service are assigned to the Northern Fleet.

The Northern Fleet's force of major surface combatants has been considerably strengthened in recent years. Besides one 43,000-ton Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carrier, and one 25,000-ton Kirov-class nuclear-powered battle cruiser, nine modern guided missile cruisers (CGs)

and ten guided missile destroyers (DDGs) are in service with the Northern Fleet. The last include two of the newest 7,888-ton Sovremenny- and the 8,500-ton Udaloy-class DDGs. The rest of major surface combatant force consist of the two old gun-armed (Sverdlov-class) cruisers (CLs), fourteen aging DDGs/DDs, nine guided missile frigates (FFG), and forty five frigates (FFs/FFLs). Also, about thirty patrol combatants (PGs), including at least seven Nanuchka-class missile corvettes, and twelve relatively modern Poti-class ASW corvettes are deployed with the fleet. The force of fast attack craft (FAC) is small in comparison with the other Soviet fleets. Reportedly, only about thirty or so FAC, of which more than a half are missile-armed, are currently deployed with the Northern Fleet.

The force of amphibious warfare ships and craft assigned to the Northern Fleet is also relatively small in comparison with the other three fleets. The fleet currently has in service only six tank landing ships (LSTs), four Ropuchas-, and two Alligator-class, and five medium landing ships (LSMs), five Polnocnys-class, plus about twenty assorted landing craft, including four landing air cushion vehicles (LACVs).

The Fleet's mine warfare component consists of two minesweeper-special (MSS), thirty ocean minesweepers (MSOs), and twenty coastal minesweepers/minehunters (MSCs/MHCs), plus about a dozen of minesweeping craft (MSIs/MSBs).

The force of auxiliary ships is relatively large, some one hundred ships, plus 105 craft. The force includes twenty five underway replenishment ships, about 45 fleet support and thirty material support ships.

The Fleet's principal force for carrying out amphibious assault landings and raids is the 63rd "Kirkeness" naval infantry brigade based at Pechanga (ex-Petsamo). Over an eighteen-month period the unit was reportedly expanded from a regiment totaling 1,800 to a 3,000-man brigade by 1984. Instead of the previous complement of about twenty PY-76 amphibious tanks, and the old T-54/55 medium tanks, the brigade presently has in its inventories about fifty modern tanks (probably T-62s) and 150 BMP armored personnel carriers.¹ The brigade is reportedly specially trained to conduct combat missions under the harsh climatic conditions and long hours of darkness prevailing in the Arctic.

The Fleet's 1,500-2,000 men strong coastal defense units reportedly include three antiship missile battalions, each with fifteen to eighteen 250 mm-range SS-C-1b Sepal missiles (land version of the SS-N-3 Shaddock). The older forty mm-range Samlet (land version of the SS-N-2 Styx) antiship missile units have been dissolved. In addition a relatively large number of 130 mm gun batteries are emplaced to protect the approaches of naval bases and commercial ports.

Like all other Soviet home-based fleets the Northern Fleet reportedly has at its disposal one special forces naval brigade of its military intelligence service (GRU), known as Spetsnaz. The 1,000-1,300-men unit is collocated probably with the 63rd "Kirkeness" naval infantry brigade. The naval Spetsnaz brigade reportedly consists of one headquarters company, a midget submarine group, two to three battalions of combat swimmers, one parachute battalion, and a signal company each and supporting units.² The overall strength of the Spetsnaz units assigned to each of the fleets appears to be considerably overstated. Yet, there is little doubt as to their existence and the role and mission they are assigned to perform.

The Fleet's air arm presently consists of about 365 fixed-wing aircraft and one hundred helicopters. The Fleet's aviation offensive strength is concentrated in two regiments with forty eight supersonic Tu-2* Backfire-B bombers, and three regiments with some seventy two Tu-16 Badger C/Cmod/Gmod bombers. A single regiment with about twenty to twenty four Yak-36 MP Forger-A V/G fighters serves on board the Kiev-class VTOL aircraft carrier. The tactical support is provided by one regiment of twelve Tu-95** Bear-D long-range (LR) maritime reconnaissance (MR) aircraft, some thirty Tu-16 Badgers used for reconnaissance/ECM support, thirty Tu-16s reconfigured as the tankers for in-flight refueling, and a few An-12 Cub-A/Il-18 Coot-A ECM support aircraft. (Figure 2).

* Soviet designation is Tu-22M

** Soviet designation is TU-142

The fleet's ASW aviation presently comprises about sixteen Tu-95 Bear-F/Gs and thirty Il-38 May long-range aircraft, and twenty Be-12 Mail amphibious. the ASW helicopter force includes about twenty of the newest KA-27 Helix-A and Mi-14 Haze-A helicopters each. Most of the sixty Ka-25 Hormone helicopters in the Fleet's aviation are used for carrying out ASW tasks.

The principal basing area of the Northern Fleet is the Kola Peninsula. The single largest base complex in the fjord-like Kola Inlet, where three major and a few minor naval bases are located. At the inlet's head lies the port of Murmansk. The city is linked with Leningrad by the 900-mile long railway line. Murmansk is a major naval base for both submarines and large surface combatants. It also serves as the Fleet's major logistical center. The Fleet's headquarters is located at Severomorsk (ex-Vayenga), some ten miles northeast of Murmansk. Severomorsk serves as a base for submarines and smaller surface combatants. In the proximity of Severomorsk are also located the Fleet's major fuel/ammunition storage dumps. Flanking the entrance of the Kola Inlet is Polyarnyy which serves as the Fleet's principal submarine base. Reportedly, a large number of submarine pens were dug in the cliffs there. Almost all the Fleet's SSBN's and most of the attack submarines are based in Polyarnyy. East of the Kola Inlet lies Gremikha-Iokanga, which serves as a minor naval base. The Typhoon-class SSBNs are reportedly based there. A minor naval base for surface

ships has been built only about eleven miles from the Norwegian border, at Pechenga/Liinachamari, inside the nine-mile long and ice-free Pechenga Fjord. That port is linked with Murmansk by a railway line. Other minor naval bases on the Kola Peninsula were established at Motovskiy Zaliv (Bay), Sanda Guba, Litsa Guba, and Olenya Guba.

The Soviets also have built a number of naval and commercial ship repair facilities on the Kola Peninsula. The repair yard for large ships is located a few miles north of Murmansk, at Rosta on the mouth of the river of the same name. A 80,000-ton capacity floating dock built in Sweden (and delivered in 1980) is reportedly located at Rosta. The dock is capable of accommodating the largest Soviet surface combatant, including the Kiev-class aircraft carriers. The Fleet's submarine repair facilities were built at Severomorsk, Polyarnyy and Gremikha. A small repair yard for surface ships exists at Pechenga.

The White Sea and adjacent coast apparently have no great significance for the Northern Fleets either as a basing area or as a zone of operations. The only naval bases of any importance are Archangel'sk and Severodvinsk (ex-Molotovsk). The first lies about twenty eight miles from the estuary of the Northern Dvina. The port is also connected by a 435-mile long railway with Moscow. Some twenty five miles northwest of Archangel'sk and also on the banks of the Northern Dvina lies Severodvinsk. However, the use of both bases by naval vessels is very limited because they are ice-blocked for about 190 days in a year.

The Kola Peninsula is also the principal basing area of the Fleet's aviation. The major naval air bases on the Peninsula are Murmansk-NE, Severomorsk, and Olenegorsk. Minor airfields for naval aircraft exist at Belusha Guba and Pechenga. Several airfields in the White Sea's littoral area, of which the most important is the one near Archangel'sk, are also used by the fleet's aviation.

The fleet's principal shipbuilding repair facilities are located in the White Sea's coastal area. The world's only major shipbuilding facility above the Arctic Circle is the shipyard No. 402 at Severodvinsk. The shipyard No. 402 reportedly has two 1,005-foot long construction docks, nine building slipways, and ten ship construction halls.³ The shipyard is one of the two Soviet yards (the other yard is at Komsomol'sk-na-Amure in the Far East) engaged in the building of the SSBNs. The shipyard has built the Yankee-, Delta-, and the Typhoon-class SSBNs, and the Oscar/Echo-class SSGNs as well. A small yard at Krasnaya Kuznitsa (near Archangel'sk) is involved in the construction of small seagoing combatants and river craft.

Presently only about 28,000 troops are permanently deployed on the Kola Peninsula. These forces are organized into two motorized-rifle divisions: 45th division in Pechenga and 341st division in Alakurtti area. Both divisions are in peace-time directly subordinate to 6th Army Headquarters at Petrozavodsk (north of Leningrad). They have undergone qualitative improvements in recent years. The

division's inventories also include amphibious tanks and bridging equipment and special winter items. The divisions are also equipped with a special troop carrier (GT-T) designed to operate over marshy ground or snow.⁴ Both divisions are organized, equipped and trained to fight under arctic winter conditions. The divisional support units controlled by 6th Army Headquarters consists of (1) one "artillery-rocket" brigade with the Frog/Scud "operational-tactical missiles," (2) 149th artillery brigade with self-propelled (SP) 122 mm and 152 mm guns, and (3) one air defense brigade. The last has been recently expanded from a regiment-size unit into a brigade, with the SA-4 surface-to-air missile (SAM) entirely reequipped with the more advanced SA-6 Gainful SAMs. All the divisional support units are deployed in the Pechenga area. In addition to these two motorized-rifle divisions the Soviets have deployed on the Peninsula two air-assault regiments, probably totalling 4,000 men.

The ground troops on the Kola Peninsula could be reinforced by some of the six motorized-rifle divisions presently subordinate to the Leningrad Military District (MD). The road and rail network on the Peninsula has been steadily expanded and modernized over the past ten years to allow the rapid reinforcement of ground troops. Subordinate to the Leningrad MD is one airborne division and a commando (Reydoviki) brigade, both deployed in the Pskov area (south of Leningrad).

After the organizational changes in the Soviet Air Force in recent years the numbered air armies of the Frontal Aviation have been apparently disbanded. They are now directly controlled by the respective Military District headquarters through the Chief of Aviation (an Air Force officer). Thus, the former 13th tactical air force has become an integral part of the Leningrad MD. The last currently controls 340 combat aircraft, of which about thirty MiG-25 Foxbat/Su-17 Fitter-H reconnaissance aircraft, plus some one hundred helicopters (including possibly fourteen Mi-24 Hind-D/E attack helicopters) are based on the Kola Peninsula. However, most of the aircraft in the Leningrad MD, including 130 MiG 21/-27 fighter-bombers, and thirty MiG-21/-25 reconnaissance aircrafts are based south of Leningrad and can be deployed to the Peninsula within hours if necessary.⁵

The defense of Soviet airspace and important military/industrial centers and installations, including naval/air bases and the ships at sea, is the responsibility of the Homeland's Air Defense Forces (PVO Strany). After the recent reorganization, the PVO Strany was integrated with that of the Army's Air Defense (Voisk PVO). The number of the PVO Strany Districts has been halved, from ten to five. However, the most significant organizational change was that for the first time closer cooperation between the PVO Strany units and respective theater headquarters is being envisaged.

The air defense of the Kola Peninsula and the

surrounding airspace is the responsibility of the Archangel'sk Air Defense District (ADD), which in turn is an integral part of the 2nd PVO Strany Army. The Archangel'sk ADD presently controls about 340 interceptors, of which some 120 are believed to be based on the Kola Peninsula. The interceptor force deployed on the Peninsula includes the most advanced models, such as are the Su-15 Flagon-E/F, MiG-23 Flogger-B, MiG-25 Foxbat, and Mig-31 Foxhound-A. The Foxhounds are probably used in conjunction with the new Il-76 Mainstay-A AWACs-type aircraft. The ground-based air defenses on the Peninsula consist of about thirty SAM sites with about 200 launchers including SA-2 Guidelines, SA-3 Goa, and SA-5 Gammon missiles. The newest and highly capable SA-10/-12 SAMs are reportedly in the process of being deployed on the Kola Peninsula.⁶

Over the last fifteen years, the Soviets have expanded and modernized the existing airbases and built a new one on the Peninsula. Presently there are reportedly forty airfields on the Peninsula. About sixteen airfields have blacktopped runways longer than 5,400 feet equipped with modern electronic equipment, allowing all-weather operations. However, only eight of the first-rate airfields are continuously in use, while other airfields on the Peninsula are reportedly mobilization sites and are used intermittently for training purposes. By 1978, the Soviets constructed hardened underground shelters for about 500 aircraft. Considerable quantities of military equipment and

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
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supplies have been preposition on the Peninsula. In 1981 it was learned that the construction of a camouflaged ammunition storage dump and hardened fuel depots was underway.⁷

The Soviets still maintain on the Kola Peninsula two bases of the IRBMs, near Kandalaksha, with about nine launchers for older, and not very useful ss-4/-5 missiles. In the same region is deployed one perimeter acquisition radar (Hen House series) for the ABM Galosh system.

Obviously the Soviet naval and air strength on the Kola Peninsula and adjacent waters far exceeds their defensive requirement. The Soviet military posture on the Kola Peninsula truly reflects the Soviet shift toward forward deployment which started in the mid-1960s. In fact, because of the overwhelming Soviet strength on the Kola Peninsula and surrounding seas, Norway may have already been left behind the Soviet front lines.⁸

The Warsaw Pact Naval Posture in the Baltic

By the end of World War II the Soviet geostrategic position in the Baltic had been transformed beyond all recognition in comparison with the situation there in the period between the two World Wars. The Soviets then not only reconquered the territories of the three former independent Baltic states, but also acquired East Prussia. Moreover, they indirectly established control over the southeastern/southern Baltic shore owing to the establishment of the communist-led regime in Poland and the

Soviet occupation of the eastern part of Germany. The Baltic Sea is today for all practical purposes a lake of the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies.

The Soviet Baltic littoral represents the very heart of Soviet maritime power. The largest number of naval bases, naval schools and training establishments and shipyards are located there. Presently, the Soviets and their allies in the Baltic have three large, and ten smaller shipyards, plus about twenty repair yards. Approximately 50 to 70 percent of all the Soviet ship building and ship repair capacity is concentrated in the Baltic area.⁹ The Baltic shipyards have built more naval vessels than all the other Soviet ship-yards combined.

The Warsaw Pact naval potential in the Baltic is concentrated in the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Once the largest among the Soviet Navy's four fleets, the Baltic Fleet is now numerically the smallest. The Fleet's significance has been relatively decreased over the past ten years because of a steady buildup of the Northern Fleet. The Baltic Fleet, however, has acquired some large and highly capable ships over the last two years. By the end of 1984, the Baltic Fleet consisted of about 190 warships, 160 auxiliaries, and 260 combat aircraft, and 107,000 men. (Figure 1).

The Baltic Fleet is like all other fleets in the administrative chain of command directly subordinate to the Soviet Navy C-in-C and Main Naval Staff. In contrast to the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet is in peacetime indirectly

subordinate to the General Staff through the Joint Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. The Fleet C-in-C is a three-star admiral with headquarters in Baltysk (ex-Pillau). The Fleet is operationally organized into the Northern Group (Talin), and the Southern Group (Baltiysk) of forces. Each of these groups is an integrated combat unit consisting of a number of major surface combatants, submarines, coastal combatants, and auxiliary ships.

The Baltic Fleet's submarine axis includes six aging Golf-II-class SSBs transferred from the Northern Fleet in the late summer-fall of 1976 and intended as a theater nuclear force. The Soviets also redeployed four Juliett-class SSGs from the Northern Fleet into the Baltic in the fall of 1982, thereby considerably increasing the Fleet's offensive capability on the open ocean. The rest of the submarine force consists of about two dozen of the older classes, torpedo-armed conventionally-powered submarines, mostly the Whiskey-class. The force of major surface combatants consists of one Kirov-class battle cruiser, one Kresta-class CG each and two Sverdlov-class gun-armed cruisers, six DDGs/DDs (including one Sovremennyy-class, and Udaloy-class each), six FFGs (Krivak-class), and twenty five FFs/FFls. The Baltic Fleet has in its composition a very large number of small surface combatants, fifty-one PGs and fifty six FACs. These forces include perhaps as many as seven missile corvettes, and forty missile-armed FAC.

The Fleet's amphibious warfare capability is concentrated in one Ivan rogov-class landing ship dock (LPD), four Ropucha- and two Alligator-class LSTs, and some twenty Polnocny-class LSMs. In addition there are some thirty assorted conventional-hull landing craft, plus about 22 LACVs. The amphibious force component also includes one 2,000 men naval infantry brigade deployed in the Leningrad area. Reportedly one 1,000-1,300-men Spetsnaz brigade is also based in the same general area. The Baltic Fleet has the largest number of mine warfare ships and craft of any other fleet, about 35 MSOs and over 100 MSCs/MHCs and miscellaneous minesweeping craft.

The Baltic Fleet force of support ships currently consists of about ten underway replenishment ships (URS), ten material support ships, twenty five fleet support ships, plus 115 smaller auxiliary ships and service craft.

The exact strength of the coastal defense units along the Soviet Baltic coast is not known. However, it is believed that as many as six "artillery-rocket battalions", each having fifteen to twenty eight truck-mounted launchers for antiship missiles, are deployed there. In addition, a very large number of coastal gun batteries and radar stations are emplaced along the coast.

The Baltic Fleet has the largest number of land-based bombers and fighter-bombers, some 140 machines, of any other Soviet fleet. The backbone of its offensive strength is concentrated in one regiment with twenty four Backfire-B

bombers. The rest of the bomber force consists of forty two Badger-Cs, and 24 Tu-22 Blinder-Bs. In addition, all of the fifty Su-17 Fitter-C fighter-bombers assigned to the Baltic Fleet are reportedly equipped for conducting antishipping strikes and ground attack missions in support of amphibious assault landing operations. The tactical support is provided by ten tankers, and thirty recce ECM support aircraft. The fleet's ASW aviation consists of one squadron with fifteen Il-38 May and one regiment with twenty Be-12 Mail, plus some 45 ASW helicopters.

The Fleet's major naval bases are Baltysk, Talinn, Riga, Kronshtadt, and Leningrad, while minor bases are located at Kaliningrad and Liepaya. Major air bases for the Fleet's aviation are at Baltysk and Kaliningrad. The Fleet's Backfire-B are based further inland at Bykhov (Byelorussiya). Since 1981 these bombers use Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula as their forward operating base.

The Soviet naval posture in the Baltic is indirectly strengthened by the deployment of a rather large number of units of other services and branches of the armed forces in the proximity of the Baltic coast. The forces of the Baltic MD (Riga) include three tank and six motorized-rifle divisions. In addition, one 6,500-men fully ready airborne division, plus one 3,000-5,000-men training airborne division, are deployed on the territory of the Baltic MD. The regional air force command controls about 340 combat aircraft.

The forces of the 2nd PVO Strany Army deployed on the territory of the Baltic MD include some 260 combat aircraft (one hundred MiG-21s, eighty MiG-23s, thirty MiG-25s, and fifty Su-15s), plus about 1,600 SAM launchers and 400 AA radar-controlled guns.¹⁰ Some of the PVO Strany units are intended to provide air cover within their effective range to naval vessels and merchant shipping at sea, and also to protect naval bases/anchorages and naval installations on the coast against the enemy attack from the air.

After the recent reorganization of the Long Range Aviation (Dal'Naya Aviatsiya), which changed its name to the Aviation Armies of the Soviet Union (Aviatsiya Armiya Sovetskiiy Soyuz), only five air armies remain. The European Theatre striking force is the 46th Air Army in Smolensk (Byelorussiya). This army consists of twelve bomber regiments including seven Tu-16 Badgers, two Tu-26 Backfire aircraft, and three Tu-22 Blinders. One of the main bases of the 46th Air Army is Sol-Tsyo, near Leningrad. The Backfires and Badgers of the 46th Air Army could be forward deployed on the Kola Peninsula or closer to the Baltic coast and used to supplement strike missions of the Fleet's aviation against enemy shipping. The 36th Air Army (Moscow), which is a direct successor to the LRA, consists of four divisions of strategic bombers, two of Bisons, and two of Badgers. The bombers of the 36th Air Army reportedly use as a forward base Olenegorsk on the Kola Peninsula.¹¹ The principal striking force of the Soviet 24th Air Army (Legnica)

deployed in Poland consists of about sixty four SU-24 Fencers. About half of these aircraft are permanently based at Zagan/Szproutuwa in Poland. The 24th Air Army also includes a full division of interceptors and a regiment of fighter-bombers (previously a part of the now disbanded 37th Air Army) also based in Poland. In addition, the 24th Air Army includes a reconnaissance regiment of MiG-25 Foxbats and Yak-28 Brewers. Some of fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft of the 24th Air Army may be used if needed in support of the Fleet unit operating in the Baltic.

Since the early 1970s both the East German Navy (Volksmarine) and the Polish Navy were assigned in increasingly important role in the overall Soviet strategy in the Baltic. In terms of size both navies are the largest among the Warsaw Pact navies, with the exception, of course, of the Soviet Navy. Both are also in peacetime operationally subordinate to the Joint Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. The Volksmarine, as the result of a modernization program which began in the early 1970s, has been transformed from a purely coastal defensive force into one capable of conducting offensive tasks in the western part of the Baltic and even in the North Sea. By mid-1984 the Volksmarine had in active service approximately 140 warships and sixty five auxiliaries/service craft and 14,600 men.

The Volksmarine's largest combatants are two 1,900-ton Soviet-built Koni-class frigates classified as "coastal defense ships." The older 300-ton Hai-III-class

"submarine defense ships" (SCs) have been gradually withdrawn from active service. Only five Hai-IIIs remain, and are used by the Coastal Border Brigade (GBK) for fisheries protection duties. The Hai-IIIs are being replaced by fourteen domestically built 1,200-ton Parchim-class ASW corvettes. An additional four (some sources say two) Parchims are expected to be built. The Volksmarine's ASW component also includes eight land-based Mi-14 Haze-A Helicopters.

The backbone of the Volksmarine's offensive strength rests in fifteen Osa-I-class missile boats and eighteen Shershen-class torpedo boats. In addition there are in service about thirty domestically-built 30-ton Libelle-class "small torpedo boats." Because of their limited endurance and poor sea-keeping qualities, the Libelles could effectively be used, however, only close to the shore and in relatively good weather conditions. The Volksmarine's amphibious warfare capability consist of twelve modern 1,900-ton Frosch-I-class "medium landing ships" (LSTs). In addition, the 2,000-men strong 29th motor-rifle regiment "Ernst Moritz Arndt" of the Ground Forces is specially trained for conducting amphibious assault landings. The Navy's mine warfare force consists of twenty seven domestically built Kondor-I-class MSCs. An additional twenty one ships of the same class serve with the Coastal Border Brigade.

The Volksmarine's supply ship force has been modernized in recent years to provide the Fleet a modest capability for conducting sustained operations on the high seas. The Volksmarine presently has in service seven, all but of which are very modern "high seas combat supply ships," and five support ships and harbor tankers. It was revealed recently for the first time that the Volksmarine has coastal defense units armed with antiship missiles. The principal bases of the Volksmarine are Rostock-Warnemuende, Penemuende, Dranske Bug, Wolgast, Sassnitz, Tarnewitz, and Barhoft.

By mid-1984 the Polish Navy consisted of about 130 warships and sixty auxiliaries and miscellaneous craft, and 22,000 men. The long overdue modernization of the Polish Navy began in 1983 with the transfer of the first Tarantul-I-class missile corvette from the Soviet Union. By late spring of 1984 an additional two Tarantuls were acquired. More ships of the class are expected to be transferred from the Soviet Union to the Polish Navy over the next few years. The largest surface combatant in the Polish Navy is the 3,600-ton Kotlin-SAM-class DDG. The submarine force currently consists of only three aging ex-Soviet Whiskey-class boats. The Navy's patrol/ASW force comprises eight mod. Obluze-class large patrol craft and about fifty seven coastal patrol craft (fourteen Pilicas, twelve Wislokas, twenty-one K-15s). In addition the Polish Border Guard operates five Obluze- and nine Gdansk-class

large patrol craft. All these craft are not only becoming old, but lack sensors and armament to conduct effective ASW duties.

The light forces component presently consists of thirteen ex-Soviet Osa-I missile-armed FAC, and seven domestically built, but apparently not very successful, Wisla-class torpedo-armed FAC.

The Polish Navy's amphibious lift capability rests in twenty three domestically built Polnocny-class medium landing ships. In addition there are in service four Marabut-class landing craft and fifteen old Eichstaden-class personnel landing craft. These ships and crafts are intended to provide lift to the 12,000-men strong, "Sea Landing Division" of the Ground Forces deployed in peacetime in the Gdansk/Gdynia area. The division is publically referred to as "coast defense unit" (Jednostka Obrony Wyrzeza), but in fact has an offensive mission to conduct amphibious assault landings on the enemy-held shores.

The Navy's mine warfare force currently consists of twelve Soviet-designed T-43-class and domestically built Krogulec-class ocean minesweepers each, two new 160-ton Notec-class coastal minesweepers boats (plus one under construction) and twenty three K-8-class minesweeping boats. With the exception of the Notecs, these ships and craft are old and of limited value. In contrast to the Volksmarine the Polish Navy possesses a numerically strong air arm. The naval aviation currently has in its inventories about 45

combat aircraft, including ten old Il-28 light bombers, 40 MiG-17 fighter bombers, 40 MiG-21 interceptors and 35 helicopters. The last include five Mi-8 ASW helicopters. The main naval bases are Gdynia, Hel, Swinoujscie, Kolobrzeg, and Ustka.

Forces' Control in Wartime

The command and control of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces in peacetime would undergo significant changes in case of national emergency or war. The present Defense Council* would then be dissolved and the State Defense Council (GKO)** formed instead. The State Defense Council would be chaired by the C-in-C of the Soviet Armed Forces, General Secretary of the CPSU; its membership reportedly would include all permanent members of the Defense Council including the Minister of Defense and the Chief of General Staff. The main responsibilities of the State Defense Council would be to coordinate and ensure the smooth functioning of the country's entire military, political and economic efforts in waging war. The Defense Ministry and the present Main Military Council*** also would be dissolved and replaced by the Supreme High Command (VGK)**** or Stavka, which would be entrusted with the strategic direction of the war effort. The C-in-C of the Soviet Navy

* Soviet Oborony
 ** Gosudarstvenny Komitet Oboroni
 *** Glavnoye Voenyy Soviet
 **** Verkhovnoye Glavnoye Komandovaniye

would be one of the members of the Stavka. The main executive organ of the Stavka would be the General Staff. The Main Naval Staff would be dissolved and its personnel merged with the General Staff. The principal responsibilities of the General Staff in wartime will be (1) to assign the mission to the troops (forces), (2) to determine the combat operations objectives, (3) to decide the distribution of "forces and means", (4) to determine methods for carrying out combat operations, and (5) to organize "cooperation", (mutual support) and coordination in the employment of the troops (forces).


The employment of the Soviet Armed Forces, and that of their Warsaw Pact allies in wartime will take place in the respective "theaters of military activities" (TVD).^{*} The last is defined as the "vast territory or part of the continent with the seas around it, or, the waters area of an ocean, or, sea with islands and the adjoining coastline of continents as well as the air space above them within the limits of which the strategic grouping of armed forces deploy and military operations may be waged."¹²

The Soviets have arbitrarily divided the Euroasian landmass with adjacent oceans/seas into six "continental" (land), six "sea" (maritime),^{**} and three ocean TVDs, ^{***}

* Teatr Vouennykh Deystviy
 ** MTVD-Morskoy Teatr Voyennykh Deystviy
 *** OTVD-Okeanskiy Teatr Voyennykh Deystviy

thereby further compounding the problem of resupply of the U.S./NATO troops in Western Europe. By seizing northern Norway the Soviets would be able to conduct maritime air surveillance missions, which are essential to provide them early warning of any potentially hostile presence north and east of the GIUK gap. The Soviets would then also be able to provide an effective air cover for their ships operating in the Norwegian Sea. By occupying northern Norway, the Soviets would virtually ensure the control of the Norwegian Sea north of the GIN (Greenland-Iceland-Norway) line. Hence, the Soviet ability to counter the threat of the U.S. aircraft carriers and the U.S./NATO SLCM-armed submarines and surface combatants would significantly be improved.

The Soviet offensive against northern Norway could be carried out in the form of: (1) a surprise attack by standing force, or (2) a mass attack by the bulk of forces presently assigned to the Leningrad MD. In the first scenario, the Soviets would probably use only the 45th and 341st motorized-rifle divisions deployed in the Pechenga-Murmansk area. These two divisions could be readied to mount a surprise attack across the 122-mile long Soviet-Norwegian border within a week after the order for attack were given. The Soviet objective initially would be to advance as far south as Tromso. The terrain north of Tromso, however, greatly favors defense because of the lack of roads and railways, and the abundance of extremely steep mountains and deep fjords. Advance of the Soviet Ground

Map 1 Northern Norway and Adjacent Seas

Bergen and Tromso has unparalleled strategic significance because it flanks the 1,000-mile long route the Soviet submarines, surface ships, and aircraft must pass before reaching the Atlantic Sea lines.

By occupying northern Norway the Soviets would extend the defensive zone of their bases on the Kola Peninsula. Numerous ice-free and deep-water fjords dotting the Norwegian coast would offer almost ideal places where to disperse the Soviet Northern Fleet. The Soviet SSBNs could be redeployed into the fjords where they would be hard to be tracked and destroyed by the enemy ASW forces. The possession of northern Norway's coast would broaden the base of operations for the Soviet submarines and surface ships. By using bases in Norway, the lines of operations of the Soviet naval forces employed to interdict US/NATO SLOC in the Atlantic would be shortened by some 600-900 miles than if they are to operate from the bases on the Kola Peninsula. The bases in Norway would also enable the Soviet ships to be replenished and repaired closer to their area of combat operations, thereby resulting in the increase of the relative number of deployable ships. The Backfire bombers based on the Norwegian airfields would significantly increase the threat to the survivability of the US/NATO surface ships in the northern Atlantic, especially aircraft carriers and other major surface combatants. The Backfire bombers based in Norway would be capable of conducting antishipping strike missions further south of the Azores,

Soviet Thrust in the North

The Soviet attack against Norway in any conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO would almost be a certainty because of the strategically important position that country occupies in relation to the Kola Peninsula and adjacent seas, and the Soviet vulnerabilities in the area. (Map 1).

A major part of the Soviet Northern Fleet, including almost all its SSBNs, are based along the thirty seven mile-long coastline of the Kola Inlet which lies some thirty miles away from the border with Norway. Protection of the Soviet bases there is compounded because the Peninsula lies far away from the Soviet industrial heartland and it lacks well developed railroad and road links with the rest of the country.

By using airfields in northern Norway, the aircraft need only a few minutes to reach the Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula. Northern Norway dominates the exists of the Soviet Northern Fleet to the open ocean. All surface ships, passing to/from the Barents Sea (especially in the winter months) and those in the Norwegian Sea would be at grave risk to whomsoever possesses airfields in northern Norway. The Soviet bases on the Kola Peninsula are very vulnerable to the strikes conducted from the aircraft carriers deployed in the Norwegian Sea. Hence, whoever controls Norway will also control the airspace over the Norwegian Sea and a large part of the Northern Atlantic. The Norwegian coast between

By taking the initiative in commencing the hostilities the Soviets would be able to select a number of options by which to reach their wartime objectives in Northern Europe and adjacent waters. Possible scenarios include: (1) a massive surprise attack by the Warsaw Pact forces on the Central Front combined with a simultaneous full-scale Soviet attack against northern Norway, (2) a massive attack on the Central Front preceded by (a) probing attack or (b) full-scale Soviet attack against northern Norway, and (3) a massive surprise attack on the Central Front combined with the two-pronged movement -- one from the north by the Soviet forces on the Kola Peninsula aimed at the occupation of northern Norway, and subsequently the central part of Norway, and another from the south aimed at the seizure of the Danish Straits and ultimately southern Norway. The northern pincer may well include a Soviet assault against Iceland.

The principal initial tasks of the Soviet Northern Fleet, and of those forces of the Baltic Fleet which reached the open oceans preceding the outbreak of a general conflict in either of these scenarios, would be to obtain sea control in the Barents/Greenland Sea, thereby protecting its own SSBNs in their operating areas. Sea denial tasks in the Norwegian Sea and elsewhere in the northern Atlantic would be conducted primarily by the SSGNs/SSGs and land-based aviation, and those SSNs/SSs not required for carrying out pro-SSBN tasks.

maritime flank of the Ground Forces, (4) defend the coast, (5) protect Soviet SLOCs, (6) interrupt the enemy SLOCs, and (7) provide bases and logistical support for other friendly forces deployed in the area.¹⁷

Soviet Options

Any military conflict in Europe between the Warsaw Pact and NATO would almost certainly be preceded by a crisis and period of heightened international tensions. Assuming that the Soviets would take the initiative in commencing hostilities, they would most likely conduct a massive movement of the submarines and ocean-going surface combatants from both the Northern and Baltic Fleet (plus perhaps some ocean-going combatants of the Volksmarine and the Polish Navy into the Northern Atlantic). Such a move would probably be disguised as a major fleet exercise (similar to the one conducted in April 1984). Otherwise, both Soviet fleets, and particularly the Baltic Fleet, could well be bottled up in their peacetime basing/operating areas. There is no reason why the Soviets should keep ocean-going combatants and most of the submarines in the Baltic where they cannot fully be employed, and are above all very vulnerable to an enemy attack, especially from the air, instead of moving them out into the open ocean during the time of heightened tensions preceding the outbreak of a general conflict.

will be to: (1) destroy the enemy naval forces in the country's coastal waters, (2) protect the maritime flank of the Ground Forces, (3) defend the SLOCs of the Warsaw Pact states in the Baltic, and (4) harass or interrupt the enemy SLOCs. The Volksmarine's actual missions to be assigned in wartime will be of course very different from those officially propounded and fully in accordance with the Soviet offensive objectives in the area. Hence, the Volksmarine's missions in wartime will probably be to: (1) contest and eventually obtain control of the western part of the Baltic, (2) provide amphibious lift for the Ground Troops, (3) support the maritime flank of the Ground Forces, (4) protect its own SLOCs, and (5) provide bases and logistical support for the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Polish naval forces operating in the western part of the Baltic.¹⁶

The main task of the Polish Navy as recently officially explained are to: (1) defend the (country's) "sea limit and support," (2) "destroy the enemy at sea," (3) "take a part in protecting the coast," (4) "prevent invasions from (across) the sea," and (5) "carry by sea both men and material." Again, as in the case of the Volksmarine, the main missions of the Polish Navy in wartime will be to (1) support the forces of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and the Volksmarine in their operations in the western part of the Baltic, (2) provide amphibious lift for naval infantry and ground troops, (3) furnish support for the

Fleet would institute a naval blockage of Western Europe and British Isles, with the aim of cutting off transport of troops and material to the continent. The Northern Fleet's other tasks in wartime would be (1) to conduct amphibious assault landings and raids, (2) to protect maritime flanks of the Ground Forces, and (3) pro-SLOC.

The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact navies in the Baltic, because of very different features of the theater of operations and the proximity of the land front, will be very different from those assigned to the Northern Fleet. The principal tasks of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in a coalition war will probably be to (1) obtain sea control in the western part of the Baltic, thereby preventing NATO naval incursions in the area, (2) protect maritime flank of the Ground Forces, and to take a part in the seizure of the Danish Straits, (3) conduct amphibious assault landings, (4) provide control and protection of Soviet merchant shipping, and (5) interdict the enemy SLOCs.

Despite its smaller size in comparison with the Polish Navy, the Volksmarine clearly is assigned a more important role in carrying out Soviet strategic objectives in the Baltic. This is the result of a change in Soviet strategy over the 1970s toward a more assertive posture in the western part of the Baltic. The Polish Navy's role was diminished, while the role of the Volksmarine's was correspondingly increased. The East Germans publicly claim that the principal wartime missions of their Volksmarine

assigned to the Soviet Navy as a whole, because each fleet is to operate in a different environment and will be assigned the accomplishment of different strategic objectives.

The principal Soviet military objectives in Northern Europe and adjacent waters in a general conflict (should it break out) would be (not necessarily in order of importance): (1) to obtain access to airbases and harbors on the Scandinavian Peninsula, (2) to prevent NATO from using Scandinavia as a forward base for its air/naval forces, (3) to protect its own SSBNs in their sanctuaries and operating areas, (4) to prevent U.S. carrier battle groups (CBGs) from conducting strikes against targets on the Kola Peninsula, (5) to obtain unimpeded passage for their naval forces through the GIUK Gap, (6) to interdict NATO's SLOC in the Northern Atlantic, and (7) to prevent NATO's naval forces incursions into the Baltic. Consequently, the principal missions of the Soviet Northern Fleet would be (1) to obtain sea control in the Barents/Greenland Seas in order to provide full protection to its own SSBNs in their sanctuaries and operating areas. The Soviets would almost certainly contest and ultimately try to obtain sea control north of the GIUK Gap in order to prevent NATO naval incursions into the northern seas, principally by the U.S. CBGs, and the SSNs. Once these tasks were successfully completed, and the war became protracted, the Soviet Northern Fleet in combination with the forces of the Baltic

of communications (SLOC), or anti-SLOC. The Soviets apparently plan to establish a "naval blockade" (morskaya blokada) as a principal means to interrupt the transport of troops and supplies should the conflict in the main theater of war be protracted. The Soviet concept of "naval blockade" operations includes the destruction of enemy shipping at sea, port terminals and shipbuilding/ship repair facilities, and naval vessels within a blockaded zone. Hence, there is a close interrelationship between anti-SLOC and anti-surface warfare (ASUW), in the Soviet conduct of war at sea, a fact sometimes forgotten by the U.S./ NATO naval theoreticians. Other secondary missions of the Soviet Navy in wartime in order of significance would be: (1) conduct of amphibious assault landing operations, (2) support of the maritime flank of the Ground Forces, and (3) control and protection of Soviet merchant shipping (pro-SLOC).

The aforelisted Soviet Navy's mission structure in wartime should not be considered immune to changes in a real war situation, as the lessons of both world wars amply illustrate. Thus, for example, anti-SLOC may become one of the Soviet Navy's principal wartime missions or even the most important one if the troops on the land front were unable to reach the assigned objectives and the conflict became protracted and was waged with conventional weapons.

Obviously, each of four Soviet Fleets will have different priorities in carrying out wartime missions

mid-1970s shifted their emphasis away from open-ocean ASW toward creating protected "bastions" in the sanctuaries and operating areas of their SSBNs, that is, in the Barents/Greenland Seas and the Okhotsk/Kamchatka Sea. In order to destroy the Soviet SSBNs in their sanctuaries and operating area units the U.S./Western ASW forces pass through a number of choke points, where the Soviets can fully employ all their available ASW assets. In other words, the Soviets by creating protected "bastions" in their home waters have succeeded (at least in theory) in turning to their own advantage some critical deficiencies in their maritime position.

Besides strategic strikes and pro-SSBN, another principal mission of the Soviet Navy in wartime will be destruction of the enemy naval forces. The Soviets apparently still consider the destruction of the U.S. aircraft carrier task forces, especially those deployed in the proximity of their homeland's borders, as one of the principal tasks of their Navy from the very beginning of a general conflict (should it break out). The destruction of the enemy nuclear-powered submarines is also regarded as one of the important tasks within the broadly stated mission "destruction of the enemy naval forces." However, anti-SSBN operations apparently do not enjoy high priority they once have had within the Soviet Navy's mission structure.

The most important secondary mission of the Soviet Navy in wartime will be the interruption of enemy sea lines

sea" (sea control) in the sanctuaries and operating areas of its own ballistic missile-armed submarines.¹⁴ The Soviet Navy's role in "intra-war deterrence" and countervalue strikes would be carried out by its SSBN/SLBM force. The Soviets asserted that both world wars . . . "have demonstrated the erroneousness of the opinion that the submarine by virtue of its movement after leaving base can itself ensure its own invulnerability." Hence, sea control on behalf of "missile submarines (SSBNs) is not a secondary, but a main goal along with the strategic strike itself, and is to be conducted by using surface ships aviation, and operational-tactical submarines (SSNs/SSs) as the first and main task from the very beginning of the war."¹⁵ By the mid-1970s the protection of its own SSBNs in their sanctuaries and operating areas or pro-SSBN had emerged as the Soviet Navy's second most important mission. The adoption of countervalue withholding strategy for the Soviet SSBNs was made possible by the introduction into service of the SS-N-8 SLBM in 1972. The SS-N-8 and subsequently introduced SS-N-18/-20 SLBMs, because of their 4,000 mm+ range allowed the Soviet SSBNs to be deployed in the relatively secure waters of the Barents/Greenland/Norwegian Seas, and the Sea of Okhotsk/Kamchatka Sea and still to hit targets in the continental United States (CONUS). The combined effect of the adoption of a withholding strategy for the SSBN/SLBM force and lack of prospects for conducting successfully anti-SSBN tasks was that the Soviets after the

OTVD/MTVD either independently or in combination with other fleets or formations and "forces" (so-yedininie) of other branches of the armed forces. The fleets would be in wartime directly subordinate to the Stavka or respective OTVD/MTVD or land TVD commander.¹³ Thus, the forces of the Northern Fleet employed in support of the "front" operations would probably be directly subordinate to the Northwestern TBD Commander. The general-purpose force and aviation of the Northern Fleet used on the open ocean would under the control of the Atlantic OTVD Commander. All the Soviet SSBNs together with other components of strategic nuclear forces would be in wartime directly under operational control of the State Defense Council.

The Soviet Baltic Fleet, the Volksmarine, and the Polish Navy would be employed for carrying out "operational-strategic" tasks in the Baltic MTVD. Therefore, these forces would be operationally controlled by the Western TVD Commander.

Wartime Missions

The main role and mission of the Soviet Navy is to carry out "national defense tasks" (zadacha oborony strany), which in turn comprises four chief components: (1) deterrence in peacetime, (2) "role in modern war" (intrawar deterrence), (3) "undermining the potential of an opponent's war economy" (countervalue strikes), and (4) "command of the

respectively. The Soviet Northwestern TVDs (some sources say Northern TVD) would geographically encompass the territory of Northern Europe, but reportedly exclude the Jutland Peninsula. The forces currently assigned to the Leningrad MD and probably Urals MD plus mobilized units would conduct operations in the Northwestern TVD. The Soviet Western TVD is believed to comprise the territory of Western Europe, including that of Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Spain, but excluding Italy. The forces presently assigned to the Baltic, Byelorussian, and Carpathian MDs, and the Soviet forces stationed in Poland, (Northern Group of Forces), East Germany, (Group of Soviet Forces in Germany), Czechoslovakia (Central Group of Forces) supported by the Polish, East Germans and Czechoslovakian Ground Forces/Air Forces would be employed in the Western TVD.

Six "maritime TVDs" include the Northern Sea MTVD, and the Baltic MTVD. The first would comprise the seas adjacent to the Soviet Arctic coast, plus probably the Greenland/Norwegian Seas. The Baltic Sea including the Danish Straits would comprise the Baltic MTVD. The Atlantic Ocean is envisaged as one of the three OTVDs to be established in wartime.

Besides "fronts" (army groups), the Soviets consider the fleet (flot), as the "operational-strategic" or "higher operational" formation (ob'yedinienie) capable of conducting strategic or "operational missions" in the respective

Troops would be supported by tactical air strikes, primarily directed against the Norwegian airfields, troop concentrations and ports. Initially the Soviets would most likely keep their naval infantry brigade in reserve until the enemy coastal defenses were sufficiently softened. The Soviets would perhaps carry out an amphibious assault landing operation against Tromso in combination with an attack by the ground troops overland.

The Soviets may decide to occupy northern Norway as far south as Bodo either by continuing their advance after reaching Tromso or carrying out a massive attack over a broad front into Finmark. In either scenario the Soviet Ground Forces on the Kola Peninsula would be organized as a "front" (army group) and reinforced by a least six-to-eight motorized rifle divisions. The Soviets are reportedly capable of transporting about one motorized rifle division per day from Leningrad to the Kola Peninsula by the existing road/railroad network. In addition, one airborne assault division deployed at Pskov is maintained at full readiness in peacetime and could be employed for combat within hours. The Soviets would probably require about two weeks to prepare a large-scale attack against northern Norway. The terrain in Finmark is largely flat and almost roadless. The population density is only about five persons per square kilometer. Fall is considered as the most favorable time of the year for conducting an offensive in Finmark because the ground is the driest and daylight is still long. The period

from late January through April favors the defender because of deep snow cover. In the summer the melting snow slows down greatly the movement of tank and other tracked vehicles that are confined largely to roads. However, there is only one major road in Finmark, which runs from Bodo and stops short of the Soviet border. The road cuts through many valleys and over mountains and a fjord which must be crossed by a ferry. The only railroad passing through Finmark runs parallel with the coast from Oslo to Bodo. These communications links could be easily destroyed by enemy strikes from the air or by commando teams. Hence, the strategic importance for both attacker and defender to have possession of a few good airfields in Finmark.

The Soviet full-scale attack against northern Norway would probably be conducted over a broad front across the common border with Norway, but with the main axis of advance through the Finnish territory in case of a full-scale attack against northern Norway would be virtually unavoidable regardless of whether the Finns choose to fight (as probably they would) or succumb to the Soviet pressure, because the Finnish wedge offers the shortest line of advance to the Norwegian coast south of Tromso. The Soviet overland advance into Finmark would be supported by tactical air strikes aimed primarily at preventing NATO reinforcement in troops and material from reaching northern Norway's ports and airfields. The Soviets would probably use the elements of one air assault division for seizing the principal

airfields in the area, such as Tromso, Bardefuss, Andoya, and Bodo. They are expected to use their helicopters in large numbers both for transport and fire support of the ground troops. The Soviets would most likely use their naval infantry brigade for carrying out an amphibious assault landing in the proximity of northern Norway's ports. In addition, the commercial Ro/Ro ships could be used for amphibious assault landings by the ground troops. The Spetsnaz teams are also expected to be used in a variety of missions, but primarily for the destruction of the coastal radar surveillance sites, artillery emplacements and minor naval bases.

Besides protecting Soviet SSBNs in the Greenland/Barents Seas, the principal task of the Northern Fleet while the battle for northern Norway is underway would be to conduct sea denial missions primarily aimed at preventing the arrival of the Allied reinforcements by sea. Sea denial tasks would be primarily conducted by attack submarines and land-based bombers. Soviet surface combatants would be employed in conducting ASUW tasks, but relatively close to the coast and only when protected by Soviet fighter aviation. The Northern Fleet would be called to protect the flank of the Ground Forces by conducting surveillance tasks and bombardment of enemy troop concentrations and installations in the proximity of the coast. The Northern Fleet also would have the responsibility to provide lift and fire support to the

forces carrying out an amphibious assault landing operations. Another mission of the Northern Fleet would be protection of its own SLOC, especially those between the ports on the Kola Peninsula and the occupied part of northern Norway, because the bulk of supplies for the Soviet troops that must come there by the sea.

The eventual seizure of northern Norway would provide the Soviets with a very favorable position from which to conduct the interdiction of the Allied SLOCs in the northern Atlantic. Yet, the Soviet control of northern Norway and even all of Norway would not ensure free access to the Atlantic by their submarines and aircraft, as the Germans learned only too well in World War II. The Soviets must seize Iceland, and perhaps even part of Greenland, in order to obtain control of the northern Atlantic.

Greenland, the Faroes and Orkneys are considered the locks, while whoever controls Iceland holds the key to the northern Atlantic. The distance between Iceland and Norway is about 550 miles, while only some 150 miles of water separates Iceland from the east coast of Greenland. Iceland flanks the end of the 1,530 nm-long route which the Soviet submarines and aircraft must pass through to reach the open waters of the Atlantic.

After leaving Murmansk and the Barents Sea, Soviet submarines normally sail over a depression approximately 100 nm wide and 270 nm long which extends from the pole to the Nansen basin where the depth ranges from 3,000 to 4,000 m

and then sail eastward of Iceland into the open ocean. The deep waters of the Greenland Sea are the patrolling areas of the Soviet SSBNs because they allow loitering space and more room for maneuver than the shallow waters of the Barents Sea or the ice-covered waters of the Arctic Ocean. Hence, by using Iceland as a base, the Soviets would be able to facilitate the transit of their submarines to and from the open waters of the Atlantic, and also enhance the protection of the SSBNs in their patrolling areas in the Greenland/Barents Sea. By using Iceland as a base for their bombers and fighter-bombers, the Soviets would be in a more favorable position to conduct strikes against U.S. aircraft carriers and other major surface combatants than if only bases in northern Norway are used. Iceland also lies at approximately the midway point between the Kola Peninsula and the U.S./NATO Atlantic SLOC. For example, the distance between Murmansk and Keflavik is about 1,520 nm, while another 1,850 nm separates Keflavik from Halifax, Nova Scotia. From their bases near Murmansk the Backfire-Bs have an unrefueled range in high-altitude subsonic flight profile of about 2,650 nm, thereby they could reach targets as far south as the Azores. The Backfire-Bs based on Iceland would be capable of conducting strikes against U.S./NATO surface combatants and merchant ships much further south of the Azores. The Allied convoys would then have to use southern routes which would add at least five days to their voyage from U.S./Canada to West European ports. (Map 2) The


Tu-16s and Tu-22s based on Iceland with their unrefueled range of about 1,400-1,500 nm would further compound the allied problems in defending the critically important SLOC in the northern/central Atlantic.

By using Iceland as a base for the fighter-interceptors, the Soviets would also considerably extend air cover for their fleet, thereby allowing major surface combatants to be employed in the northern Atlantic.

The Soviet move to seize Iceland would most likely take place simultaneously with their full-scale invasion of northern Norway. The Soviets would probably carry out a surprise attack by at least one airborne assault division and the Spetsnaz units against the island. The air strikes against military installations on Iceland would be conducted only after airborne assault elements have been deployed. The Soviet attempt to seize Iceland would most likely be accompanied by actions to secure control of the Svalbards (Spitsbergen). The last lie some 400 miles north of Norway and 850 miles northeast of Iceland. The Svalbards occupy a significant strategic position because they flank the exit route of Soviet ships and submarines to and from the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean.

The strategic significance of Greenland (especially its northern part) increased in the recent years because the adjacent Greenland Sea became the patrolling area of the Soviet Delta-class SSBNs. The Soviet attack submarines reportedly use a new route which runs from the Kola

Map 2 Combat Range of the Tu-26 Backfire-B Bombers



Peninsula northwards under the Arctic ice to and through the narrow Kennedy Channel between Greenland and the Island Ellesmere (Baffin Bay), then through the Davis Strait into the North Atlantic. The Kennedy Channel is also a convenient passage for submarines seeking the Soviet SSBNs in the Greenland Sea. The surveillance of submarine transit on that route is very difficult because of the bad weather conditions prevailing there. Nevertheless, the Soviets might be tempted to occupy the northern part of Greenland after their seizure of Iceland in order to prevent U.S./NATO submarines from entering the Greenland Sea through the Kennedy Channel. The Soviets would almost certainly occupy part of the eastern coast of Greenland to strengthen their control of the Denmark Strait.


Southern Pincer

The Soviets consider the Baltic, the Danish Straits and the North Sea as a strategic whole. The Baltic extends along the main axis for about 920 nm, and it has an average width of about 150 nm. Sea distances between various points in the Baltic are relatively short. For example only 90 nm separates Sweden's island of Gotland and the Soviet naval base Liepaya. The distance between East Germany's island of Ruegen and Bornholm is only about 46 nm. The latter occupies an excellent position for monitoring all naval and air movements in the western part of the Baltic. The most important strategic position, however, is the Danish Straits, which control the exits to and from the Baltic. Of

course, there are two artificial outlets in the Baltic, the White Sea Canal in the north and the Kiel Canal in the south, but both are limited in capacity. The White Sea Canal can accommodate ships up to the size of 5,000 tons; transit through it is barred because of ice for six to seven months in a year. Both canals are, moreover, highly vulnerable to enemy action in wartime. Thus, whoever controls the Danish Straits holds the keys to the Baltic. The Warsaw Pact's huge naval potential in the Baltic would be entrapped unless the Danish Straits are seized early on in the conflict. Soviet control of the Danish Straits would allow the Baltic Fleet to conduct operations in the North Sea, thereby eliminating any role of the NATO naval forces in the battle on the Central Front. The control of the Baltic approaches would enable Soviet ocean-going combatants and aviation to be employed in combination with the Northern Fleet against NATO's forces in the Norwegian Sea. By controlling the Danish Straits and adjacent islands the Soviets would considerably increase the depth of their air defenses in the Baltic area, especially against the U.S./NATO SLCMs. (Map 3)

The Warsaw Pact navies in the Baltic are expected to play a major role in protecting the Northern Flank of the Warsaw Pact forces on the Central Front. The Soviets would probably conduct an extensive mining of the approaches to the Danish Straits by using submarines and small surface combatants at the beginning of the war in order to prevent

NATO's naval incursions into the Baltic. The control of the western Baltic would probably be decided by using missile-armed surface combatants, especially FAC, submarines and mines, and supported by the tactical air against NATO's surface combatants and naval installations. The Soviet Baltic Fleet, supported by the Polish Navy and the Volksmarine is expected to provide protection of the flank of the Ground Forces in their advance along the coast of the Schleswig-Holstein and the Jutland Peninsula. Perhaps as many as six-to-eight tank and motorized-rifle divisions would be used in the overland drive. The terrain there favors the attacker because large expanses of flat agricultural land and an excellent system of road and rail communications allow rapid movement overland. The Warsaw Pact advance overland would be supported by one or more amphibious assault landings along the Schleswig-Holstein coast, notably in the proximity of Kiel and some locations along the eastern coast of the Jutland Peninsula. The Warsaw Pact amphibious ships and commercial Ro/Ro ships deployed in the Baltic are reportedly adequate to provide lift for at least three divisions in the first wave. The seizure of the island of Zealand would probably be accomplished by a combined assault from the sea and air, in which at least one or two Soviet airborne divisions would be used. The island of Bornholm also must be seized by Warsaw Pact forces, (probably by employing both amphibious and airborne assault and elements), in order to strengthen the

Map 3 The Baltic Approaches

control of the western Baltic. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies in the Baltic are expected to conduct an extensive mining of their own coastal waters. The Finns would probably acquiesce in Soviet demands for mining of their waters, thereby ensuring closure of the Gulf of Finland. Sweden's neutrality would not worry the Soviets as long as that country's airspace and coasts were not used by the NATO forces. The Soviets really would not have any need to violate Sweden's territory in mounting their offensive against northern Norway. However, any sign of weakness on the part of Sweden in defending its neutrality would most likely prompt the Soviets to use Sweden's ports and airspace in their conflict with NATO. Sweden's navy and air force are not likely to deter the Soviets from using their available naval assets on the open ocean once they obtain control of the Danish Straits.

The Soviet seizure of the Danish Straits, however, would not in itself guarantee unhindered access to their ships on the open ocean, unless southern Norway's airfields are neutralized. Southern Norway, with its excellent airfields and naval installations, represents the very heart of NATO's Northern Flank. The Soviet occupation of northern Norway would place the southern part of the country in jeopardy. Thus, the Soviets may decide to continue their drive southward until all of Norway would fall under their control. Under these conditions the Soviets would be within striking distance to dominate the western entrance to the

Baltic even in the case where they failed to seize the Jutland Peninsula. In another scenario, the Soviets may bring about the fall of southern Norway by mounting an amphibious assault landing operation after they obtain control of the Danish Straits. However, such a Soviet move would have chance to succeed only if the Soviets already succeeded in seizing northern Norway. Then the Soviets would be able to mount an overland drive southwards toward Oslo as an ultimate objective combined with an amphibious landing along Norway's southern shore. In such a scenario, the Soviets must neutralize airfields in southern Norway to prevent the arrival of the allied reinforcement, and also interdict SLOC to the Norwegian ports.

Implications for the
NATO Alliance Strategy

The enormous military potential of the USSR and its two Warsaw Pact allies deployed on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic area pose serious questions about the viability of NATO's Northern Flank. Obviously, the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact would not be decided on the NATO's Northern Flank but it could definitely be lost there. The fall of Norway, or even only northern Norway, would have serious repercussions on the situation in the North Atlantic, the North Sea and the English Channel. The successful interdiction by the Soviets of the U.S./NATO supply routes across the northern Atlantic would mean the end of the conflict in Europe quickly even if principal

action would take place on the Central Front. The capacity to move reinforcements in troops and material is vital in order to prevent rapid seizure of northern Norway by the Soviets, and thereby contain the potential threat of a short war. Hence, NATO must be able to maintain control of Greenland, Iceland, and the Faroes, which besides Norway comprise principal elements in defense of the North Atlantic. The Alliance must obtain and sustain sea control of the Norwegian Sea. The U.S. CBGs, however, should not be deployed in the northern part of that sea until the Soviet bomber strength on the Kola Peninsula was sufficiently weakened. The Soviet bombers would be very vulnerable on their way from the bases on the Peninsula and southward through the GIUK Gap, to concentrated attacks carried out by the NATO fighter interceptors. The U.S. CBGs, if deployed within the effective range of their aviation to the bases on the Kola Peninsula, would be under constant threat of attack by the Soviet land-based bombers and submarines, and probably even Soviet missile-armed major surface combatants. The high effectiveness of land-based aviation against ships at sea was amply proven in World War II, as the example of the German Luftwaffe in the battle for Crete and Malta had shown. Whoever controls the air over northern Norway and adjacent seas would ultimately win the battle for Norway. Therefore, NATO must find ways and means to obtain and maintain air superiority there.

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| Category/Type | Total SNA | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|------------------------|--------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| ASW AVIATION | | | |
| <u>Patrol Aircraft</u> | | | |
| Tu-95 Bear-F/G | 50 | 16 | - |
| Il-38 May | 50 | 30 | 15 |
| Be-12 Mail | 90 | 20 | 20 |
| <u>ASW Helicopters</u> | | | |
| Mi-14 Haze-A | 90 | 20 | 20 |
| Ka-25 Hormone * | 120 | 60 | 20 |
| Ka-27 Helix-A | 25 | 20 | 5 |
| Total: | 425 | 166 | 80 |
| TRANSPORT/UTILITY | | | |
| An-12 Cub-A | 280 | 95 | 40 |
| An-26 Curl | | | |
| Il-18 Coot | | | |
| Il-76 Classic | | | |
| Mi-6 Hook | | | |
| Mi-8 Hip | 280 | 95 | 40 |
| Mi-14 Haze-B ** | | | |
| Miscellaneous | | | |
| Total: | 280 | 95 | 40 |
| Grand Total: | 1,555 | 469 | 300 |

Notes:

* Includes also a number of Ka-25 Hormone-Bs for over-the-horizon targeting

** Employed for mine-counter measures

Figure 2

SOVIET NORTHERN FLEET
BALTIC FLEET: NAVAL AVIATION (mid-1984)

| Category/Type | Total SNA | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|-----------------------------------|---------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| STRIKE AVIATION | | | |
| <u>Bombers</u> | | | |
| Tu-26 Backfire-B | 105 | 48 | 24 |
| Tu-16 Badger-C/C mod. G/G mod. | 190 } 65 } | 50+ | 42 |
| Tu-22 Blinder-B | 35 | - | 24 |
| <u>Strike Fighters</u> | | | |
| Su-17 Fitter-C | 70 | - | 50 |
| <u>V/G Fighters</u> | | | |
| Yak-36MP Forger-A | 60 | 18 | - |
| ----- | | | |
| Total: | 525 | 116 | 140 |
| ----- | | | |
| TACTICAL SUPPORT | | | |
| <u>LR MR Aircraft</u> | | | |
| Tu-95 Bear-D | 45 | 22 | } 40 |
| Tu-16 Badger-D/E/F/K | 135 | 18 | |
| Tu-16 Badger H/J | | 12 | |
| <u>Recce/ECM Support</u> | | | |
| Tu-22 Blinder-C | | } 10 | } 40 |
| An-1 Cub-B | 70 | | |
| Il-18 Coot-A | | | |
| <u>Tankers</u> | | | |
| Tu-16 Badger-A | 75 | 30 | |
| ----- | | | |
| Total: | 325 | 92 | 40 |

| Type | Class | Total Soviet Navy | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|--------|-----------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| TOTAL: | Warships: | 938 | 338 | 191 |
| | Craft: | 712 | 85 | 208 |

SUPPORT FORCE

| | | | |
|--|-----|-----|-----|
| Underway Replenish- ment Ships (URS) [AO, AOR, AF, AW] | 85 | 25 | 10 |
| Material Support Ships [AEH, AGP, AR, AS] | 70 | 30 | 10 |
| Fleet Support Ships [ATA, ASR, ARS] | 145 | 45 | 25 |
| Other | 480 | 105 | 115 |
| Sub-Total: | 780 | 205 | 160 |

Notes

1. U.S./NATO designation; 2. Under construction; 3. Withdrawn from service. Reportedly being converted into SLCM-armed SSNs; 4. Serves as a testing platform for the SS-N-8 SLBMs, outside of the SALT II limits; 5. Outside the SALT II limits; 6. Serve as Theater Nuclear Force; 7. Serve for testing of the SS-N-8 SLBMs; 8. Serve as a testing platform for the SS-N-20 SLBMs; 9. Kept in reserve; Not included are 1 Uniform-class AGSSN, 1 Lima-class research submarine, 2 India-class rescue submarine and 3 mod. Golf-I-class communications submarines; 11. Serve in the KGB Maritime Border units.

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| Type | Class | Total Soviet Navy | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|------|-------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
|------|-------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|

Amphibious Craft

| | | | | | |
|------------|----------------|------|-----|----|----|
| LCU | <u>Vydra</u> | 15 | 70+ | 15 | 30 |
| | <u>SMB-1</u> | 15 | | | |
| LCM | <u>Ondatra</u> | 40 | | | |
| | <u>T-4</u> | some | | | |
| LACV | <u>Aist</u> | 16 | 72 | 4 | 22 |
| | <u>Lebed</u> | 17 | | | |
| | <u>Gus</u> | 36 | | | |
| | <u>Utenok</u> | 2 | | | |
| | <u>Tsaplya</u> | 1 | | | |
| Sub-Total: | | 142 | 19 | 52 | |

Mine Warfare Ships

| | | | | | |
|------------|-------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| Mine-layer | <u>Alesha</u> | 3 | 130 | 30 | 35 |
| MSO | <u>Natya-I</u> | 34 | | | |
| | <u>Natya-II</u> | 1 | | | |
| | <u>Yurka</u> | 45 | | | |
| | <u>T-43</u> | 50 | | | |
| MSS | <u>Andryusha</u> | 2 | 132 | 35 | 100 |
| MSC/MHC | <u>Sonya</u> | 45 | | | |
| MSC | <u>Zhenya</u> | 3 | | | |
| MSC/MHC | <u>Vanya</u> | 69 | | | |
| | <u>mod. Vanya</u> | 3 | | | |
| MSC | <u>Sasha</u> | 10 | 55 | 35 | 100 |
| | | 265 | | | |
| MSI | <u>Yevgenya</u> | 45 | | | |
| | <u>Iluysha</u> | 10 | | | |
| | <u>Olya</u> | | | | |
| MSB | <u>TR-40</u> | 10 | 50 | 35 | 100 |
| | <u>K-8</u> | 40 | | | |
| | | 105 | | | |
| Sub-Total: | | 370 | 65 | 135 | |

| Type | Class | Total Soviet Navy | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|------------|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| | | <u>Patrol Combatants</u> | | |
| | <u>Nanuchka-I/-III</u> | 17 | 28 | 23 |
| | <u>Nanuchka-III</u> | 7 | | |
| | <u>Tarantul-I</u> | 4+3 ⁽²⁾ | | |
| | <u>Tarantul-III</u> | 1 | | |
| | <u>Poti</u> | 60 | 90 | 28 |
| | <u>T-58</u> | 18 | | |
| | <u>Pauk</u> | 12 | | |
| ----- | | | | |
| Sub-Total: | | 119+3 | 30 | 51 |

| <u>Fast Attack Craft (FAC)</u> | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|-----|---|-----|-----|-----|
| <u>Osa-I</u> | 65 | } | 122 | 23 | 39 |
| <u>Osa-II</u> | 40 | | | | |
| <u>Matka</u> | 16 | | | | |
| <u>Sarancha</u> | 1 | | | | |
| <u>Shershen</u> | 20 | } | 78 | 8 | 17 |
| <u>Turya</u> | 31 | | | | |
| <u>Babochka</u> | 1 | | | | |
| <u>SO-1</u> | 25 | | | | |
| <u>Slepen</u> | 1 | | | | |
| <u>Stenka</u> ⁽¹¹⁾ | 95 | } | 133 | N/A | N/A |
| <u>Pchela</u> ⁽¹¹⁾ | 8 | | | | |
| <u>Zhuk</u> ⁽¹¹⁾ | 30 | | | | |
| <hr/> | | | | | |
| Sub-Total: | 333 | | | 31+ | 56 |

| | | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|----|----|----|
| <u>Amphibious Warfare Ships</u> | | | | |
| LPD | <u>Ivan Rogov</u> | 2 | - | 1 |
| | <u>Ropucha</u> | 16 | 4 | 4 |
| LST | <u>Alligator</u> | 14 | 2 | 2 |
| LSM | <u>Polnocny</u> | 55 | 5 | 20 |
| | <u>MP-4</u> | 4 | - | - |
| | | 91 | 11 | 27 |

| Type | Class | Total Soviet Navy | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| CL | <u>Sverdlov</u> | 9 | 2 | 2 |
| CG | <u>Sverdlov-SAM</u> | 1 | - | - |
| CC | <u>Sverdlov mod.</u> | 2 | - | - |
| | | 40 | 11 | 5 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| DDG | <u>Kildin</u> | 1 | - | - |
| | <u>Kildin mod.</u> | 3 | - | 1 |
| | <u>Kashin</u> | 12 | 1 | 1 |
| | <u>Kashin mod.</u> | 6 | 3 | 1 |
| | <u>Kotlin-SAM</u> | 8 | 3 | 1 |
| | <u>Karin</u> | 8 | 5 | - |
| | <u>Sovremennyy</u> | 4+3 ⁽²⁾ | 3 | 1 |
| | <u>Udaloy</u> | 4+3 ⁽²⁾ | 3 | 1 |
| DD | <u>mod. Kotlin</u> | 12 | | |
| | <u>Kotlin</u> | 3+(3) ⁽⁹⁾ | 4 | 4 |
| | <u>Skoryy</u> | 9+(10) ⁽⁹⁾ | | |
| | | 24 | 4 | 4 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| FFG | <u>Krivak-I</u> | 21 | 5 | 5 |
| | <u>Krivak-II</u> | 11 | 4 | 1 |
| | <u>Krivak-III</u> | 1+? | - | |
| | | 33+? | 9 | 6 |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| FF | <u>Riga</u> | 37+(10) ⁽⁴⁾ | | |
| | <u>Koni</u> | 1 | | |
| | | 38+(10) | | |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| FFL | <u>Grisha-I</u> | 15 | | |
| | <u>Grisha-II</u> | 8 ⁽¹¹⁾ | | |
| | <u>Grisha-III</u> | 32 | | |
| | <u>Mirka-I</u> | 9 | 45 | 45 |
| | <u>Mirka-II</u> | 9 | | |
| | <u>Petya-I</u> | 7 | | |
| | <u>Petya-I mod</u> | 11 | | |
| | <u>Petya-II</u> | 22 | | |
| | <u>Petya-II mod</u> | 1 | | |
| | | 125 | | |
| <hr/> | | | | |
| Sub-Total: | | 311 | 88 | 46 |
| <hr/> | | | | |

| Type | Class | Total Soviet Navy | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| SSN | <u>Alfa</u> | 6 | 5 | - |
| | <u>Echo-I</u> | 5 | - | - |
| | <u>Mike</u> | 1+? | 1 | - |
| | <u>November</u> | 12 | 8 | - |
| | <u>Sierra</u> | 1+? | 1 | 1 |
| | <u>Victor-I</u> | 16 | 14 | - |
| | <u>Victor-II</u> | 7 | 5 | - |
| | <u>Victor-III</u> | 18 | 10 | - |
| | | <u>66</u> | <u>44</u> | <u>-</u> |
| SS | <u>Bravo</u> | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| | <u>Foxtrot</u> | 62 | 32 | 9 |
| | <u>Kilo</u> | 5+1 ⁽¹⁾ | - | - |
| | <u>Romeo</u> | 10 | - | - |
| | <u>Tango</u> | 18+ | 10 | 2 |
| | <u>Whiskey</u> | 50+ (75) ⁽⁹⁾ | 10 | 10 |
| | <u>Whiskey-Canvas Bag</u> | 2 | 2 | - |
| | <u>Zulu-IV</u> | 4+ (4) ⁽⁹⁾ | 4 | - |
| | | <u>155</u> | <u>54</u> | <u>22</u> |
| Sub-Total: | | 287 | 139 | 26 |

Air-Capable Ships

| | | | | |
|------|----------------|--------------------|----------|----------|
| CVN | <u>Kremlin</u> | +1 ⁽²⁾ | - | - |
| CVHG | <u>Kiev</u> | 3+1 ⁽²⁾ | 1 | - |
| CHG | <u>Moskva</u> | 2 | - | - |
| | | <u>5</u> | <u>1</u> | <u>-</u> |

Major Surface Combatants

| | | | | |
|-----|------------------|--------------------|---|---|
| CGN | <u>Kirov</u> | 2+1 ⁽²⁾ | 1 | 1 |
| | <u>Slava</u> | 1+2 ⁽²⁾ | - | - |
| | <u>Kara</u> | 7 | - | - |
| CG | <u>Kresta-I</u> | 4 | 1 | 1 |
| | <u>Kresta-II</u> | 10 | 7 | - |
| | <u>Kynda</u> | 4 | - | 1 |

Figure 1

SOVIET NORTHERN FLEET & BALTIC FLEET:
FORCE COMPOSITION (mid-1984)

| Type (a) | Class | Total Soviet Navy | Northern Fleet | Baltic Fleet |
|------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| | PERSONNEL | 461,000 | 119,000 | 107,000 |
| | <u>Strategic Forces</u> | | | |
| SSBN | <u>Typhoon</u> | 2+4 (2) | 2 | - |
| | <u>Delta-I</u> | 18 | 10 | - |
| | <u>Delta-II</u> | 4 | 4 | - |
| | <u>Delta-III</u> | 14+2-3 (2) | 7 | - |
| | <u>Yankee-I/mod.</u> | 23+(11) (3) | 14 | - |
| | <u>Yankee-II</u> | 1 | 1 | - |
| | <u>Hotel-II</u> | 2 | 2 | - |
| | <u>Hotel-III</u> (4) | 1 | | |
| | | 65 | 38 | - |
| ----- | | | | |
| SSB (5) | <u>Golf-II</u> (6) | 13 | - | 6 |
| | <u>Golf-III</u> (7) | 1 | 1 | - |
| | <u>Golf-I</u> (8) | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | 15 | 2 | 6 |
| ----- | | | | |
| Sub-Total: | | 80 | 40 | 6 |
| ----- | | | | |
| | <u>General-Purpose Forces</u> | | | |
| | <u>Attack Submarines</u> | | | |
| SSGN | <u>Charlie-I</u> | 11 | 8 | - |
| | <u>Charlie-II</u> | 6 | 4 | - |
| | <u>Echo-II</u> | 28 | 14 | - |
| | <u>Oscar</u> | 2+1 (2) | 2 | - |
| | <u>Papa</u> | 1 | 1 | - |
| | | 48 | 29 | - |
| ----- | | | | |
| SSG | <u>Juliett</u> | 16 | 7 | 4 |
| | <u>Whiskey-Long Bin</u> | 2 | - | - |
| | | 18 | 7 | 4 |
| ----- | | | | |

and tactical aircraft to reinforce forces defending northern Norway and the Jutland Peninsula with its adjacent islands. The Soviet offensive move against Iceland could only be deterred by permanent or semi-permanent deployment of NATO ground troops and the establishment of strong anti-air defenses on the island.

The Warsaw Pact superiority in the Baltic could be offset by helping in any way it is possible the continuing neutrality, and especially the defensive, capability of Sweden. Finally, NATO should move frequently its ships and aircraft into the Baltic and hold exercises there (despite attendant political risks), thereby weakening the Soviet claim to consider the Baltic as mare clausum.

elsewhere in the northern Atlantic. Such a forward posture would signify both to the Soviets and NATO allies the strength of the U.S. commitment in defense of Norway and the Baltic approaches. The critics argue that such a move would further exacerbate tensions in an area where careful political management has attempted to maintain tensions at the lowest possible level. Moreover, the U.S. forward posture designed to put the Soviet military complex on the Kola Peninsula under semi-permanent threat from the U.S.-carrier-based aviation and SLCM-armed submarines and surface ships could prompt the Soviets to extend their zone of defense as far as the southern part of the Norwegian Sea. Thus, the critics say, the Norwegian Sea may become another area of superpower confrontation, as the Mediterranean is with all the attendant risks such a deployment of rival naval forces would entail in times of heightened international tensions. Without a U.S. forward posture in the area, however, the Soviets would continue to have almost a free hand in their policy of political intimidation and pressure against the Scandinavian countries, and Norway in particular. The preponderant Soviet naval strength in the northern seas could only be offset, though not completely, by forward deployment of U.S. naval forces in the area. An eventual Soviet move against Norway on the land front could be prevented by the deployment of a larger standing force in northern Norway. But above all, NATO must assign a larger number of troops

The foremost problem for NATO is how to deter the Soviets from exercising their envelopment option in case of a major conflict in Europe. The Soviets would be tempted to make an offensive move against Norway or Iceland, or the Baltic approaches, only if the level of regional deterrence in peacetime is low, as it is now. Too great a preoccupation with defense of the Central Front by NATO might lead the Soviets to believe that they could avoid the attendant military and political risks by making an offensive move against Norway, or even Denmark. Conversely, any further weakening of NATO's Northern Flank would seriously undermine the credibility of NATO's defensive posture on the Central Front.

Obviously the Atlantic Alliance cannot match the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies on a one-to-one basis in terms of raw military power deployed on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic. However, the Alliance could offset to some extent the Soviet military superiority in the area by the series of military, political and economic moves intended to increase the level of regional deterrence.

The security of NATO's Northern Flank is essentially a naval problem. The political, military and economic considerations all have maritime connotations and are intimately interwoven with the geostrategic features of the area. The evergrowing Soviet threat to the security of NATO's Northern Flank could all but be countered by permanent deployment of the U.S. SLCM-armed submarines

The control of the western part of the Baltic and above all of the Danish Straits is intimately tied to the control of the Northern Flank of the Central Front. Such control would act as a hinge upon which would swing the ultimate fate of Norway. The crucial role in the defense of the Jutland Peninsula and adjacent islands would be played by NATO reinforcements. However, Denmark must be prepared to wage a defense-holding operation on the land-front against superior Warsaw Pact forces until the U.S./NATO reinforcements reach the scene. Otherwise, control of the Baltic approaches by NATO might be lost at the outset of the conflict. The Danes also must have an adequate stock of mines to carry out closure of the Danish Straits during a period of heightened tensions preceding the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe. Once the hostilities start, NATO should be prepared to conduct an extensive mining campaign elsewhere in the Baltic in order to bottle up the Warsaw Pact naval forces in their bases and inflict losses upon their ships at sea. The battle for control of the western Baltic would be decided by the outcome of the battle in the air. Hence, NATO must possess adequate forces to obtain air superiority over the Baltic approaches. NATO should use primarily fast attack craft supported by tactical aviation, as well as small submarines and mines to maintain its control of the western part of the Baltic. No NATO major surface combatant, including destroyers/frigates, should be employed there in wartime, even when having strong protection from the air.

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